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The Relationship Between Performance on a Prototype








Based on the premise that psi information is initially processed at an
unconscious level, parapsychologists have repeatedly drawn parallels
between subliminal perception and extrasensory perception. For instance,
defensiveness - resistance to, or distortion of, unpleasant or threatening
information - has been considered to affect both subliminal and extrasensory
perception. This thesis reviews studies suggesting a relationship between
'defensiveness' and psi performance, and reports the outcome of a meta¬
analysis of a subset of these studies that used the Defence Mechanism Test as
a measure of defensiveness. The review and meta-analysis suggest that there
is a need for independent replication of the defensiveness-psi findings, and
for an extension of this line of research. Difficulties with the various methods
used for measuring defensiveness are identified, and the development of an
alternative, prototype measure of 'perceptual defence/vigilance', using a
'subliminal perception' paradigm, is described. Seven experiments are
conducted to explore the relationship between defensiveness and psi using
this prototype indicator. The first three are preliminary studies aimed at
developing the prototype indicator of perceptual defence/vigilance, and in
two of these studies comparisons are made between perceptual
defence/vigilance and psi performance. Experiment 4 describes a systematic
comparison of perceptual defence/vigilance and ESP performance, while
experiment 5 compares defensiveness with ESP scoring before and after
training with various mental techniques reputed to enhance psi performance.
Experiment 6 explores variations in methodology and scoring systems
associated with the prototype measure of perceptual defence/vigilance.
Experiment 7 compares perceptual defence/vigilance and ESP performance,
including a theory-based examination of 'implicit' and 'explicit' measures of
defensiveness and ESP. The main findings of these experiments are that
perceptual defensiveness/vigilance consistently correlates in the predicted
direction with PK, with forced-choice ESP, and with 'unconscious' ESP, but
that there appears to be no systematic relationship between defensiveness
and free-response ESP before and after training. Importantly, there is also a
consistent correlation between defensiveness and a questionnaire measure of
neuroticism, that provides converging evidence of the validity of the
prototype indicator of perceptual defence/vigilance. The final chapter
summarises and synthesises the findings of the experiments conducted, and
makes suggestions for future research. It is concluded that while there is a
need for further, more systematic development of the perceptual
defence/vigilance apparatus, these experiments have shown the potential of
this prototype indicator to be a useful tool, both for parapsychologists
wishing to explore the psi process, including its relationship to defensiveness,
and for psychologists interested in enhancing human performance.
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Chapter 1. Introduction, definitions
and outline of thesis.
It is here, in the common unconscious functions of both
sensorimotor and extrasensorimotor (or psi) character that
parapsychology comes closest to psychology (Rhine, 1977, pl71)
With these words, J.B. Rhine, the founder of experimental parapsychology,
expressed a sentiment echoed in the thoughts and researches of many
parapsychologists: the remit of parapsychology and psychology can overlap
considerably. Indeed, the word parapsychology itself suggests that the
discipline of psychology has much to offer the relatively young field of
scientific research into ostensibly paranormal phenomena. Perhaps, in turn,
some of the pioneering research techniques and findings of parapsychology
may contribute to the development of psychology.
The considerable commonalties between the research approaches and
findings of psychology and parapsychology have been illustrated by Irwin
(1979), Child (1985); and Schmeidler (1988) has comprehensively reviewed
the similarities and dissimilarities between the two disciplines. For instance,
the social dynamics of the experimental setting (such as subjects' and
experimenters' attitudes and expectations) have been shown similarly to
influence the outcome of both psychological and parapsychological studies
(e.g. Rosenthal, 1966; Harris & Rosenthal, 1985; Crandall, 1985; Taddonio,
1976; White, 1977). The 'ganzfeld', a technique for inducing an altered state of
consciousness that was first introduced into parapsychology in 1974 by
Charles Honorton (Honorton & Harper, 1984), has its origins in studies of the
psychology of perception (e.g., Avant, 1965); today, parapsychological studies
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using the ganzfeld technique are regarded as providing some of the best
evidence for a replicable psi effect (e.g. Utts, 1991).
One area of overlap between psychology and parapsychology which has
excited a great deal of interest in the last 30 or so years is that concerning the
perception of, and reaction to, information (such as a weak visual stimulus) of
which an individual is not consciously aware. In the past, such unconscious
perceptual processes have been termed 'subception' (Goldiamond, 1958), or
perhaps most commonly 'subliminal perception' (Dixon, 1971); more recently,
as computer and information processing metaphors influenced psychologists'
thinking, and signal detection techniques revealed that there was no such
thing as a fixed or absolute sensory threshold or limen (e.g., Swets, 1964),
terms such as 'preconscious processing' (Dixon, 1981) and 'unconscious
cognition' (Greenwald, 1992) have become popular. It was found that
individuals varied in their responses to subliminal stimulation (e.g. Eagle,
1962), and psychologists and parapsychologists remarked upon the similarity
between the impact of individual differences on subliminal perception and on
extrasensory perception (e.g. Dixon, 1979; Roney-Dougal, 1986, 1987;
Schmeidler, 1986,1988).
Phenomenologically, subliminal and extrasensory perception appear to have
many similarities. Individuals may find it difficult to distinguish between
subliminal perception and extrasensory perception; indeed there have been
studies in subliminal perception which have been disguised as ESP studies
(Calvin & Dollenmayer, 1959; Miller, 1940) and ESP studies which have been
disguised as subliminal perception studies (Lovitts, 1981; Tart, 1963; Nash &
Nash, 1963). The question has even been raised whether subliminal
stimulation is actually 'psi in disguise' (Roney-Dougal, 1982, p.99).
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Conversely, significant scoring in early ESP experiments has been attributed
to methodological flaws that could have enabled the subjects to pick up
minimal or subliminal cues as to the target identity (Kennedy, 1939). In both
subliminal perception and extrasensory perception, subjects may feel like
they are simply guessing the nature of the stimulus or target (Roney-Dougal,
1986; Schmeidler, 1986), or the stimulus information may appear almost
incidentally in the subjects' cognitions (Irwin, 1979). In her report of an
exploratory study and a lengthy follow-up study comparing psi with
subliminal perception, Roney-Dougal concluded:
SP (subliminal perception) is as affected by psychological
variables as other parapsychologists have found psi to be...At
both an objective and a subjective level, it was impossible to tell
whether a particular session had been a psi or an SP one; there
seemed no clear way of differentiating between the two at the
response side of the process, although they are quite clearly
different at the stimulus side. (Roney-Dougal, 1987, p.174)
While it is not yet known by what means information is perceived 'extra-
sensorially' (and some consider it has not even been demonstrated that such
extrasensory information transfer occurs, e.g., Kurtz, 1985), many lines of
parapsychological research have been stimulated, like J.B. Rhine, by the
notion that extrasensory information may be unconscious to begin with, and
that individual differences in perception, cognition, personality, and
motivation may similarly affect the emergence of extrasensory and subliminal
information into conscious awareness. This model of psi processing
(developed by Tyrrell, 1947, and later adopted by L.E. Rhine, 1962, and 1967)
has come to be known as the 'two-stage' theory of psi, and since it provides
the foundation for comparisons of subliminal and extrasensory perception, it
will be briefly described.
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The two-stage theory ofpsi processing. In his work The Modus Operandi of
Paranormal Cognition, Tyrrell (1947) was the first to propose the theory that psi
information is initially 'perceived' at an unconscious level, and that this
information may be subject to distortions and transformations before it
emerges at a conscious level, in the same way as normally-perceived
information may be distorted. An extract from Tyrrell's Summary of
Conclusions best conveys those aspects of his theory most relevant to the
present thesis:
(1) Paranormal cognition is not a conscious process. Its product
alone is revealed to consciousness.
(2) This product is here called a "mediating vehicle". It is
subconsciously created by the percipient.
(3) The mediating vehicle is not a paranormal phenomenon
but is the product of psychological machinery which all
possess. It may take the form of a sensory hallucination or of an
impulse or of automatic verbalization or of a dream
(4) The same vehicle which mediates paranormal cognition
also mediates subconscious expectations and beliefs or
normally acquired knowledge which has not reached
consciousness independently. In these latter cases, neither the
vehicle nor the material is paranormal.
(5) Something which may be broadly called a subconscious
motive underlies the formation of mediating vehicles in normal
and paranormal cases alike...(Tyrrell, 1947, p.117).
L.E. Rhine (1962, 1967) then elaborated upon Tyrrell's model by examining
large collections of 'spontaneous cases' (that is, 'real life' experiences rather
than lab. experiments) of ostensible ESP, to see what 'mediating vehicles'
were used. She found that psi experiences fell into four different forms:
intuitions, hallucinations, and realistic and unrealistic dreams, and concluded
that these must be the 'psychological means' by which information
transferred from Stage 1 (unconsciousness) to Stage 2 (consciousness). In her
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popular book ESP in Life and Lab, Rhine (1967) conveyed the same basic
message as Tyrrell had, though in a different language:
In the workshop of the unconscious the several forms in
which ESP information can be processed are available to carry it
to higher levels. But they are not objects like carts or cars
standing around waiting to be loaded. They are processes ready
to be activated, for although the messages arrive at their
destination without a tag or any obvious indication of their
source, they are not simply "there", instantaneous, pristine, and
unchanged from start to finish. They do not come like a streak
of lightning, clear, immutable, or not at all.
They are the result of processes that operate in the secret
recesses of the mind and cannot be directly observed. They do
go on long enough, and in such a manner, however, that
circumstantial evidence can show something of the way they
operate. (Rhine, 1967, p. 178).
These ideas, therefore, provide a theoretical foundation upon which studies
comparing subliminal and extrasensory perception may rest.
Comparing subliminal and extrasensory perception. For detailed
consideration of the similarities that have been identified between subliminal
and extrasensory perception, the following papers are recommended: Beloff,
1974; Dixon, 1979; Irwin, 1979; Johnson, 1975; Nash, 1986; Rao & Rao, 1982;
Roney-Dougal, 1981, 1986; and Schmeidler, 1986, 1988. As an example,
however, let us consider individual differences in what might loosely be
termed 'cognitive styles'. Experimental findings both in parapsychology and
subliminal perception indicate that there are wide individual differences in
apparent 'sensitivity' to subliminal and extrasensory stimulation. It seems that
authors generally take an operational definition of 'sensitivity' - for example,
sensitivity is revealed in the correct identification of subliminal stimuli
observed in an experimental task. Often, theoretical assumptions as to what
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'stage' of perception or cognition is indicated by task scores are not made
explicit (and one wonders sometimes whether such assumptions have even
been considered implicitly). While terms such as 'sensitivity' may imply fairly
basic sensory or perceptual processes, in fact authors often correlate
'sensitivity' scores with 'higher level' cognitive, personality, and situational
variables.
1. Subliminal perception. Eagle (1962) studied the personality correlates
of individual differences in sensitivity to subliminal stimulation. Each
subject took part in a subliminal perception task, and the scores were
rated according to the subject's sensitivity (indicated by the degree to
which interpretation of a supraliminal stimulus was influenced by a
previously-presented subliminal stimulus). Participants were also
given an extensive battery of psychological tests. It was found that
when subjects were split into 'high' and 'low' sensitive groups, each
group showed distinctive 'cognitive styles'. Eligh sensitivity was
characterised by being responsive to people, intuitive, strong in
imagery, confident, and with cognitive and affective openness. In
contrast, subjects who were low on sensitivity to subliminal perception
scored low on these characteristics. Similarly, in her review of the
literature on the effect of personality variables on subliminal
perception (which did not include the study by Eagle), Roney-Dougal
(1986) concluded that 'those susceptible to subliminal stimuli tend to
show less repressiveness, more imageability, more 'passivity', greater
flexibility of report, and less hostility' (p.416). A state of dispersed
attention or relaxation is known to facilitate sensitivity to subliminal
stimulation (Dixon, 1981; Fiss, 1961; Fisher & Paul, 1959). Such a
relaxed state may be achieved through pharmacological means, by
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instructing subjects in relaxation, or by pre-selecting subjects who
exhibit such characteristics.
2. Extrasensory perception. There are several parallels between the
above-noted cognitive and personality variables thought to enhance
receptivity to subliminal stimulation and those thought to facilitate psi
perception. Parapsychologist Gertrude Schmeidler (1986) was struck
by the similarity between Eagle's (1962) personality correlates and
those which had been noted by researchers attempting to characterise
the individual differences in personality between psi-hitters and psi-
missers. William Braud has proposed a 'psi-conducive syndrome' of
characteristics appearing to facilitate manifestations of psi (Braud,
1975). Among these is a tendency to have decreased egocentricity and
a concomitant increase in caring for others.
Another apparently psi-conducive characteristic is to have an
increased awareness of internal processes, feelings, and imagery
(Honorton, 1974). Braud gives anecdotal and experimental evidence
supporting his speculation that 'receptive mode/right hemispheric
functioning' may facilitate psi. He concludes that this mode of
processing is characterised by 'a more passive acceptance of
appreciation; diffuse attending; paralogical thought processes;
decreased boundary perception; dominance of the sensory over the
fomal; and imagery, spatial, concrete, holistic, nonlineal, analogical,
intuitive, and unconscious functioning' (p.147). Relaxation has also
been found to enhance psi performance (perhaps not surprisingly,
since a state of relaxation would be expected to facilitate a more
passive, open, and non-analytical state of mind)(Braud & Braud, 1974).
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One area of parapsychological research that has arisen from the assumption
that common processes may affect subliminal and extrasensory perceptions
concerns reactions to unconsciously-perceived unpleasant or threatening
information. As stated by Martin Johnson, one of the first to conduct
systematic research in this area:
People who are prone to draw their preconscious blinds in
matters of visual perception might act somehow similarly
towards perceptions which are extrasensory. (Carpenter, 1965,
pp.70-71)
Subsequently, a series of experiments have demonstrated a relationship
between 'defensiveness', broadly defined as unconscious resistance to
unpleasant or threatening information, and 'psi' performance (defined below)
(e.g. Haraldsson & Houtkooper, 1992). This thesis is concerned with the
defensiveness-psi relationship and, ultimately, with what this relationship
can tell us about how psi works. In discussing the value for parapsychology
of research of this nature, Rao (1978) notes:
The recognition that psi usually operates at the level of the
unconscious raises the possibility that an understanding of the
dynamics of the unconscious may give us insights into the way
psi manifests in our consciousness, (pp. 266-267).
By exploring individual differences in cognition, personality, attitudes and
motivation, parapsychologists can learn more about the psi process, and this
thesis is intended to make a contribution to that effort. Before proceeding,
however, it is necessary to clarify the meaning of some terms which will be
used frequently, and to set a context for the research which follows.
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It is useful at the outset to distinguish between 'proof-oriented' and 'process-
oriented' research in parapsychology. The principal aim of the former is to
prove that 'psi' exists, while the latter is more concerned to find out how psi
works. Based on the premise that one can never prove anything beyond
doubt, most parapsychologists prefer to accept the existence of psi as a
working hypothesis. Their research efforts therefore tend to focus on
identifying correlates of psi performance and testing process-related
hypotheses that may lead to the construction of theories of psi. For a more
extensive consideration of theoretical conceptualisations of psi, see Stanford
(1977,1992). This thesis continues the process-oriented tradition.
Definitions
'Parapsychology' is the scientific study of apparently anomalous means of
communication between an organism and its environment. The words
'apparently anomalous' refer to occasions where information appears to have
been exchanged between an organism and its environment despite the fact
that known channels of communication and inference are closed. For
example, if a person (the 'receiver') in one sensorially isolated room can
correctly describe a picture (the 'target') which is being seen by another
person (the 'sender') in a second sensorially isolated room, such that there is
no possibility for even the slightest cues of sight, sound, smell, and so on, to
be transmitted from the sender to the receiver, and there is no way that the
receiver could have prior knowledge of, or could infer, the target identity,
this might be considered to be apparently anomalous communication. (Of
course the receiver could correctly describe the target by chance alone, so any
single instance of apparently anomalous communication is uninformative.
With repetition, however, one can establish a theoretical chance baseline for
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correct target identification and one can statistically compare the obtained
correct target identifications with the number which would be expected by
chance. One may thereby examine whether an experiment, or group of
experiments, supports the hypothesis of anomalous communication.)
The use of the term 'anomalous' does not, however, entail any presumption
that the communication is somehow non-physical, defying the 'laws of
physics'. It is quite possible that the information is travelling along channels
obeying physical laws which have yet to be discovered. That this
communication is described as 'apparently' anomalous acknowledges, too,
that information may be 'leaking' along channels which parapsychologists
have as yet failed to recognise or monitor.
The somewhat multi-purpose term 'psi' is applied to situations where such
anomalous information transfer may be occurring. Hence, a 'psi task' refers to
an experiment designed to prevent information transfer along known
channels of communication or inference, that may enable one to infer that
some sort of 'anomalous' information transfer has nevertheless taken place.
'Psi-missing' and 'psi-hitting' describe, respectively, consistent scoring below
or above mean chance expectation in a psi task.
Psi is a general term, and parapsychologists usually distinguish between two
types of anomalous communication. The first of these, 'Extrasensory
Perception' (ESP), refers to cases where the organism gains information from
its environment, either from the experience of another organism ('Telepathy'),
or without the conscious mediation of another organism ('Clairvoyance');
when this information does not exist in the present, but is located in the
future, this is termed 'Precognition'. 'Psychokinesis' (PK) is the second class of
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psi phenomena, referring to cases where the environment appears to be
receiving information or influence from the organism; in other words, the
organism is exerting some influence over the environment (PK is also
popularly known as 'mind over matter').
It is actually extremely difficult to distinguish, at a theoretical level, between
these different categories of psi. For instance, if a subject is asked to generate
impressions of a picture which is concealed in an envelope, this would be
described to the subject as a clairvoyance task. But if one accepts the
possibility of precognition then perhaps the subject is gaining impressions of
the target not in 'real time' but by looking to the future moment of feedback,
when the picture is revealed. One might never give the subject feedback of
the target identity, but what if someone else opens the envelope in the future
- could the subject precognitively read their minds? Also, how did the picture
get in the envelope in the first place? Someone must have put it there, so the
subject could read their minds in 'real time' rather than clairvoyantly gaining
impressions directly from the sealed envelope.
Parapsychologists have of course grappled with these questions, and
procedures have been evolved to attempt to test for 'pure' clairvoyance,
precognition, and PK (e.g., Rhine & Pratt., 1957), but at present the simplest
solution is to define telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, and PK, in
operational terms: that is, how the experimental task is presented to the
subject will establish their direction of attention and intention (that is, it will
frame the task for them). A telepathy task would ask the participant to work
with a 'sender'; a clairvoyance task would have no sender; a precognition task
would ask the subject to identify the nature of a target to be selected in the
future; and a PK task would ask the participant to try to influence the target.
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ESP experiments usually present participants with either or both of two
general forms of task: forced choice or free response. A forced choice ESP task
is one that presents participants with a known, restricted range of target
possibilities; an example would be the 'Zener' cards, showing just five simple
geometric shapes, that were used in the early days of experimental
parapsychology. Participants are required to choose correctly which of the
five cards is the designated target. The number of correct guesses ('hits') that
would be expected by chance alone is compared with the actual number of
hits and if the actual number of hits deviates significantly from chance
expectation then this is thought to indicate that some sort of anomalous
information transfer has occurred (assuming known channels of
communication and inference have been ruled out).
A free-response ESP task, as the name suggests, is one that has a potentially
infinite range of target possibilities: from video clips of nature programmes,
movies, and old newsreels; to static pictures clipped from magazines, or
postcards of works of art; to geographical locations; to real, three-dimensional
objects which a 'sender' may be able to touch and handle. Usually, in any one
experiment only one type of free-response target is used, but this still allows a
wide range of possible targets. The participant responds to the target by
generating thoughts, feelings, and images, that are noted or recorded in some
way; this 'mentation' is then compared to a duplicate of the actual target,
presented alongside several 'foils'. The degree of similarity of the mentation
to the 'target pool' may be judged by the participants themselves, or by
independent raters. The member of the target pool which is judged to be most
similar to the mentation is chosen as the target. From this point on the scoring
is quite similar to that for forced choice targets: the number of correct target
judgements is compared to chance expectation (see Morris, 1978, and Edge,
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Morris, Palmer, & Rush, 1986, for more detailed descriptions of experimental
and statistical methods in parapsychology).
Unlike the forced choice methodology, free response scoring systems may
enable analyses of the degree of correspondence between the mentation and
the target pool members. The main difference between forced choice and free
response methodologies is that the latter provides qualitatively richer
material which may give greater insight into the ESP process than the former.
An associated drawback is that whereas the occurrence of a hit is
unambiguous with forced choice methods, the rich free-response material
may include 'noise' that is unrelated to the target, or that may be related by
chance to another member of the target pool, so there is more ambiguity in
identifying a hit with the latter methodology.
Perhaps the most successful free-response methodology, which has already
been referred to briefly, is called the 'ganzfeld'. In the ganzfeld, the
participant relaxes in a pleasant state of partial sensory deprivation induced
by unpatterned auditory and visual stimulation (visually, the participant
usually experiences a uniform grey or pink 'screen' that encompasses the
entire visual field, so that not even the nose is seen; headphones playing
'white noise' at a comfortably loud level provide unpatterned auditory
stimulation). The state of consciousness induced by the ganzfeld stimulation
is thought to be conducive to ESP, by dampening down external and internal
sources of distraction or 'noise', and encouraging the experience of internal
mental imagery (Honorton & Harper, 1974; Braud, 1975). The expectation is
that this internal mental imagery is related to the target which is
simultaneously being presented in a second, remote and sensorially isolated
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room (the ganzfeld may also be used with a precognitive design, but the 'real
time' method is most common).
A 'Subliminal Perception' task is one where a stimulus is presented to an
individual in difficult perceptual circumstances (see Dixon, 1971, & 1981, for
a comprehensive introduction to the techniques and findings of research in
subliminal perception; Merikle & Cheesman, 1987, present a brief summary
of the current status of research in subliminal perception). Although the term
subliminal perception may be outmoded nowadays (see chapter 2), it will be
used thoughout this thesis because its similarity with the term extrasensory
perception suggests an overlap between the two phenomena that is a basic
premise of this thesis. In a subliminal perception task, the stimulus may be
briefly presented (e.g., illuminated for only a few milliseconds), or of weak
physical intensity (e.g. presented at very low levels of illumination), such that
the individual claims to be unaware of the stimulus, despite having
apparently perceived and responded to it. Note that this is a subjective
definition of awareness, resting on the reported perceptual experiences of the
subject (e.g. Merikle, 1984). Chapter 3 includes further discussion on the
controversial matter of what constitutes awareness.
Whereas subliminal perception experiments attempt to present stimuli below
levels of awareness, investigations of 'Perceptual Defence/Perceptual
Vigilance' are more concerned with the grey 'threshold' area where
individuals begin to become aware of the stimulus (Bruner & Postman, 1946,
1947; Brown, 1961; Dixon, 1981). These studies typically attempt to measure
thresholds for subliminally presented neutral stimuli and then observe how
thresholds alter for subliminally presented emotional stimuli. Where a
person's threshold for emotional stimuli seems higher than for neutral stimuli
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(that is, the presence of an emotional stimulus is reported less quickly than
that of a neutral stimulus), this is termed perceptual defence. Conversely, an
individual is described as perceptually vigilant if the subliminally presented
emotional stimulus is reported more quickly than a neutral stimulus.
Researchers into perceptual defence/vigilance typically use one of two
variables as the threshold measure, both of which are subjective in nature.
The 'awareness threshold' is the stimulus duration or intensity at which the
subject claims to notice the presence of the stimulus. The 'recognition
threshold' refers to the stimulus duration or intensity at which the subject is
able to identify the stimulus (Dixon, 1981). For instance, if a subliminal
stimulus is a written word projected onto a screen at a gradually increasing
brightness, the awareness threshold would be signified by the point at which
the subject reports noticing the presence of the stimulus (e.g., a patch of light,
or a shape), without being able to identify it; the recognition threshold would
be the first point at which the subject could identify the word.
Defensiveness and neuroticism. The term 'defensive' is often popularly
used to refer to an individual who withdraws from, or is resistant to,
unpleasant, stressful or threatening information. Perceptual defence and
perceptual vigilance can be constructively regarded as different strategies of
coping with stressful information (Olff, 1991), but it is more usual to find that
perceptual defensiveness is, either implicitly or explicitly, regarded as a
maladaptive response to stress (e.g. Cooper, 1988a; Henley & Dixon, 1976;
Vaernes, 1982). How is the concept of defensiveness related to personality
styles?
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The phenomenon of perceptual defence (that is, the apparent raising of
perceptual thresholds for emotional compared to neutral stimuli) has been
considered to be analogous to the Freudian concept of repression (that is, the
denial of entry into consciousness) (Kline, 1981; Cooper, 1982; Cooper &
Kline, 1986). For example, Kline (1981) argues that:
Since in Freudian theory...repression is defined as denial of
entry into consciousness, it can be seen that perceptual
defence...is precisely the same. The raising of the perceptual
threshold to the emotionally loaded stimulus word is simply an
example of repression at work...That perceptual defence...is an
example of repression is fully supported by Fenichel (1945) who
makes it clear that the defence mechanism applies to external
perceptions of the real world and not just to mental events (pp.
210-211)
Weinberger, Schwartz, & Davidson (1979) define repression as 'low anxiety,
high defensiveness', so there appears to be some agreement that, at least in
theory, perceptual defence and repression may be related concepts; both
certainly concern the denial of entry of potentially stressful information into
consciousness.
Turning now to the relationship betwen defensiveness and neuroticism,
Kreitler & Kreitler (1990) note that 'more theoretically oriented discussions of
repression emphasize favorably its status as a major element of a neurotic
personality style' (p.559). It appears to me, however, that there has as yet been
little experimental demonstration of the relationships between perceptual
defence and repression, and between these and neuroticism. Cooper & Kline
(1986), for instance, found no relationship between scores on the repression
scale of the Defence Mechanism Test (DMT - a projective psychological test
that will be described in detail in the following chapter, which is designed to
elicit and measure the operation of various Freudian defence mechanisms)
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and a measure of perceptual defence. Similarly, Haraldsson & Houtkooper
(1992) reported a series of studies with the DMT that had found no
relationship between DMT scores and other major personality factors.
However, a number of studies have recently been carried out to develop and
validate the NEO-PI (a personality questionnaire based on a five factor model
of personality, measuring neuroticism, extraversion, openness, agreeableness,
and conscientiousness), and some of these have correlated neuroticism with
coping mechanisms such as defensiveness. Details of these validation studies
are reported in the NEO-PI-R Manual (Costa & McCrae, 1992). One finding
was that 'many theoretically immature or neurotic coping mechanisms...were
significantly related to NEO-PI N (neuroticism) scores...poor coping is
intimately tied to this domain' (Costa & McCrae, 1992, p.51, my brackets). For
instance, in the two studies reported by McCrae & Costa (1986), it was found
that: 'In both studies, neuroticism is associated with increased use of hostile
reaction, escapist fantasy, self-blame, sedation, withdrawal, wishful thinking,
passivity, and indecisiveness' (p.392). Also, a study by Costa, Zonderman, &
McCrae (1991) that correlated 292 participants' Neuroticism scores with three
sets of measures of defence mechanisms (Bond, Gardner, Christian, & Sigal,
1983; Haan, 1965; Ihilevich & Gleser, 1986) found that:
N was related to measures of regression, displacement, doubt,
and maladaptive action patterns, confirming the association of
N with poor coping styles...(and showing that)...individuals'
characteristic ways of dealing with stress and conflict are
consistent with their enduring personality traits (Costa &
McCrae, 1992, p.52, my brackets).
In summary, then, neuroticism may be linked to perceptual defensiveness on
a theoretical level, and there is some experimental research that also
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indirectly suggests a possible relationship between perceptual defensiveness
and neuroticism, if one accepts that coping and defence mechanisms are
related to perceptual defensiveness. The experiments in this thesis may
enable a more direct comparison between perceptual defensiveness and
neuroticism. \ J
Outline of Thesis
One of the problems facing parapsychology is that psi effects are apparently
weak and unreliable (Shapin & Coly, 1984; Rush, 1986). The use of meta-
\
\
analytic techniques has helped to identify both the size of psi effects and
some of the factors associated with enhanced psi performance (e.g. Honorton
et al., 1990; Honorton, Ferrari, & Bern, 1991; Utts, 1991; Radin & Ferrari,
1991). Meta-analysis can therefore help to identify potentially fruitful lines of
research. This thesis reviews studies suggesting a relationship between
'defensiveness' and psi performance, and reports the outcome of a new meta¬
analysis of a subset of these studies, that used the Defence Mechanism Test
(DMT) as a measure of defensiveness. The review and meta-analysis suggest
that there is a need for independent replication of the defensiveness-psi
findings. Difficulties with the various methods used for measuring
defensiveness are identified, and the development of an alternative,
prototype measure of 'perceptual defence/vigilance', using a 'subliminal
perception' paradigm, is described. Seven experiments are reported. Their
aim is to develop this prototype indicator of perceptual defence/vigilance, to
provide a conceptual replication of the 'DMT-ESP studies', and to explore the
process-related questions of how the personality of the experimental
participant and the nature of the ESP target correlate with psi performance.
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After summarising and synthesising the findings of these experiments,
thesis concludes with some suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2. The defensiveness-psi correlation.
General Introduction and Review
In their attempts to identify correlates of successful psi performance, and
ultimately to understand how psi works, parapsychologists have related
various measures of personality and cognitive style to ESP performance. For
example, extraversion has been shown to correlate with ESP, the more
extraverted tending to score more highly at ESP tasks (e.g. Honorton, Ferrari,
& Bern, 1991). Two explanations have been put forward for this trend: 1.
extraverts are more sociable than introverts and hence more comfortable in an
experimental setting; and (not necessarily mutually exclusive), 2. extraverts
tend to have lower levels of cortical arousal than introverts, and so would
have the reduced physiological arousal that is thought to be psi-conducive
(Braud, 1975). Also on the question of arousal, Stanford has explored the
relation between extraversion/introversion, the intensity of white noise
stimulation in the ganzfeld, and ESP performance. He found that extraverts
enjoyed the relatively loud white noise stimulation and had higher ESP
scores than introverts (Stanford et al., 1989a, 1989b). However these findings
were not replicated in a study by Stanford & Frank, 1992. As chapter 1
pointed out, one topic that has excited much interest is the study of
unconscious reactions to weak stimuli, of both subliminal and extrasensory
origin, especially with relation to defensiveness.
The most systematic exploration of the defensiveness-psi relationship has
used the Defence Mechanism Test (DMT) as the measure of defensiveness,
and the bulk of this chapter will deal with a review and meta-analysis of the
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DMT-ESP studies. Besides these studies, a number of others have correlated
some measure of defensiveness with psi performance. As will be seen, these
measures tend to assume different definitions of defensiveness; nevertheless
they show some consistency in their relationship to psi performance.
Behind all the studies that have explored the defensiveness-psi relationship is
the assumption that there exist considerable commonalties between
individuals' characteristic responses to weak stimuli, whether they be of
subliminal or extrasensory origin; the quotes in chapter 1 from Tyrrell (1947),
Carpenter (1965), J.B. Rhine (1977), L.E. Rhine (1967), and Rao (1978)
exemplify this approach. The defensiveness-psi studies therefore sought to
explore the relationship between the subliminal and the extrasensory with
particular reference to resistance to weak, possibly negatively emotional,
stimuli. It had been noted (by, for instance, Roney-Dougal, 1987; Carpenter,
1965), especially, that defensiveness to weak or subliminal stimuli appeared
strongly similar to the phenomenon of psi-missing (consistent scoring below
chance expectation at a psi task, that suggests the participant knows the target
identity, but is avoiding correctly identifying the target, possibly for
attitudinal, motivational, or emotional reasons). Beloff (1974) points out:
The acknowledgement of perceptual defence as a genuine
psychological phenomenon should make it that much easier for
us to accept the concept of 'psi-missing' as a parapsychological
phenomenon. For the point about perceptual defence is that it
implies the possibility of identifying a stimulus at an
unconscious level in order to prevent its recognition at a
conscious level (p. 109)
Before reviewing the DMT-ESP studies, I will briefly overview other
defensiveness-psi research. A series of studies by Lendell Williams Braud
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(Braud, 1976; Braud, 1977; Williams & Duke, 1980) found 'openness versus
closedness' related to ESP performance. An 88-item questionnaire composed
of four principal scales was developed, including items from Jourard's Self-
Disclosure Inventory (Jourard,1971) (Jourard equated the healthy personality
with a nondefensive, open, and self-disclosing attitude; Jourard, 1974). The
term 'openness' was used very broadly to refer to 'the opening up and taking
in of experiences...and...the opening up and letting out, or self-disclosure, of
aspects of ourselves' (Braud, 1976, p. 155). One of the scales was specifically
aimed at identifying 'defensiveness' in individuals. Braud therefore
conceptualised 'openness' or 'nondefensiveness' very broadly, including
tolerance to a variety of attitudes, nonsuspiciousness, accepting of unusual
experiences and altered states of consciousness, and accepting of oneself,
including a willingness to disclose aspects of oneself. This is a relatively loose
definition of defensiveness, compared to that found, for instance, with
perceptual defensiveness in the subliminal perception paradigm.
Nevertheless, these different conceptualisations of defensiveness may share
some common ground since they both relate to resistance to or distortion of
some aspects of reality. These studies used free-response ESP methodology,
and generally all found the same trend towards more psi hitting from more
'open' subjects.
Another study, by Miller & York (1976), designed a projective test 'similar to
the DMT' as a predictor of performance at a free-response clairvoyance test.
The projective test presented subjects tachistoscopically with six stimulus
pictures on slides; three of the slides showed a central hero figure and a
peripheral threatening figure, while three control slides showed a central
hero figure but no threat. The slides were shown to participants at gradually
increasing exposures and participants described what they could see at each
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exposure, until they gave accurate descriptions of the slide contents. If
participants took considerably longer to report the peripheral threat figure
than the central hero figure, this was regarded as 'perceptual filtering or
screening'. The analysis compared the psi performance of 'high perceptual
filterers' (i.e., high defensive) with 'low perceptual filterers' (i.e., low
defensive); results were in the predicted direction (lower psi scores for the
high perceptual filterers), but not significantly so.
Johnson & Liibke (1977) cite this study by Miller & York and the studies by
Williams Braud as providing indirect support for the DMT-ESP relationship
to be described shortly; while the methodologies are not directly comparable,
there is a common trend for those participants who tend to distort or resist
potentially threatening stimuli to score relatively poorly at psi tasks.
Bellis & Morris (1980) supplemented the 88-item openness questionnaire with
three items measuring belief in ESP, and gave subjects a free-response
clairvoyance task. They considered that their results suggested a weak but
positive relationship between openness and psi. A subsequent study
(Sondow, Braud, & Barker, 1982) used a 22-item openness questionnaire and
found no significant difference between psi-hitters and psi-missers on
questionnaire scores. However, the entire sample consisted of low-defensive
subjects. (Unfortunately, one cannot tell from the data reported in Sondow,
Braud & Barker whether or not the openness-psi relationship was in the
predicted direction, although it was not statistically significant).
Sondow (1987) measured subjects' hypnotizability and creativity in order to
explore the assumption that:
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psi information first enters at an unconscious level; thus,
openness to the unconscious should aid in the psi task, while
personalities that habitually censor, repress, or inhibit
unmodified unconscious material might also habitually repress
intrusions of psi information into consciousness (p.42)
Subjects also participated in a free-response ganzfeld experiment. Dream
quality correlated significantly with psi success (rp=+.25, 58df, p<.05, 2-t),
suggesting to Sondow that 'of the measures planned to reflect lack of
repression, the best seems to have been the dream quality score' (p.45), as
reports of bizarre and unrealistic dreams might be thought to indicate low
repression or defensiveness.
'Openness' was also found to relate to psi performance (and subliminal
perception performance) by Roney-Dougal (1982). She described an
exploratory and a follow-up study that gave subjects a battery of tests
including a measurement of their attitudes towards subliminal and
extrasensory perception, and their openness as measured by the As
Openness-to-Experience questionnaire (which was originally designed to
measure susceptibility to hypnosis; As, O'Hara, & Munger, 1962). Subjects'
performance on subliminal perception and ESP tasks correlated in the
predicted direction (though not always to a statistically significant degree)
with their personality and attitude test results. Roney-Dougal concluded that
'overall hitting ability, irrespective of the nature of the information
[subliminal or extrasensory], is clearly related to attitude and to one's
openness to experience of altered states of consciousness' (Roney-Dougal,
1982, p.99, brackets mine).
Finally, a rather unusual performance measure of defensiveness was
suggested by Stanford & Schroeter (1978), who expected persons with low
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levels of defensiveness more readily to express impulses mediating
extrasensory responses. The ESP measure was a word association task, and
defensiveness was measured by the degree to which subjects chose to recline
the chair for their ESP task. It was assumed that low defensive individuals
might choose the fully reclined position, while high defensive individuals
might feel more vulnerable, threatened and less able to relax in such a
position and should therefore choose a more upright seating posture. Out of
67 subjects, 40 chose the fully reclined position while 27 adjusted the chair to
be either partially reclined or upright. The 'laid back' group of subjects scored
significantly greater than chance at the ESP task (f=2.1, 39df, p=.04, 2-t). The
remaining group scored non-significantly below mean chance expectation.
The difference in ESP scoring between the two groups was in the anticipated
direction, but not significantly so. This 'chair test' of defensiveness in a psi
task seems to have been discovered independently of an earlier study in
subliminal perception by Fisher & Paul (1959). Subjects were subliminally
stimulated and then asked to draw images either in an upright position with
the room illuminated, or in a supine position with the room darkened. The
latter group showed the stronger subliminal effect, however in this study the
effects of seating position are confounded with those of lighting conditions.
In conclusion, if one takes a broad definition of defensiveness as a tendency
to resist or distort weak or subliminal potentially stressful information, it can
be seen that researchers using a variety of different indicators and
conceptualisations of defensiveness have found a general trend for relatively
high defensiveness to be associated with relatively poor ESP performance,
and conversely for relatively low defensiveness to be associated with
relatively successful ESP performance. None of these various indicators of
defensiveness has been applied in a systematic way, however; it is to the
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studies comparing ESP performance with scoring on the Defence Mechanism
Test that one must turn for a more rigorous examination of the defensiveness-
psi relationship.
Review and Meta-Analysis of the DMT-ESP Studies
Introduction to the Defence Mechanism Test: Application, methodology,
theory, and validity.
Application of the DMT. The DMT was developed in Sweden by Ulf Kragh
(1955) primarily for use in the Swedish air force to predict the ability of pilots
to cope with life-threatening stressors, and to select out those pilots who were
likely to be 'accident prone'. With governmental support, Kragh was able to
carry out extensive validation tests of the DMT, and Neuman (1978, cited in
Cooper & Kline, 1986) found the DMT could indeed identify those pilots who
were likely to be involved in accidents, and that after pilots had either passed
or failed their training the DMT was the only psychological instrument that
retained its predictive power. Nowadays the DMT is primarily used in
Swedish and other NATO air forces as an instrument for selection of air force
pilots, though it has also been used to identify those who are likely not to
perform well in other dangerous and stressful tasks, such as deep sea diving
and parachuting (Vaernes, 1982; Vaernes & Darragh, 1982; Cooper 1988a).
Method. The DMT is a projective test (that is, one that presents participants
with ambiguous information or an unstructured task on the assumption that
participants' perception and interpretation of the test material may reflect
their characteristic thought processes, motivations, anxieties, and conflicts). In
what is probably the most up-to-date comprehensive survey of the use of the
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DMT in Europe, Olff (1991) noted that there was a wide variation among
researchers in the DMT methodology they used, including differences in
apparatus (e.g. whether stimuli were presented within a tachistoscope
viewing box or were projected onto a screen), stimulus pictures, number of
stimulus exposures, instructions, subject's response mode (e.g. written and/or
verbal), evaluation of the protocol, and analysis. Based on her survey, Olff
made a number of recommendations for standardising DMT methodology.
For the present thesis, which considers the use of the DMT in
parapsychology, it is most helpful to describe the DMT methodology as
parapsychologists have typically applied it (though even in this small subset
of DMT studies there are variations in testing).
Subjects are repeatedly exposed to (usually) two pictorial stimuli similar to
Thematic Apperception Test cards as well as a 'distractor' picture that is not
evaluated. In order to increase the reliability of the test, the stimulus pictures
are presented in two parallel series (that is, alternating presentations of each
picture), with the distractor picture being exposed before each stimulus
picture exposure.
The stimulus pictures usually depict a central 'hero' figure and a peripheral
'threat' figure; both figures are of the same sex as the subject, and the threat
figure is usually judged to be older than the hero figure. The distractor
picture can vary; in the two studies reported by Johnson & Kanthamani
(1967), for instance, the distractor depicted two 'fighting boys'. The purpose
of the distractor picture is to familiarise subjects with the procedure and to
ensure that they have similar expectations about the appearance of the
stimulus slides proper. Olff (1991) notes, however, that the nature of the
distractor picture is quite important in the cognitive set, and consequent
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expectancies, that it may elucidate in subjects; many of the DMT studies
reviewed by her used non-aggressive distractors that might predispose
participants to react differently to the stimulus slides than aggressive
distractors.
Initial exposures are very brief (around 8 milliseconds) and exposure times
gradually lengthen through a series of increments up to around 2 seconds.
When subjects are tested individually, the stimuli are usually presented via a
tachistoscope; when tested in groups (of about 6 to 8 persons), a slide
projector with a camera shutter may be used. Background luminance is
measured and held constant. The brief exposures mean that the stimuli
appear unclear. After each exposure subjects are required to try to describe,
in writing and drawings, what they thought was presented. The test
continues until subjects correctly identify the main elements of the stimulus
pictures.
Trained scorers examine each of the series of subject's descriptions and score
each protocol according to the presence or absence of one or more of the ten
defensive 'signs' which, theoretically, correspond to Freudian and neo-
Freudian defence mechanisms: repression (often considered analogous to
perceptual defence, e.g. Dixon, 1981; Wagstaff, 1974a), isolation, denial,
reaction formation, identification with the aggressor, turning against the self,
introjection of opposite sex, polymorphous introjection, projection and
regression.
Theoretical assumptions underlying the DMT. Typically, the stimuli
feature a central 'hero' figure with an older more threatening and unpleasant
'threat' or 'secondary' figure seeming to emerge from the shadows behind the
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hero. Kragh used the assumptions of projective test theory to argue that the
secondary figure induces unconscious anxiety in the subject: through
projection, the subject identifies with the hero figure and therefore the
apparent threat against the hero from the secondary figure evokes defensive
reactions in the subject. The fragmented nature of the stimuli supposedly
allows the subjects to project their characteristic Freudian defence
mechanisms into their description of what was seen. So, distortions in
subjects' descriptions of what they see are thought to reveal the operation of
Freudian defence mechanisms. The subject is not aware that the stimulus is
actually the same each time; changes in what the subject describes seeing over
the series of exposures, plus the distractor picture, apparently lead most
subjects to conclude that there are subtle differences between each picture
exposed.
The technique of presenting the stimulus picture serially and in increasingly
lengthy steps is based on the principle known as percept-genetics (Kragh &
Smith, 1970; Smith & Westerlundh, 1980). This theory suggests that
perception is a constructive or an adaptive process, and that it is possible to
examine this process by disrupting or 'fractionating' perception through
presenting the stimulus very briefly and serially. It is thought that some of
the perceptual distortions which occur during the fractionating process may
indicate the operation of defence mechanisms. At very brief ('stimulus distal')
exposures, the stimulus is highly ambiguous and the subject's perception of it
is thought to be dominated by internal, personality factors. At longer
('stimulus proximal') exposures the stimulus becomes increasingly clear and
early perceptions are modified until a completely accurate description of the
stimulus is given.
29
The DMT therefore has three basic theoretical assumptions: that through
projection the subject identifies with the hero figure; that the presence of the
secondary figure activates Freudian or neo-Freudian defences; and that by
fractionating perception these defences can be studied and scored. However,
it is not necessary for the individual researcher to accept these assumptions,
as the DMT uses them more as working hypotheses, to be tested and rejected
as necessary (Cooper, 1982) (a brief description of such a test is given in the
following section on validity of the DMT).
Validity of the DMT. We have seen that the DMT appears to have some
external validity in predicting individuals' ability to cope with stress and
threat. It is not yet clear, however, that the success of the DMT validates the
existence of percept-genetic processes and/or Freudian defence mechanisms.
A one-time student and colleague of Ulf Kragh, Martin Johnson, introduced
the DMT to parapsychology; Johnson has argued that the success of the DMT
does not validate percept-genetic ideas because there has been no attempt to
test these assumptions explicitly. He implies that those researchers who have
considered the DMT truly to demonstrate percept-genetic mechanisms have
tended to validate their own expectations: by selective reporting; by not
stating their expectations in advance; and by not carrying out validation
'blindly' (Johnson, 1986).
However, formal studies to validate the DMT have been conducted (e.g.
Kragh, 1962; Cooper, 1982; Cooper & Kline, 1986; Kline, 1987; Cooper, 1988b;
Kline, 1988a). Kragh (1962), for instance, adminstered the DMT with both
threatening and smiling secondary figures to examine the effects of these
different stimuli on 'percept-genetic defensive organisation'. He found
significantly more signs of defensiveness in the protocols of subjects who saw
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the threatening secondary; however some of those who saw the smiling
secondary also showed some signs of defensiveness. Kragh concluded that
while the subliminal threat seemed important for the activation of defences,
he could not rule out the possibility that stimulus ambiguity alone could also
be effective. A similar study, by Cooper & Kline (1986), administered the
DMT with both threatening and neutral secondary figures, to test whether
there was more evidence of perceptual distortion (perhaps indicating the
operation of defence mechanisms) for the former stimuli than for the latter;
they concluded that 'the nature of the Secondary figure exerts a powerful
influence on the number and nature of the defences coded...A threatening
Secondary induces a higher level of defensive activity' (p.25).
These results support but do not confirm the assumption that identification
with the hero figure activates defences. Perhaps it is simply the negative
emotional tone associated with the traditional DMT stimulus that induces
stress and perceptual distortions. As Cooper (1982) states:
it would seem useful to examine whether or not even more
dramatic results may be obtained when the 'hero/secondary'
notion is abandoned in favour of a purely aversive
stimulus...Subjectively...it did seem that more dramatic
distortions were observed to Picture 8BM of the TAT, which
depicts a rather primitive surgical operation, than to the more
traditional 'ugly face' threat (Cooper, 1982, p.286).
Similar thoughts were voiced by Johnson & Carpenter in the first study to
compare DMT and ESP performance (Carpenter, 1965) (discussed in more
detail below). Noting that a correlation had been found between relatively
neutral ESP target material and defensiveness, they asked:
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If the ESP targets were constructed out of threatening figures
rather than geometric designs, would the effect be stronger?
(p.73)
Cooper argued that a general weakness of the DMT was that the operation of
defence mechanisms was inferred rather than directly observed. Clinical
studies have shown the DMT to be useful in the differential diagnosis of
alcoholism, parent loss, and phobias (Kragh & Smith, 1970). For instance,
Kragh & Kroon (1970) compared the frequency of reported aggression in
DMT protocols for a group of young offenders (at reform schools) and a
contol group. It was found that at relatively brief exposure levels
(hypothesised to reflect early stages of perceptual development) there was no
difference between the two groups in the amount of reported aggression. At
longer exposure levels (hypothesised to reflect later stages of perceptual
development), the young offenders' DMT protocols contained significantly
less aggressive content than did the protocols of the control group. This latter
finding suggested to the authors that the young offenders' defensive
structures (such as repression, isolation, and reaction formation) were
activated at longer exposure levels. While such studies do not directly prove
that the DMT is measuring defence mechanisms (for instance, perhaps the
young offenders had learned at their reform schools not to vocalise their
feelings of aggression), they do show the test's potential applicability in
practical settings.
Kline (1987) argued that, although the various signs of defensiveness were
derived from psychoanalytic studies of individuals in a clinical setting, these
have face validity only. For example, the defence mechanism of Isolation is
coded when 'the hero and secondary figure are separated or isolated; one
may not be seen'; for Denial, 'the threat is emphatically denied' (Kline, 1987,
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p.55). Just because a part of a DMT protocol resembles a defence mechanism,
this does not confirm that the individual's responses actually reflect the
operation of Freudian processes. Cooper & Kline (1986) found some
indications that responses to the DMT were as hypothesised from Freudian
theory, but they also found little correspondence between the repression scale
of the DMT and Wallace & Worthington's (1970) measure of perceptual
defence (described in more detail in chapter 3, this test measured subjects'
rate of dark adaptation to projections of taboo and matched control words;
relatively slow dark adaptation to taboo words was thought to indicate
perceptual defence).
Whether or not the stimulus exposures in the DMT are subliminal is open to
debate, and depends upon one's definition of subliminal (see the discussion
on this topic in chapter 3). Certainly at later, more lengthy, exposures,
subjects see increasingly detailed glimpses of the stimulus pictures, until they
eventually describe the main elements of the pictures correctly. By any
definition of the term, this is not subliminal. What is important, however, is
not the objective subliminality of the stimuli, which will always be difficult to
establish, but the fact that the stimuli appear distorted to the subjects. This
lack of clarity, or stimulus ambiguity, enables the DMT to act like any other
projective psychological test so that individual differences in reactions to
weak but potentially threatening information may be revealed; where the
DMT differs from most, though, is in the apparent predictive value of DMT
scores in both research and applied settings. The next section reviews how
the DMT has been used as a predictor of psi performance.
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The Defence Mechanism Test in Parapsychology
Martin Johnson, who had been a student and researcher with the founder of
the DMT, Ulf Kragh, first introduced the test to parapsychology in a study
conducted with James Carpenter entitled 'An exploratory test of ESP in
relation to anxiety proneness' (Carpenter, 1965). Johnson's idea was that
'people who are prone to draw their preconscious blinds in matters of visual
perception might act somehow similarly towards perceptions which are
extrasensory' (pp.70-71). Like the other parapsychologists referred to in
chapter 1, therefore, Johnson was attracted by the notion that subliminal and
extrasensory perceptions might share common features.
Ten students with favourable attitudes towards the likely existence of ESP
were ranked according to their performance on a restricted-choice
clairvoyance task. The DMT was also administered to subjects and Johnson
ranked their scores on this test (in a methodological flaw, this ranking was
not done 'blindly' of the ESP scores; later studies were to correct this flaw). It
was found that there was a significant positive correlation (rp=.79, 9df, p<.01)
between the DMT and the ESP scores, such that subjects showing a relatively
high level of defensiveness would tend to perform below chance on the ESP
task, while subjects with a low level of defensiveness showed ESP scores
generally above chance expectation. (Note that later published summaries of
this study give the correlation as Spearman's rather than Pearson's; the
probability level of the correlation does not, however, differ between the two
measures, and so conclusions are not affected by this ambiguity.)
Since then there have been a further 15 experiments directly comparing
subjects' performance on the DMT to their performance in restricted-choice
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psi tasks (usually called the DMT-ESP studies). These experiments have been
conducted by researchers in the USA, Holland, and Iceland, but it is
important to note that two principal investigators, Martin Johnson and
Erlendur Haraldsson, have been involved in most of these studies. A
distinctive feature of the Icelandic experiments is that they were planned at
the outset to be a series of ten studies conducted and reported systematically
to enable detailed comparisons between the studies. Haraldsson and Johnson
have used a convention of labelling the DMT-ESP studies by country and
order of publication, and table 2.1 gives the full authorship of each study.
These 16 studies all used broadly similar methods and the features of a
typical experiment were as follows. Subjects were volunteer undergraduate
students (the Icelandic series used male subjects only and tried to avoid using
psychology students). There were two testing sessions. In one, subjects were
administered the DMT (Martin Johnson, with his extensive experience of the
DMT, usually administered the test) and in the other session the subjects took
one or two ESP tests (the order of the two sessions varied unsystematically
across experiments; there was no attempt to counterbalance the order of the
ESP tasks administered to subjects, and there is no indication in the published
reports of the DMT-ESP studies whether or not the order of testing affected
the results). In the Icelandic series, psychology students administered the ESP
tests. The DMT was administered to groups of subjects rather than
individually, so a slide projector with a camera shutter was used (rather than
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Johnson & Haraldsson (1984)
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Haraldsson & Houtkooper (1992)
The ESP tests were of restricted-choice clairvoyance or precognitive design,
and the Icelandic studies and US studies II and III attempted to encourage
some light-hearted competition between subject pairs participating in the ESP
test. For example, in Icelandic V the first ESP test was a forced-choice
clairvoyance computer game with feedback. Subjects worked in pairs,
alternating periods at the computer until each had completed 40 trials.
Rewards (such as a book token or an LP record) were sometimes offered to
encourage high scoring on this test. The second ESP test was 40 trials of a
forced-choice precognition test, where subjects had to guess which of four
letters would later be selected by a computer as their targets. Sometimes,
questionnaires were also administered to measure subject personality and
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Table 2.2
Summary of the psi tasks usedfor the DMT-ESP studies
Study First psi task Second psi task
US I Clairvoyance3
-
US II Clairvoyance -
US III Clairvoyance -
Dutch I Clairvoyance -
Dutch II Clairvoyance -
Dutch III Clairvoyance & PK^
Icelandic I Clairvoyance Precognition
Icelandic II Clairvoyance Precognition
Icelandic III Clairvoyance Precognition
Icelandic IV Precognition Clairvoyance
Icelandic V Clairvoyance Precognition
Icelandic VI Clairvoyance Precognition
Icelandic VII Clairvoyance Clairvoyance
Icelandic VIII Clairvoyance Clairvoyance
Icelandic IX Clairvoyance Precognition
Icelandic X Clairvoyance Precognition
a The brief report of this study (Carpenter, 1965) states that three 'very different' ESP
experiments took place using the same subjects. Only two of the three experiments showed
'striking associations' between ESP and DMT scores, and details of the psi task are given for
only one of these; this was a forced choice clairvoyance task.
b Details of this study have not been published; it is briefly mentioned by Haraldsson et al.
(1987), and by Johnson & Haraldsson (1984). The latter describe the psi task as 'a
complicated combined computer test of clairvoyance and of retroactive PK' (p.195).
attitudes towards ESP. Table 2.2 summarises the psi tasks used for the
various DMT-ESP studies.
Thirteen of the 16 DMT-ESP studies operated a double-blind procedure
where the DMT ratings and the ESP scores were independently calculated
and were then correlated at a later date. Typically, Ulf Kragh or Martin
Johnson rated the DMT protocols. As is seen in table 2.3 (page 40), while
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there was a significant overall correlation between level of defensiveness and
direction of ESP scoring (combining the two psi task scores) where high
defensive individuals tended to score poorly at ESP and low defensive
individuals tended to score well at ESP (see the meta-analysis to be described
shortly), overall ESP scores have tended to be non-significant. Haraldsson &
Houtkooper (1992) reported, however, that of the two ESP tasks in the
Icelandic series (clairvoyance and precognition), the combined precognition
score (based on the number of hits or correct guesses obtained) for the ten
studies was statistically significant (z=2.413, p=.008, 1-t). Combining scores
for both psi tasks, there was a significant decline in the strength of the DMT-
ESP correlation both within the Icelandic series (rs=.636, N=10, p<.05, 2-t) and
over all 16 studies (rs=.794, N=16, pc.OOl, 2-t) (Haraldsson & Houtkooper,
1992).
An Icelandic version of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire was
administered in Icelandic studies V, VII, VIII, IX, and X, and an Icelandic
version of Cattell's 16PF test was administered in Icelandic studies I, II, and
III. Haraldsson & Houtkooper (1992) found no significant relationships
between Neuroticism, Extraversion, and psi performance (there was a
significant negative correlation between Psychoticism and combined psi
scores [so that subjects low on psychoticism scored relatively high on ESP;
Z=-2.071, p=.038, 2-t], but as this is a post hoc finding replication is needed).
Also, no significant correlation was found between Neuroticism,
Extraversion, and DMT scores. This latter finding is in accord with Kragh &
Smith's (1970) finding that DMT scores were unrelated to other major
personality dimensions; Cooper & Kline (1986), too, found only small
correlations between DMT scores and 16PF scores (though the general pattern
of correlations was as predicted by percept-genetic and Freudian theory).
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Meta-Analysis of the DMT-ESP Studies
As the findings reviewed in the previous section show, there have already
been some attempts to analyse the DMT-ESP studies as a group (Haraldsson,
Houtkooper, & Hoeltje, 1987; Haraldsson & Houtkooper, 1992), but these
attempts consisted primarily of calculations of combined significance levels.
There has been no reported effort to estimate the overall magnitude (that is,
effect size) of the DMT-ESP correlation, and its confidence limits; only
recently (Haraldsson & Houtkooper, 1992) has there been any attempt to
establish the homogeneity (consistency) of the findings of the DMT-ESP
studies. It was decided, therefore, to conduct a meta-analysis of the 16
principal DMT-ESP studies, using the data reported in table 2.3.
Honorton, Ferrari & Bern (1990) describe a simple technique for the meta¬
analysis of correlation coefficients (using procedures detailed by Hedges &
Olkin, 1985, and Rosenthal, 1984) and this technique was applied to the DMT-
ESP data shown in Table 2.3. Spearman correlation coefficients were
converted to their Fisher z equivalents, were weighted by their df, and
averaged; two-tailed significance levels and 95% confidence intervals were
calculated; chi-square tests of homogeneity were conducted and mean zs were
transformed back to r as an indicator of effect size. The results of this meta¬
analysis are summarised in Table 2.4.
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Table 2.3
Results of the DMT-ESP studies (adapted from Haraldsson & Houtkooper, 1992):
number of participants(N), Spearman's rho for overall ESP scores and DMT scores,
and statistical significance ofDMT-ESP correlation.
Study N rho p(1-t) Notes
US I 10 .79 .01 Pilot study, not double-blind.
US II 16 .67 .005 Pilot study, not double-blind.
US III 11 .59 .05
DUTCH I 18 .42 .05 Pilot study, individual DMT testing.
DUTCH II 49 .26 .05
DUTCH II 16 -.19 NS
ICELANDIC I 37 .47 .002
ICELANDIC II 37 .17 NS
ICELANDIC III 41 .02 NS
ICELANDIC IV 54 .25 .03 Only partially double-blind. Prior selection
of subjects based on extreme dream recall
questionnaire scores or extreme scores on
precognition test.
ICELANDIC V 46 .11 NS
ICELANDIC VI 44 .06 NS
ICELANDIC VII 48 .11 NS
ICELANDIC VIII 50 -.09 NS
ICELANDIC IX 50 -.04 NS
ICELANDIC X 55 .10 NS
Icelandic studies VII and VIII gave two clairvoyance tests, the other Icelandic studies gave
one clairvoyance and one precognition test; in study IV the precognition test preceded the
clairvoyance test, in all other studies the clairvoyance test was administered first (see table
2.2). The correlations shown are between DMT scores and total ESP scores.
Table 2.4
Meta-analysis of DMT-ESP studies
Study Grouping N(Ss) Effect size 95% c.i. z p(2-t) ChiScj(df)
(N studies) (rs) From To
All (16) 582 .16 .08 .24 3.82 .00014 27.84(15df)1
Icelandic(lO) 462 .11 .02 .20 2.32 .02028 10.01(9df)
US(3) 37 .68 .30 .78 4.43 .00001 .60(2df)
Dutch(3) 83 .22 -.01 .42 1.91 .05572 3.09(2df)
Double-Blind(13) 502 .12 .03 .21 2.65 .00797 15.44(12df)




Table 2.4 demonstrates that, with the exception of the marginally significant
Dutch sub-group of studies, the DMT-ESP relationship is statistically
significant (overall p=.00014, 2-t); however the size of the correlation is fairly
modest (r=.16 overall) and the 95% confidence interval for the effect ranges
close to zero (from .08 to .24). The greatest effect size (r=.68) is found for the 3
US studies, however 2 of these were not double-blind, so that the DMT scorer
might be aware of a subject's ESP scores, thus perhaps unconsciously
influencing his interpretation of the DMT protocols in the expected direction
and enhancing the DMT-ESP correlation. The correlation for the 1 double-
blind US study was higher than all the other double-blind studies, raising the
possibility that the US results may not be homogeneous with the northern
European results. The Dutch and the Icelandic studies do not have
significantly different correlations from each other or from the overall group
of studies. The statistically significant homogeneity value for all 16 studies
(x2 = 27.84, 15df, p<.025) indicates that there is a significant amount of
heterogeneity in the DMT-ESP studies overall, and the not double-blind
studies are also significantly nonhomogeneous (x2 = 6.12, 2df, p<.05). The 3
US studies provide the prime source of homogeneity (x2 = -60, 2df). In other
words, the study outcomes are fairly inconsistent overall and the US studies
are most consistent.
'Miscellaneous' DMT-ESP studies
In addition to the 16 principal DMT-ESP studies included in the meta¬
analysis, there are a few others which are relevant to this review, though they
are too diverse in their methodology to be directly compared with the main
studies through a meta-analysis (Haraldsson et al., 1987)
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Miller & York (1976) created their own 'unofficial' version of the DMT, and
selected high and low scorers from this test to participate in a subsequent
free-response clairvoyance task incorporating a relaxation tape with an
'impression period'. No significant 'DMT'-ESP correlation was found, though
results were in the expected direction. A follow-up study by York (1977) gave
subjects the DMT and in a subsequent session subjects participated in a free-
response 'ganzfeld' clairvoyance procedure. In the ganzfeld procedure used
for this study, subjects were not exposed to red light and did not hear
continuous white or pink noise. Instead, they listened to a muscular and
mental relaxation tape which concluded with five minutes of white noise as
an 'impression period' followed by a reminder to relax then a second five
minute white noise impression period. Full results for this study have not
been published, but are included in an unpublished paper (York & Morris,
1978). A comparison of two groups of relatively high and relatively low DMT
scorers found no significant difference between the groups' ESP scores (f=.82,
26df, p>.30, 2-t). However the study did yield significant psi scoring (Z=2.92,
p<.005, 2-t). The authors suggest that the reason why the DMT failed to
predict psi scores could be because the ganzfeld procedure and the relaxation
tape might be less likely to activate defences than the experimental conditions
typically seen in the principal DMT-ESP experiments, where there is often an
attempt to create a competitive situation which may raise subjects' stress
levels. Morris has also noted (personal communication, 1993) that the DMT
scores for this study indicated that subjects tended to be fairly low defensive
overall, perhaps reflecting the 'laid back' nature of the Californian student
sample at this particular university (University of California, Santa Barbara).
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Similar results and conclusions were reported in a study by Haraldsson &
Gissurarson (1985) (which claims to be the first to compare DMT scores with
free-response ESP performance in the ganzfeld). They selected high and low
DMT scorers from Icelandic VII, but found no significant DMT-ESP
correlation; in fact the observed small correlation was opposite to the
predicted direction. The authors speculate (like York and Morris) that the
failure of the DMT-ESP correlation to generalise to their study could be due
to the use of the ganzfeld condition in the ESP test. Perhaps the ganzfeld is
insufficiently stressful for the subject to activate defence mechanisms. They
note also that in psychoanalytic theory, free association (similar in some
respects to the ganzfeld situation) has been considered to decrease the
operation of defence mechanisms.
These findings may suggest that whatever aspect of the subject that is
measured by the DMT is influenced by the experimental setting: studies
which have been designed to engender some stress in subjects have generally
shown a positive DMT-ESP correlation, whereas no significant correlation is
seen in studies where there have been attempts to reduce subjects' stress
levels through the use of the ganzfeld and relaxation procedures. A
confounding factor may be that the former studies have generally used
restricted-choice ESP tasks, while the latter have used free-response ESP
tasks, so that the nature of the psi task may also interact with the subjects'
DMT performance.
Other studies relevant to the DMT-ESP work have been carried out by
Johnson & Hartwell (1979) and Johnson & Nordbeck (unpublished, cited in
Johnson & Kanthamani, 1967). The former was an exploratory study which
tried to relate defensiveness to success at guessing and changes in galvanic
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skin response as the ESP measures. As it was testing no specific hypotheses
and few subjects showed sufficient extremes of defensiveness to allow an
examination of the DMT-ESP relationship, this study was not included
together with the principal studies. The latter experiment was also a
preliminary test utilising an exploratory scoring system for the DMT. Rather
than evaluating subjects' protocols according to the usual 9-point rating scale,
it was decided to look only for one 'positive' and one 'negative' indicator (the
idea being that these indicators were relatively easy to identify in DMT
protocols even for an inexperienced rater). The 'positive' indicator was the C-
phase (correct phase) criterion (briefly, an indication that the subject has
correctly perceived the main elements of the stimulus picture). The 'negative'
indicator was a sign of isolation described as 'threat discontinuity' (briefly,
the subject identifies a threat in the earlier, short stimulus exposures, but
ceases to identify this threat in later, longer duration exposures). It was found
that significantly more 'psi-hitters' than 'psi-missers' reached the C-phase
criterion (p=.0149, 1-t); more psi-missers showed the negative indicator than
did psi-hitters, though this was not statistically significant (p=.0650,2-t).
Discussion
Drawbacks of the DMT and suggestions for a conceptual replication of
the DMT-ESP studies.
This review and meta-analysis has demonstrated that there exists a
statistically significant correlation between DMT scores and ESP
performance, such that 'high defensive' individuals tend to score lower on
ESP tasks than 'low defensive' individuals, and Palmer (1986b) cites the
replicability of the DMT-ESP studies as one of the more significant
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accomplishments of experimental parapsychology. The meta-analysis shows,
however, that the overall effect size is quite weak (r=.16) with 95% confidence
intervals coming close to zero (from .08 to .24). The results of the studies
comparing free-response ESP performance to exploratory versions of the
DMT have been inconclusive, but other studies (discussed at the beginning of
this chapter) have supported the defensiveness-psi relationship using
alternative measures of defensiveness or related personality characteristics
(related in the sense that these characteristics may contribute to distortions of
reality or resistance to unpleasant, stressful, or threatening information).
The decline in the DMT-ESP correlation over time, shown graphically in
figure 2.1, may be because the earliest studies were not double-blind, perhaps
leading to an artefactual inflation of the correlation for these studies.
However, even excluding the studies which were not double-blind, there
remains a pattern of declining DMT-ESP correlations that resembles the
famous 'decline effect' that has been observed within and between many
parapsychological experiments (Palmer, 1978), often thought to be due to
declining motivation and interest both on the part of experimenters and
subjects.
The decline in DMT-ESP correlations over time is statistically significant, both
for all 16 studies (rs=0.794, N=16, pc.OOl, 2-t) and for the 10 Icelandic studies
(rs=0.636, N=10, p<.05, 2-t) (Haraldsson & Houtkooper, 1992). There is a
confound, of course, between the decline in the DMT-ESP effect over time,
and the country in which each study was conducted, with the earliest studies
being US, the next being Dutch I and II (there is no published information on
the date that Dutch III was conducted), and the most recent being the
Icelandic series. If, in figure 2.1, we consider the correlations by country, we
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see that the clearest declines are for the US and Dutch studies (recall that the
first two US studies were not double-blind). For the Icelandic studies, there is
an obvious peak for Icelandic I, and then the remaining studies are actually
quite varied in their results; the significant decline effect for these studies is
probably attributable to the results of Icelandic I and Icelandic VIII and IX.
It has been suggested that the pattern of correlation in the DMT-ESP studies
represents some kind of initial effect or experimenter effect, as each of the
experimental series was begun with fresh energy and enthusiasm by either
Martin Johnson or Erlendur Haraldsson (Haraldsson & Johnson, 1979).
Figure 2.1
DMT-ESP correlations (rs), presented chronologically; U=US; D=Dutcha;
I=Icelandic.
a Dutch Study 3 is not included in this graphic because there is no published information
regarding the date that this study was conducted; the DMT-ESP correlation for Dutch Study
3 was -0.19.
46
Because different student experimenters conducted the ESP tests in the
Icelandic series, though, this might be expected to circumvent the decline
effect to some extent. Alternatively, it is possible that the declining
correlations reflect unreported changes in subjects' or experimenters' attitude,
methodology, or analysis of results. For instance, Haraldsson & Houtkooper
(1992) speculate:
Could the prevalence of increasingly bloody horror movies
explain the decline in the series of DMT-ESP correlations, by
lowering the intensity of the perceived threat or lack of
identification with the central person which is displayed in the
DMT? (p.1094).
The authors themselves stress the need for independent replication of the
DMT-ESP studies (Johnson & Haraldsson, 1984; Haraldsson, Houtkooper, &
Hoeltje, 1987), as most of these studies have been conducted at least in part by
only two researchers: Johnson and Haraldsson. Given that one of the
criticisms often levelled at parapsychology is a lack of repeatability (which
can be due to lack of replication attempts, which is the case for the DMT-ESP
studies, or to failed replication attempts), why is it that other
parapsychologists have been slow to follow-up on these promising findings?
The answer may lie with some of the practical and theoretical difficulties
associated with the DMT.
Drawbacks of the DMT. It is likely that practical difficulties in using the
DMT have discouraged other researchers from following-up the DMT-ESP
studies. Firstly, at least three months' intensive (and expensive) training is
needed to learn how to administer and score the DMT. Even after the basic
training, it may take many years before testers can code subjects' protocols for
the presence or absence of the 10 defensive signs with sufficient objectivity to
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achieve a respectable degree of inter-rater reliability. Of studies of DMT inter-
rater reliability, Kragh notes:
The inter-rater reliabilities are low to satisfactory in comparison
with ordinary aptitude tests, and as good or better than those of
ratings based on projective methods. The reliability coefficients
seem to correlate positively with the increased training of the
rater, and with the use of the complete code version. The
coefficients vary between .57 and .90 with a mean (for all raters)
of .70. (Kragh, 1970, p. 185)
Icelandic study IV reported an impressive inter-rater reliability between Ulf
Kragh and Martin Johnson of between r=.90 and r=.93. However, Johnson
was a student and researcher with Kragh, the founder of the DMT. No other
parapsychologists have had the opportunity of such close collaboration with
the originator of the test. While researchers have argued that the DMT scoring
scheme 'requires few interpretations by the rater' (Cooper & Kline, 1986,
p.22), it does seem that 'objective' scoring is more easily achieved by
experienced raters. Few psychologists outside of Scandinavian countries are
familiar with the DMT, and there is only one published translation of the
complex scoring scheme into English (Westerlundh, 1976; there is also an
English translation in an unpublished PhD thesis by Cooper, 1982).
Experienced raters are therefore relatively rare, thus perpetuating the lack of
familiarity with the DMT.
Another drawback of the DMT is that it is rather time-consuming to
administer and score. Group testing (with around 4 to 7 subjects, a procedure
used for all the DMT-ESP studies, with the exception of Dutch study I;
information on DMT testing conditions has not been published for Dutch
study III and for US study I) is obviously a quicker means of DMT
administration than individual testing, but outside of parapsychology
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individual testing is preferred to group testing because the latter makes it
difficult to ensure that each subject experiences identical levels of stimulus
and background illumination, identical angles and distances from the screen,
and so on. Irrespective of whether individual or group testing is used, the
analysis of each subject's series of responses to the DMT stimuli must be done
individually, and this is a lengthy process. When resources of time and
money are scarce, parapsychologists might be more inclined to use a more
convenient measure of defensiveness.
A third drawback of the DMT is the question of validity, which has already
been mentioned above when considering the theoretical assumptions
underlying the DMT. Certainly the DMT appears to have validity in applied
settings; but it is not yet clear what exactly the DMT is measuring - is it the
operation of Freudian defence mechanisms, is it perceptual distortions caused
by physiologically arousing emotional stimuli, or is it measuring something
else entirely? When parapsychologists come to question the reasons
underlying the defensiveness-psi correlation (that is, process-oriented
questions about the relationship between psi performance, the nature of the
psi task, and aspects of the subject's motivation, attitudes, personality, and
perception, and what all of these might suggest for information-processing
models of psi), they will need to have a clearer idea of the dynamics behind
DMT responses.
Related to this question of validity, is that concerning the aim of the DMT. It
is principally geared to identifying individuals on the dimension of
defensiveness, so that scores may indicate a person to be 'high defensive' or
'low defensive'. As Kragh and Smith (1970) point out:
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...the negative influence of pathogenic factors has so far been
almost the exclusive object of investigation in the DMT, while
the task of extricating 'positive' control mechanisms is still in
abeyance, (p.179)
In chapter 1 it was noted that in the paradigm of subliminal perception, there
are two sides to perceptual defensiveness: 'perceptually defensive'
individuals are slower to report awareness of emotive stimuli compared to
neutral stimuli; others, known as 'perceptually vigilant', identify emotional
stimuli more rapidly than neutral stimuli. It may be that the DMT is very
good at identifying perceptually defensive individuals because it is designed
to do this: its original development, it will be recalled, was as an instrument
to select out pilots likely to be involved in accidents. It is not clear, however,
whether a 'low defensive' score is equivalent to 'perceptually vigilant' (=
'especially alert or sensitive to danger') or to a 'lack of defensiveness' (= 'not
resistant to stressful or threatening information'). Kragh and Smith (1970) do
seem to imply that the dimensionality of defensiveness has not yet been fully
elucidated. Parapsychologists, however, may also profit from identifying
perceptually vigilant individuals, as there is some indication from the
research outlined above (for example, research showing that individuals who
are relatively open or susceptible to subliminal perception also perform
relatively well at psi tasks; Roney-Dougal, 1987) that these individuals might
be expected to score above chance expectation in a psi task.
The above-mentioned problems should not overshadow the fact that the DMT
can successfully predict responses to environmental stress in a practical
setting. Further, it already has an honourable place in parapsychological
research. This position may be strengthened by those future studies which are
planning to use the DMT. Adrian Parker, for instance, is studying the
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relationship between absorption, defensiveness as measured by the DMT,
and reported anomalous experiences, from clinical, cognitive and
parapsychological perspectives (Parker, 1989). Another question worth
following up is whether the DMT-ESP correlation is specific to restricted-
choice ESP tasks, as the results of studies comparing DMT performance to
free-response ESP performance have been inconclusive (Miller & York, 1976;
York, 1977, results in York & Morris, 1978; Haraldsson & Gissurarson, 1985).
York and Morris (unpublished) suggest that further studies should look at the
DMT-ESP correlation in different psi-testing modes, for example competition
versus no competition, use of psi-conducive procedures versus non-psi
conducive procedures. Research along these lines may give further insight
into the relationship between defensiveness and psi scoring.
Towards a conceptual replication of the DMT-ESP studies. The early part
of this chapter reviewed a miscellany of studies that had used a variety of
different indicators of defensiveness (defined broadly as a tendency to distort
or to resist potentially unpleasant or threatening information) and that had
related subjects' performance on these measures with their psi performance.
These studies were inspired by a common idea that there was some similarity
in people's unconscious reactions to weak information, whether that
information be of 'normal' or 'extrasensory' origin. Generally, the findings of
these 'defensiveness-psi' studies indicated a tendency for individuals who
were relatively low defensive, or 'open', to perform relatively well at psi
tasks. Due to their variety, however, it is difficult systematically to compare
and replicate these studies.
The DMT-ESP studies, on the other hand, while conceptually related to the
studies using different measures of defensiveness, have been conducted in a
more systematic fashion, using a test that has been extensively researched
and developed as a measure of defensiveness in its own right. The DMT-ESP
studies are therefore amenable to direct and quantifiable comparisons with
one another, as well as to replication attempts. I have outlined some reasons
why parapsychologists other than Johnson and Haraldsson have tended not
to attempt exact replications of the DMT-ESP studies; probably the practical
difficulty of lack of expertise has played the greatest role in discouraging
parapsychologists from following up the DMT-ESP studies. However, the
promising DMT-ESP findings can also be followed up by research which is
conceptually similar, though not using the DMT itself as an indicator of
defensiveness.
It is one of the principal aims of this thesis to explore an alternative 'objective'
measure of defensiveness, using the definition of perceptual
defence/vigilance found in the subliminal perception paradigm. The aim
would be to overcome many of the problems, outlined above, associated with
the use of the DMT, and to introduce a methodology that could facilitate
process-oriented research into defensiveness/vigilance and its relationship to
psi performance. This comparison of psi and defensiveness is based on the
theoretical assumption (originally elucidated by Tyrrell's two-stage model of
psi (1947) and, as described in chapter 1, later adopted implicitly or explicitly
by many parapsychologists) that common processes may act to distort or
transform weak unconscious perceptions, whether these perceptions are
subliminal or extrasensory in origin.
In order to progress towards this aim it is necessary and informative to
review, in chapter 3, some of the principal measures of defensiveness used in
psychology.
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Chapter 3. Review of measures reported to demonstrate
perceptual defence/vigilance.
This chapter reviews different measures of defensiveness with a view to
identifying a simple and effective method suitable for use in studies of
defensiveness and psi. Firstly, 'Serial' and 'Paper and Pencil' techniques are
briefly discussed. For a more detailed examination of these measures of
defensiveness, see Cooper (1982), whose PhD thesis was concerned with the
experimental investigation of Freudian defences; Smith & Kragh (1970)
review the techniques employed in percept-genetic research, together with an
account of the history of these techniques; and Kline (1981) considers defence
mechanisms as they are conceptualised in Freudian theory. Later in this
chapter, more detailed consideration will be given to subliminal perception
techniques, after a discussion of what constitutes awareness.
'Serial' Measures of Defensiveness
The Defence Mechanism Test is only one of several measures of defensiveness
that share the assumption that perception is an adaptive process, reflecting
the operation of both internal (personality and motivation) and external
(stimulus) variables. 'Serial' methods, such as the DMT, the Stroop Test,
After-image and After-Effect techniques, and the Metacontrast technique, aim
to examine the perceptual process, or subjects' reactions to stimuli over time,
by prolonging, fractionating, or intermittently interrupting the presentation
of the stimulus (Smith & Kragh, 1970).
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The Serial Colour-Word (Stroop) Test (Stroop, 1935) presents subjects
with columns of names of different colours, printed in different colour
ink (for example, the word 'red' printed in green ink). The subject is
required to say out loud the printed word, ignoring the colour in
which it is printed. Originally, researchers were only interested in
overall reading times for interference and non-interference series
(Thurstone, 1943). The test was later adapted as a serial technique by
scoring the reading time of the subject after 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100
words (e.g. Smith & Klein, 1953). Depending on the pattern of errors
made, the subjects are classified into one of three 'cognitive styles' that
can be related to clinical variables (for example, anxious subjects'
performance steadily deteriorates).
After-image (e.g. Smith & Kragh, 1967) and After-Effect (e.g.
Andersson, 1962) techniques observe subjects' reported perceptual
experiences after they have been looking at repeated exposures of,
respectively, an intense stimulus (e.g., a simple red figure with a sad
mouth in black) or a rotating spiral pattern. Again, it is hypothesised
that by prolonging or fractionating the presentation of a visual
stimulus, individual differences in behavioural reactions to the
experience can be noted. The nature of subjects' reports is thought to
vary systematically depending on the subjects' psychopathology
(Smith & Kragh, 1970).
The Metacontrast Technique (e.g. Bokander & Radeborg, 1967)
examines how a stimulus that is presented very briefly
(tachistoscopically), either just before or during exposure of a second
stimulus via the tachistoscope, affects the perception of that second
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stimulus. It is thought that incongruous stimuli provoke anxiety and
subsequent defences. There are some similarities between the scoring
schemes of the Metacontrast technique and the DMT, with the
Metacontrast technique scoring revealing signs of 'repression',
'isolation', 'sensitivity', 'projection', 'stereotypy', 'depression',
'instability', 'discontinuity', and 'psychosis and abnormity' (Smith &
Kragh, 1970).
Cooper (1982) concludes that all of these serial techniques have only limited
application because although they can differentiate between 'clinical' groups
of individuals (e.g. schizophrenics versus depressives), fewer distinctive
signs of defensiveness are seen for 'normal' individuals. The DMT is seen as a
clinical test because expert understanding is required in order to score it
reliably.
'Paper and Pencil' Measures of Defensiveness
There also exist 'paper and pencil' scales that purport to measure
defensiveness. These include the Repression-Sensitization Scale; the Defense
Mechanism Inventory; and the Defence Preference Inquiry. In these tests,
subjects are required to introspect about their reactions in hypothetical
situations that might evoke defensiveness.
The Repression-Sensitization (R-S) Scale (Byrne, 1961, 1964; Byrne,
Barry, & Nelson, 1963) is a questionnaire that asks respondents to
indicate whether statements such as 'My sleep is fitful and disturbed'
and 'I believe I am no more nervous than most others' are true or false
descriptions of themselves. Individuals' responses to the scale are
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considered by Byrne to place them on a continuum according to their
characteristic modes of responding to threatening stimuli:
The repressive extreme involves avoidance defenses,
such as denial, while the sensitizing extreme refers to
approach defenses, such as intellectualization. (Byrne,
Barry, & Nelson, 1963, p.323).
The Defence Mechanism Inventory (Gleser & Ihilevich, 1969; Ihilevich
& Gleser, 1986) presents subjects with a booklet containing 10 short
stories and sets of possible responses to each situation. The sets of
responses are intended to be 'operational definitions' of different
defence mechanisms, and the respondents are required to indicate
which responses they would be most likely and least likely to make if
the events of the story were to happen to them.
The Defence Preference Inquiry (Blum, 1949) shows subjects the
'Blacky Pictures' (Blacky is a little dog performing various acts
hypothesised, within Freudian theory, to reflect critical stages of
psychosexual development). This test bears some similarity to the DMI
test, in that the respondent is required to rank order the likelihood that
Blacky is feeling or acting according to a given set of descriptions; each
description is intended to correspond to one of the defence
mechanisms.
Such paper and pencil instruments purporting to measure possibly
unconscious mechanisms such as defensiveness have been criticised because,
by definition, individuals cannot have introspective access to unconscious
processes, and conscious efforts at suppression will affect scores on, for
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instance, the R-S scale (Cooper, 1982). The measures do not actually attempt
to activate possibly defensive tendencies, so it is possible that these tests are
measuring something other than defensiveness.
On a practical level, also, the reliability and validity of some of these paper
and pencil measures has been questioned (Kline, 1981). For instance, the
Repression-Sensitization Scale has been criticised by Joy (1963) as correlating
-.91 with Edwards' (1957) Social Desirability Scale, which may suggest that
the R-S scale is measuring conscious response suppression. There have been
few studies of the validity of the Defence Preference Inquiry, though there is
some evidence that this relates to measures of perceptual defence (e.g. Blum,
1955) in ways that would be expected if the Defence Preference Inquiry
measures repression validly. While the Defence Mechanism Inventory is
described by its founders as 'An objective instrument for measuring defence
mechanisms' (Gleser & Ihilevich, 1969), Kline (1981) reviews studies
conducted with the DMI and concludes: 'there is little evidence attesting to
the validity of the DMI variables...Nor can the scales be used as objective
measures of defences' (p.251).
It would be desirable to identify a measure of defensiveness that measures an
aspect of individuals' perceptual experience outwith their conscious control.
The third class of purported measures of defensiveness that will be
considered are 'objective' insofar as they show high objectivity in their scoring
and are difficult to fake by subjects. These are studies of perceptual defence,
within the subliminal perception paradigm.
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Introduction to Subliminal Perception
In a subliminal perception task, subjects are presented with a stimulus which
is either so weak in intensity or of such short duration that they claim to be
unaware of any stimulation. Researchers then look for any influence of that
subliminal stimulus on the subjects' subsequent behaviour such as their
response to a following stimulus; such influence is thought to indicate that
information has been extracted from the perceptual input of which the subject
was not consciously aware.
For example, Somekh and Wilding (1973) presented the words 'HAPPY' and
'SAD' subliminally to one eye, and presented a neutral face supraliminally to
the other eye. The subjects tended to describe the neutral face as 'happy'
when it was presented in association with the subliminal 'HAPPY' stimulus,
and to describe the neutral face as 'sad' when it was presented in association
with the subliminal 'SAD' stimulus.
In studies of perceptual defence and perceptual vigilance, attention turns to
the 'threshold' area at which the subject begins to become aware of the
stimulus. This 'threshold' is variable and diffuse rather than absolute, but this
does not mean that it is wrong to speak of a 'threshold'. As Dixon points out,
one may allow the notion of threshold as a 'fuzzy' limen that varies from time
to time; thus a stimulus is subliminal if it is 'below the range over which a
limen may vary' (Dixon, 1981, p.188).
It is thought that the emotive nature of some stimuli alter physiological
sensitivity thus raising (perceptual defence) or lowering (perceptual
vigilance) awareness thresholds (e.g. Brown, 1961, Dixon, 1981). As
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awareness thresholds may vary from one individual to another (e.g., due to
differing baseline arousal level, response tendencies, eyesight), it is usual for
experiments in perceptual defence/vigilance firstly to establish for each
subject that level of stimulus intensity or duration that corresponds to the
subject's awareness threshold. This may be done, for instance, by presenting a
stimulus quite clearly, and then at gradually decreasing intensity or duration,
until the subject reports no awareness of the stimulus (or, say, correctly
identifies the stimulus only 50% of the time; criteria for establishing
awareness thresholds have varied from one experimenter to the next, and are
to some extent arbitrary). Alternatively, one could begin with extremely brief
or low intensity subliminal stimulus exposures, and gradually increase them
until the awareness threshold is reached.
Subliminal perception is often confused with what may be termed
'nonconscious perception' (Price, 1990). The former specifically attempts to
present stimuli below the limen, or threshold, of awareness. The latter can
refer to any technique that presents stimuli outside of awareness, for instance
while the focus of attention is elsewhere (such as in the dichotic listening
paradigm where subjects attend to input to one ear and ignore input to the
other), or where a briefly presented visual stimulus is followed by a 'mask'
(usually consisting of jumbled stimulus fragments) which can 'obscure'
awareness of the initial stimulus. Thus, subliminal perception is a
subcategory of nonconscious perception.
There have been extensive criticisms of subliminal perception experiments,
especially the early ones; for details of these, including rebuttals of many
criticisms, see the numerous literature reviews considering the strength of the
evidence for subliminal perception: Adams, 1957; Bevan, 1964; Dixon, 1971,
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1981; Dixon & Henley, 1980; Eriksen, 1960; Goldiamond, 1958; Holender,
1986; Merikle & Cheesman, 1987; Shevrin & Dickman, 1980; and Greenwald
(and accompanying articles). Dixon (1981) probably gives the most
comprehensive review of criticisms of subliminal perception studies. Some of
the criticisms are less damaging to the case for subliminal perception than
others. Among the weaker arguments reviewed (and countered) by Dixon are
that:
1. subliminal perception effects are so slight that they are trivial (but
small effects may nevertheless be important);
2. it is logically impossible for something to be perceived in order not
to perceive it (perhaps this is an objection if processing were sequential
or only on one level; but if one allows for parallel processing, or
processing at nonconscious as well as conscious levels, there is no
conundrum);
3. the unconscious cannot be more sensitive or discriminating than the
conscious (this is a misunderstanding of the literature; actually, the
subliminal perception literature neither claims nor implies that the
unconscious is 'supersensitive' compared to the conscious);
4. subliminal perception is physiologically impossible - there exist no
brain mechanisms for transmitting, interpreting and responding to
information without conscious representation (Dixon counters that, in
fact, there exist brain mechanisms that could enable perception
without conscious awareness).
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The remaining objections to subliminal perception reviewed by Dixon (1981)
are, in my opinion, more serious (this fact has, however, been recognised by
researchers via methodological improvements in relatively recent studies).
Briefly:
5. there are 'alternative explanations' for apparent subliminal effects,
implied in failures to replicate studies that originally successfully
demonstrated subliminal perception effects. Dixon argues that the
unsuccessful replication studies often include methodological
characteristics that:
render it likely that subliminal stimuli will be ineffective,
either because they never register, through interference
at the peripheral receptor, or because attention is
directed away from the modality in which subliminal
stimuli are being applied, or because other, competing,
response tendencies militate against the subject's ability
to signal that he has registered a stimulus below the
awareness threshold. (Dixon, 1981, p.191)
6. subjects in subliminal perception studies are able to show signs of
having perceived the stimulus because the stimulus is not truly
subliminal - there are actually partial cues as to the stimulus identity;
thus, for instance, apparent perceptual defence to taboo words (as
indicated by higher recognition thresholds for taboo than for neutral
words) might represent conscious response suppression by subjects
who wish to avoid the embarrassment of wrongly identifying as taboo
a partially perceived word that might be neutral. (Dixon counters that
the partial cue hypothesis cannot account for experiments where
subjects have given responses that are semantically related to the
'subliminal' stimulus, but that, contrary to what one might expect if the
61
subject was perceiving partial information about the stimulus, are
structurally quite different from the subliminal stimulus. Further, studies
showing perceptual vigilance, that is, lower recognition thresholds for
emotional compared to neutral stimuli, are also difficult to account for
in terms of partial cues and response suppression).
As Reingold & Merikle (1988) note, it appears that much of the controversy
over whether or not subliminal perception has been demonstrated can be
traced to the differing (often implicit) assumptions held by different
investigators on, for instance, an operational definition of awareness. One
such assumption is criticised by Macmillan (1986), who suggests that
confusion arises from the implicit definition of a subliminal stimulus as one
that is never detected, in combination with the mistaken assumption that an
observer will unfailingly say 'yes' to all stimulus detections and 'no' to all
failures to detect the stimulus. Merikle (1984) suggests that too many
investigators have used a subjective definition of awareness (that is, one
based on the subject's reported confidence as to whether or not a stimulus has
been perceived). A similar point is made by Bowers (1984), who draws a
distinction between perceiving and noticing information (a notion similar to
Cheesman and Merikle's objective and subjective thresholds), and suggests that
researchers have often failed to acknowledge this distinction, thus adding to
the controversy.
Current status of research into subliminal perception
While 'subliminal perception' has waned in popularity (and respectability) as
a research topic (Dixon, 1981), several nonconscious perception techniques
are relatively common in modern cognitive psychology, where they are being
62
used to investigate processes of lexical access and awareness. There is,
however, still controversy over whether 'semantic activation without
conscious identification' has been demonstrated (see Holender, 1986, and
accompanying peer commentary for a comprehensive review of this issue).
The concepts of consciousness and phenomenological awareness have also
made something of a comeback in psychology. For instance the June 1992
edition of American Psychologist contains a series of articles by leading
researchers in the field of subliminal perception and cognitive psychology,
debating the capabilities of the unconscious (e.g. Anthony Greenwald; Jerome
Bruner; Matthew Erdelyi; John Kihlstrom et al.; and Philip Merikle). How
sophisticated is unconscious cognition? Does sophistication reflect complex
processes (so that, for instance, the meaning of words and even sentences can
be processed), even an ability to deal flexibly with a novel situation (so that,
through mechanisms such as repression and projection, the unconscious can
protect the conscious mind) (Loftus & Klinger, 1992)?
Although there is still little agreement on what these concepts mean, there is
emerging a consensus of opinion that these are worthy topics for study (for a
collection of viewpoints about consciousness, see Marcel & Bisiach, 1988).
Perhaps this relatively recent acknowledgement that the unconscious is no
longer a 'taboo' topic for psychology can be attributed to the waning influence
of behaviourism on modern psychology.
Dixon and Henley (1980) argue that there are eleven areas of research that
provide converging evidence for the existence of perception without
awareness: subliminal perception; binocular rivalry; signal detection
experiments; perceptual defence; 'blind sight'; stabilized images; selective
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attention; sleep and dreams; the Poetzl effect; visual search; and pattern
masking. On the other hand, Merikle & Cheesman (1987) feel that controversy
continues, and that:
an answer to the question, 'Does subliminal perception occur?'
depends entirely on a) how 'subliminal' or the threshold for
perceptual awareness is defined and b) the adequacy of the
procedure used to measure this threshold, (p.298)
Not without reason has the notion of perception without awareness stirred
controversy. One fundamental problem is that different authors have meant
different things by 'awareness' (as was seen in a recent symposium on
Consciousness whose speakers included Kathleen Wilkes, Wolf Singer,
George Butterworth, and Margaret Boden; November 1992). Not only is there
disagreement over what it is to be conscious or aware, but there is also
disagreement on what are the best indicators of awareness (Goldiamond,
1958 and Eriksen, 1960, give excellent reviews of this problem). Indicators
(e.g. galvanic skin response, dream recall, primed biases, free associations,
introspective verbal reports) may vary not only in their sensitivity but also in
their appropriateness (Erdelyi, 1986). For instance, the 'dissociation paradigm'
(Erdelyi, 1986) that underlies much of subliminal perception research finds
evidence for subliminal perception when the subject appears unaware of
some stimulus input but nevertheless shows signs of the availability of the
same stimulus input. Yet dissociations of awareness are easily demonstrated:
It is well known that recognition indicators of memory typically
yield information estimates greater than those of recall
indicators. Yet recognition-recall discrepancies have not usually
been treated as instances of subliminal perception or
memory...Put differently, how do we decide that a particular
indicator of availability...is not simply another indicator of
consciousness? (Erdelyi, 1986, p.31)
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The variety of different viewpoints in cognitive psychology over what
constitutes awareness and what the capabilities of the unconscious are, is
illustrated in the target articles by Holender (1986) and Greenwald (1992) and
the accompanying peer response. This is obviously still an active topic for
debate in contemporary psychology.
Given this controversy, it seems appropriate at this point to take a short
diversion to discuss different conceptions of awareness, and to state how
awareness will be operationalised in the experiments in this thesis.
What constitutes awareness?
There are two main camps of opinion on what constitutes the threshold for
awareness in a perception without awareness experiment. One defines the
awareness threshold 'objectively', as the level of discriminative responding
corresponding to performance at chance expectation (e.g., Marcel, 1983;
Holender, 1986). Signal detection theory methodology is typically used here
(e.g. Macmillan, 1986; Cheesman & Merikle, 1985): a finite number of visual
stimuli are repeatedly presented at varying intensities or for varying lengths
of time and the subject attempts to identify the individual stimuli. The
stimulus exposure level at which the subject's identification performance is no
better than chance would be the 'objective' threshold - above this level the
subject's identification performance begins to improve (even though subjects
may still feel that they are receiving so little stimulus information that they
are merely guessing), and below this level performance remains at chance
expectation.
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The other camp of opinion uses a 'subjective' definition of awareness
threshold, as the level of discriminative responding at which the subject
claims to be performing at chance, or guessing (e.g. Bowers, 1984). Typically,
the subjective threshold is found at a higher level of stimulus intensity than
the objective threshold (Cheesman & Merikle, 1984; 1985). To add to the
controversy is the fact that, while at the subjective threshold subjects claim to
be performing at chance, their actual performance, measured objectively, is
well above chance (Cheesman & Merikle, 1986).
In my opinion, Cheesman and Merikle's (1984) conceptualisation of 'objective'
and 'subjective' thresholds best captures the most significant difference
between the two views of awareness: the first is supposed to be free of bias;
the second is supposed to reflect the subject's phenomenological experience.
Whether or not one adopts an objective or subjective definition of awareness
depends very much on what phenomena are considered to be intriguing or
psychologically important. Many consider the equation of absence of
awareness with d'=0 in a forced choice detection or discrimination procedure
to tell us nothing of what it means to be conscious or unconscious of a
stimulus (e.g. Bisiach, 1986; Cheesman & Merikle, 1986; Fowler, 1986;
Hardaway, 1990; Morton, 1986; Navon, 1986; and Paap, 1986). As Fowler
(1986) says, the subjective threshold "reveals the provocative discrepancy
between what perceivers know and 'what they know they know'" (p.34).
I would argue along with the above researchers that the subjective definition
of awareness is the more meaningful of the two, but although its ecological
validity is a strength, its weakness is its reliance on introspection. Many
authors (e.g. Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Dennett, 1988) feel introspective reports
are unreliable as indicators of phenomenal experience, and signal detection
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techniques have shown that verbal reports are readily biased by, for instance,
the trade-off between the rewards (or benefits) for correct detection and the
punishment (or costs) for errors. Also, adopting a subjective definition of
awareness means that subjects may each adopt their own, idiosyncratic
definition of awareness (Merikle, 1984).
In order to resolve the dilemma of using a definition of awareness that
captures the experiential nature of awareness but which at the same time is
vulnerable to response biases, Cheesman & Merikle (1985, 1986) suggested an
additional criterion to distinguish conscious from unconscious perceptual
processes: there should be an attempt to establish that the same stimulus
could produce qualitatively different behavioural effects when presented above
or below the subjective awareness threshold. As an example of how this looks
in practice, in his study of lexical access Marcel (1980) found that polysemous
or ambiguous words (e.g., money-bank-river; tree-palm-wrist) were
differentially processed depending on whether they were presented above or
below the level of conscious (reported) awareness. Marcel presented three
successive letter strings and asked subjects to indicate whether the first and
the third letter strings were words or nonwords. On critical trials, the second
letter string was a polysemous word such as bank that was either masked or
not masked. The reaction time for the lexical decision to the third letter string
was taken as an index of the particular meaning accessed by a polysemous
word. Marcel found that when all three words were clearly visible, lexical
decisions to the third words in triads such as tree-palm-wrist were slower than
decisions to the third words in triads that contained unrelated words, and the
fastest lexical decisions were made to the third words in series such as hand-
palm-wrist. However, when the second word in a series was masked so that
subjects reported no awareness of its presence, Marcel found a quite different
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pattern of results. In this case, lexical decisions to the third word in triads
such as tree-palm-wrist and hand-palm-wrist were both facilitated relative to the
unrelated word triads. In other words, apparently both meanings of the
second words were activated when these words were presented below the
level of reported awareness, while when these words were clearly visible the
meaning activated by its presentation was biased by the previously presented
word.
From the point of view of the research conducted in this thesis, I would
favour a different resolution to the conflict. The validity of an operational
definition of awareness is only important to those researchers who are
investigating awareness per se, and who are making claims that individuals
can process the meaning of perceptual information without awareness. In
seeking to replicate the DMT-ESP studies conceptually, and in turn to
contribute to our understanding of the defensiveness-psi relationship, I am
looking for a more easily applied measure of perceptual defensiveness or
vigilance than the DMT. With this aim in mind, the question of whether or
not subjects are truly unaware of the stimuli is not pivotal or crucial: the
apparent similarity that has been suggested to exist between reactions to
weak sensory and extrasensory perceptions does not necessarily depend on
both occurring below the level of conscious awareness; rather, it is thought
that both are weak and fragmentary stimuli (like in the DMT) and that as
such there may be distortions in their perception and/or interpretation due
perhaps to personality, motivational, attitude, and cognitive factors. Thus,
while I am adopting the paradigm of subliminal perception, and will be
referring throughout this thesis to 'subliminal' stimuli, it is not the aim of this
thesis to prove that such stimulation really is subliminal. Rather, it will be
assumed that the subjective thresholds adopted by participants in the studies
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to be described later reflect reported awareness (in fact, because my participants
are pressing a button rather than speaking to indicate awareness, it is more
appropriate to say that these experiments will reflect signalled awareness),
which may differ from the participant's phenomenal experience.
Introduction to Perceptual Defence and Vigilance
A subcategory of subliminal perception research looks at perceptual defence
and perceptual vigilance. Here, the emphasis is less on the influence of a
subliminal stimulus on responses to a supraliminal stimulus and more on the
marginal 'threshold' area where the subject begins to claim awareness or
recognition of the stimulus. Researchers have varied in exactly how they
operationalise awareness or recognition in experiments, but Dixon (1981)
considers the awareness threshold to be that intensity of stimulus
presentation at which subjects become aware that they are being stimulated
(e.g., they can see a patch of light), though no other stimulus characteristics
(such as shapes or partial letters) are reported; the recognition threshold is
reached when subjects begin to see stimulus features that may enable them to
identify the stimulus (e.g., they see lines that tell them the stimulus is a
picture); once partial cues of the stimulus nature are perceived, then complete
stimulus identification may rapidly occur, especially for well-known patterns
such as words.
Experiments in perceptual defence attempt to ascertain the stimulus duration
or intensity at which awareness or recognition is claimed, and then alter the
nature of the stimulus and observe how the threshold alters.
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It has repeatedly been found that the nature of the subliminal stimulus
material appears to exert an influence over individuals' reported awareness
for the stimulus. Some individuals seem to take longer to report awareness
for emotional stimuli compared to neutral stimuli; and conversely others
appear to perceive emotional stimuli more quickly than neutral stimuli.
Jerome Bruner and Leo Postman were the first to name these responses,
respectively, as perceptual defence and perceptual vigilance (Bruner &
Postman, 1946, 1947). Apart from the reviews of the subliminal perception
literature cited above, there are further reviews specifically on the problems
of research into perceptual defence /vigilance (Brown, 1961; Natsoulas, 1965;
Erdelyi, 1974; Dixon, 1981); many of these problems will be highlighted
below, in the discussion of experimental techniques claiming to demonstrate
perceptual defence or vigilance.
Theoretical assumptions ofperceptual defence studies
Chapter 2 described the Defence Mechanism Test, which uses the Freudian
notion of 'defence mechanisms' to suggest a motivational basis to the
distortions in descriptions of the DMT stimulus pictures. That is, the subject is
threatened by the stimulus and does not wish to perceive it consciously. As is
perhaps implied by the words of Kragh & Smith (1970) ('the negative
influence of pathogenic factors has so far been almost the exclusive object of
investigation in the DMT, while the task of extricating 'positive' control
mechanisms is still in abeyance' [p. 179]), however, it seems that the DMT is
not designed specifically to identify vigilant individuals. Furthermore, it is
difficult to interpret the concept of vigilance in Freudian or motivational
terms. Kline (1981) argues that the raising of perceptual thresholds for
emotive stimuli seen in perceptual defence is related to the Freudian concept
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of repression (the denial of entry into consciousness); while he acknowledges
the phenomenon of perceptual vigilance or sensitization (the apparent
lowering of perceptual thresholds to emotive stimuli), it does not appear that
this phenomenon has been related to the Freudian defence mechanisms.
Studies of perceptual defence and vigilance have usually attempted to
demonstrate that the differential responses to emotional versus neutral
stimuli are due to fluctuations in perceptual sensitivity, rather than to
motivational or response effects. Indeed, the history of experimental research
into perceptual defence/vigilance can be largely characterised as a search for
experimental methods and designs to distinguish perceptual effects from the
influence of other (confounding) variables. Yet Kline (1981) argues that
perceptual defence is actually an example of repression, because Fenichel
(1945) states that the defence mechanism of repression may relate not only to
internal mental events, but also to the perception of the external, 'real world'.
It seems that there is a need for further research into the relationship between
on the one hand perceptual defence and perceptual vigilance, within the
subliminal perception paradigm, and on the other hand repression and the
other defence mechanisms within the psychoanalytic or Freudian paradigm.
Is there any evidence to back up Fenichel's assertion that repression relates
also to external perceptions? Are the apparent perceptual distortions seen
with tests such as the DMT distortions of incoming perceptions or of outgoing
reports of perceptual experiences, or a combination of the two? Dixon, an
influential researcher in subliminal perception until his retiral, considers that
perceptual defence and vigilance reflect relatively automatic fluctuations in
physiological arousal, mediated by systems within the brainstem, in response
to emotive stimuli. While he is aware of psychodynamic interpretations of
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defensiveness, Dixon stresses the physiological nature of the phenomena of
defensiveness and vigilance.
Perhaps these two camps, the physiological/subliminal perception camp and
the motivational/Freudian camp, are merely different ways of looking at the
same phenomena. Perhaps they merely represent different levels of
explanation for the same phenomena, with, for instance, the psychodynamic
paradigm explaining the why of defensiveness, and the physiological/
subliminal perception paradigm explaining the how of defensiveness.
Psychology has tended to shy away from traditionally 'difficult' or 'messy'
topics such as volition, consciousness, motivations and emotions in favour of
apparently clear-cut and quantifiable (but sometimes rather trivial) topics
such as lexical decision times, memory, and the verbal capabilities of infants
(Kline, 1988b). It is possible that the 'scientific respectability' afforded by
physiological interpretations of perceptual defence/vigilance attracts some
researchers to this approach. So far as the present thesis is concerned, I prefer
to think of perceptual defence or vigilance in operational or pragmatic terms -
as differences in signalled awareness for emotional compared to neutral
stimuli. The difficult question as to what mechanisms underlie the apparent
perceptual defence/vigilance effect is outwith the scope of the present
project.
Experimental techniques claimed to demonstrate perceptual
defence/vigilance
Dixon (1981) has outlined five areas of research that claim to demonstrate real
alterations in sensitivity to emotional stimuli. The methods used are: response
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bias subtraction, EEG correlations, rate of dark adaptation/sensory scaling,
signal detection techniques, and closed loop control. The main characteristics
and strengths and weaknesses of these techniques will be described below.
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2. Response Bias Subtraction
Many of the earliest studies into perceptual defence/vigilance presented
subjects tachistoscopically with emotional and neutral stimulus words and
measured the stimulus duration/intensity at which subjects identified these
words. These studies were often subject to criticism, however, as they failed
to take into account various factors that could exert a confounding influence
over the apparent ease of stimulus word identification. For instance, the
higher the word-count frequency of the word, the lower the recognition
threshold (up to a point) (Brown, 1961). So, early studies would compare
recognition thresholds for, say, taboo words (which by definition are
relatively infrequent) to thresholds for more frequently encountered neutral
words. The raised thresholds that were often found for taboo words could not
provide unequivocal evidence for perceptual defence because the two sets of
stimulus words were not of equal frequency. Further, the most common
source of information about word frequency that was used in subliminal
perception studies is the Thorndike-Lorge word-count (1944), which is based
on the frequency of words as they appear in written sources and which is
intended as a guide to teachers as to what words they might most usefully
teach their learner readers; it is quite possible that certain taboo words would
be used more frequently, verbally, in some sub-cultures, and it is also quite
likely that modern word usage has changed considerably since 1944.
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A related problem for the early experiments was that subjects were required
to vocalise the stimulus words to indicate stimulus identification. Again,
these studies were criticised on the grounds that subjects might be more
reluctant, consciously or unconsciously, to say taboo words out loud. Thus, it
became necessary to develop methods to distinguish perceptual effects from
response suppression or response bias effects.
Later studies tried to measure response behaviour in a no-stimulus situation,
so as to get a measure of response bias, and then subtract that from the
subject's total response performance. Typically, stimuli were emotional or
neutral words presented in a tachistoscope, word emotionality being
designated by the subject's reactions in a prior word-association test. There
was an attempt to match the stimuli for length, structure, and frequency.
Subjects were required to call out the words to indicate recognition. For
instance, Mathews and Wertheimer (1958) claimed to demonstrate perceptual
defence in their study 'A 'pure' measure of perceptual defence
uncontaminated by response suppression'. Subjects were presented with a list
of eight words (four emotional, four neutral) and were asked to identify these
as they were flashed up singly at subliminal duration. In actuality, only four
of the eight stimulus words were shown (two emotional and their matched
neutrals). Calls of absent stimuli were considered to provide a measure of
response bias which was then subtracted from the score of correctly called
present stimuli. Mathews and Wertheimer found a remaining 'pure'
perceptual defence effect.
However, this method of response bias subtraction does not necessarily imply
an effect upon perception, and as such fails to give unambiguous support for
the perceptual defence hypothesis. It is possible to interpret these findings in
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terms of a stimulus effect hypothesis, where the defence which is instigated
by a stimulus occurs not in the perceptual system but in the response system;
in other words, the stimulus may be exerting a specific effect on response
tendencies (Natsoulas, 1965). (While it may be argued that such an effect on
response tendencies may reflect defensiveness, the traditional definition of
perceptual defence within the subliminal perception literature is restricted to
perceptual or physiological interpretations as variations in the sensitivity of
the perceptual threshold).
This ambiguity may be related to a problem with the method of response bias
subtraction as it appeared in classical psychophysics in the guise of 'catch
trials' that were intended to give a measure of chance success. Here, one takes
the proportion of false-positive responses as an index of how much the
proportion of correct-positive responses is inflated. Then, by subtracting, one
is left with the proportion of 'true' positive responses. Signal detection theory
showed that chance correction assumes statistical independence of false-
positive and true-positive responses, and that this assumption was unjustified
(Swets, 1973). It is unclear how serious an indictment this is for the method of
response bias subtraction in subliminal perception, but it certainly suggests
that the conclusions from research using such procedures should be treated
with caution.
2. EEG Correlations
A second paradigm thought to demonstrate perceptual defence/vigilance
involves examining changes in cortical activation as the subject observes a
gradually strengthening stimulus. For example, Dixon and Lear (1963)
presented a random series of emotional and neutral words onto a translucent
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screen (a large screen several feet away from the subject, rather than a small
screen within a tachistoscope-like apparatus), with stimulus brightness
increasing from near zero. Subjects were required to indicate (by pressing a
button) the point at which they first became aware of seeing something on the
screen (the awareness threshold), and then to indicate the moment they could
recognise the word (the recognition threshold). A continuous EEG record was
taken, and was later analysed in periods when there was no stimulus; periods
between stimulus onset and reported awareness; and periods between the
awareness and recognition thresholds.
It was found that defensive subjects, who took longer to report awareness for
emotive than for neutral words, had more alpha abundance in the EEG
record prior to reported awareness than vigilant subjects. Thus, the defensive
subjects appeared to show depressed cortical activation prior to awareness.
These findings (replicated and extended by Dixon & Lear, 1964, and Emrich
& Heinemann, 1966, the latter cited in Dixon 1981; also see Shevrin, 1973, for
a study of 'repressiveness' and averaged evoked responses) may indicate a
physiological basis for perceptual defence: the cortex appears to be able to
discriminate stimulus meaning (emotionality) prior to reported awareness
and subsequently to influence the hypothalamus and ascending reticular
activation system to enhance or depress cortical activation (the details of the
neurological processes involved in perceptual defence/vigilance have been
propounded by Dixon (1981) on the basis of neurophysiological studies on
humans and other animals).
Of course, the recording of cortical activation with scalp electrodes is a
particularly crude measurement of gross brain electrical activity. While EEG
studies such as those reported above have been useful in providing some
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converging evidence that there is a physiological component to perceptual
defence/vigilance effects, they are unlikely to be of great utility for detailed
examination of the psychological processes involved in perceptual
defence/vigilance. This is simply because there is insufficiently detailed
information contained in EEG recordings for EEG-perceptual defence
correlations to suggest meaningful hypotheses for further studies. Such
physiological measures would, however, be of interest if they were taken in
tandem with other indications of physiological state, such as the galvanic skin
response as an indicator of autonomic arousal.
3. Rate of Dark Adaptation/Sensory Scaling
A few studies have been conducted on the assumption that if perceptual
defence truly reflects physiological sensitivity rather than a response effect,
then the rate at which an individual adapts to seeing in darkness may
provide an index of threshold fluctuations (Worthington, 1964; Wallace &
Worthington, 1970). It is difficult to be certain that perceptual defence
influences dark adaptation itself rather than another aspect of physiological
sensitivity, but such studies have examined individuals' subjective judgement
of the relative brightness of emotional and neutral words presented below the
recognition threshold. Worthington (1969) has also used a similar approach
called sensory scaling which omits the emphasis on dark adaptation. Cooper
& Kline (1986) used the method described by Wallace & Worthington (1970)
in their evaluation of the DMT in relation to other measures of defences.
The original study by Worthington (1964) used the time taken for the subject
to indicate awareness of the presence of white light in the visual field as the
dependent variable. Stimuli were emotional and control words, that were
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projected individually at a brightness level that had previously been
identified as that at which subjects could report the presence of light after a
dark adaptation period of about 50 seconds. Subjects looked at bright lights
for 2 minutes, then all lights were extinguished and the subjects' task was to
look at the screen and indicate a) when there was the slightest impression of
white light in the fixation area, and b) when the light could be reported with
certainty. Subjects were unaware that the light was from verbal stimuli (that
is, projections of words). After each stimulus presentation, subjects were light
adapted again, and the procedure was repeated.
It was found that subjects took longer to report awareness of light produced
by the emotive words than for the other stimuli. However, Worthington
noted that these results, although demonstrating perceptual defence effects,
failed to ascertain whether the stimuli were influencing subjects' rate of dark
adaptation rather than differences in perception of individual light patches. A
study by Barber and Mahotiere (1982) that failed to replicate these findings
criticised the experiment for allowing for unintentional experimenter cueing,
and some subjects in the replication study were able to perceive that the
stimuli were verbal. In reply, Worthington (1982) argues that Barber and
Mahotiere's study was not an exact replication, but admits there was a
possibility of experimenter cueing in the original experiment. An earlier
failure to replicate (Weintraub & Krantz, 1968) prompted Wallace and
Worthington (1970) and Worthington (1969) to improve their methodology.
In the first of these studies, improvements were achieved principally by using
a single test stimulus throughout the testing session. This was a nonsense
shape presented in a series with either emotional words, words structurally
similar to the emotional words, neutral words, nonsense shapes, or inverted
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emotional words. A second alteration was to use a more accurate
measurement of psychophysical sensitivity. It was found that only when the
test stimulus was presented in a series with emotional stimulus words did
subjects take significantly longer to identify the test stimulus. As the same test
stimulus was used throughout, differences in the apparent rate of dark
adaptation (the time taken to register awareness) could not be attributed to
differences in the actual light transmission between stimulus types. Wallace
and Worthington (1970) concluded that this technique could reliably
demonstrate that perceptual defence effects genuinely reflect differences in
perceptual sensitivity rather than response bias effects.
It should be noted that the dark adaptation method is not a particularly
simple way to study perceptual defence/vigilance. During the period of light
adaptation it is important to ensure that all areas of the subject's retina are
stimulated with equal amounts of light, otherwise it is possible that some will
adapt more quickly to the dark than others, allowing glimpses of the nature
of the stimulus earlier than intended. A quote direct from Wallace and
Worthington (1970) conveys the elaborate measures which must be taken to
ensure adequate light adaptation:
The light adaptation apparatus consisted of two hemispheres,
one encasing the other. The outer hemisphere had a diameter of
36 in., the inner, a diameter of 30 in. The outer hemisphere was
metal and painted matt black. The inner hemisphere was
bracketed on to the rim of the outer and was constructed of
white translucent plastic. The plastic sphere was illuminated
from behind by 10 lOOw. pearl lamps set in the metal sphere.
The placement of these 10 lamps was such that at all points
sampled on the inner sphere the intensity of illumination
approximated 2.3 log. ft. lamberts...Attached to the outside rim
of the plastic sphere was a piece of masonite painted matt black
on the outside and white on the inside. In the centre of this
piece of masonite was an opening large enough to
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accommodate the S's head. When the head was appropriately
positioned the S's field of vision was restricted to the field of
uniform luminance provided by the inner sphere, (p.42)
Wallace and Worthington do not report on the subjects' views on this
methodology, but it seems unlikely that it was a pleasurable experience. The
subjects placed their head within a sphere illuminated by 10 lOOw. lightbulbs
for one minute. After this time, the lights were extinguished and the subjects
swivelled round to place their mouth in a biteboard (to control the distance
and positioning from the eyes to the screen). As the subjects were recently
light adapted (some might say dazzled), the location of the screen had to be
indicated by dull red lamps on either side. One wonders how the subjects
managed comfortably to locate the biteboard in the dark.
It is likely that these experiments were unpleasant and stressful for the
subjects. It is not clear why it was necessary to go to the lengths of designing
an experiment looking at dark adaptation as an index of perceptual defence,
especially since there was no prior evidence that dark adaptation was
affected by perceptual defence. A more straightforward method would be to
look at subjective brightness judgements at a constant level of background
illumination. The sensory scaling approach described by Worthington (1969)
implicitly admits this by dropping the dark adaptation emphasis from the
design. Instead, subjects were required to scale pairs of faintly presented
verbal stimuli of varying emotionality in terms of their subjective brightness,
though objectively the brightness of the stimuli were identical.
There were two conditions in this sensory scaling experiment: in one, pairs of
stimuli were presented simultaneously; in the other, the stimuli were
presented successively, with a 10 sec. interval between the first and second
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members of a stimulus pair. Stimuli were projected at a level of illumination
.1 log ft. lambert lower than that previously identified as the lowest required
for stimulus word recognition. The only illumination was from the slides.
Subjects identified which of the two patches of light was brightest, and were
asked to guess if they could detect no difference. Subjects later reported no
awareness that the stimuli had actually been words.
The rationale behind comparing successive with simultaneous stimulus
presentation was that any response biases might be expected to appear in the
simultaneous comparisons, but that in the successive comparisons only
specific perceptual effects could be seen. In other words, in the simultaneous
condition any sensory effects from emotional stimuli would be the same for
both members of the stimulus pair, whereas in the successive condition the
sensory effects could be different for the two pair members.
Results were interpreted as supporting the hypothesis that there is a
physiological arousal component to perceptual defence, as only in the
successive condition was it possible significantly to correlate the stimulus
words' initial, conscious emotionality ratings with the subsequent brightness
ratings.
It is not clear exactly how Worthington decided on the length of the period
between the individual stimuli in the successive condition. As Worthington
admits, the adoption of a 10 second interval is rather arbitrary: after
consultation, he decided that 'it seemed likely that any 'arousal' change
would be complete by 5 or 6 sec.' (Worthington, 1969, p.366), and 10 seconds
was chosen to give a safety margin. Would a two second interval between the
first and second member of a stimulus pair give different results? One
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wonders how the subject's memory (presuming there can be memory for
items of which the subject claims to be unaware) interacts with the
experimental design; or how a lingering shift in arousal would affect the
results. While the sensory scaling approach seems methodologically superior
to the dark adaptation paradigm, there is a need for further examination of
the effects of different intervals between members of a stimulus pair on the
subject's apparent perceptual sensitivity. This is therefore a promising
method in general, but it needs some refinement so that some aspects of the
methodology are less arbitrary.
4. Signal Detection Methods
Earlier, it was noted that much of the controversial history of perceptual
defence /vigilance research has been characterised by attempts to ascertain
whether apparent changes in the awareness for emotional stimulus material
are due to response effects or to genuine changes in perceptual sensitivity.
Signal detection theory (SDT) provides a method for identifying the relative
contributions of response bias and perceptual sensitivity to an individual's
decision to say whether or not a signal is present in a noisy background, and
so is evidently relevant to the study of perceptual defence/vigilance.
A study by Dorfman (1967) on 'Recognition of taboo words as a function of a
priori probability' illustrates the basic SDT paradigm. Sixty subjects were each
allocated one of four word pairs for stimuli. The pairs each consisted of one
taboo word (e.g. PENIS) and one neutral word (e.g. MIXER), equated for
word frequency on the Thorndike-Lorge (1944) word count. Stimuli could be
presented (via a tachistoscope) at three possible durations: 30, 50, and 70
milliseconds. Each subject was given four sessions of 200 trials each, and for
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each session the a priori probability for the taboo word was either .30, .50, .70,
or .90, and the two words were each exposed for the same duration. Of the
200 trials in a session, 20% had blank stimuli; because the subjects were
instructed to report one member of the word pair on each trial even if they
felt they had seen nothing, this was a measure of response bias. Among the
results, it was found that the probability of uttering a taboo word increased as
its a priori probability increased. Dorfman was also surprised to note that,
when response bias was accounted for, sensitivity was greater for taboo
words than for neutral; that is, it appeared that the taboo words were more
discriminable than the neutral words. Dorfman explained this latter finding
as the effects of conditioned fear associated with the taboo words, as it has
been suggested that conditioned fear increases the effective intensity of a
stimulus. It might also be interpreted as perceptual vigilance due to increased
physiological arousal associated with emotional stimuli (Dixon, 1981).
Signal detection theory renders obsolete the classical notion of fixed
physiological thresholds; instead, an individual's report of whether or not a
signal is present is considered to depend on several factors, such as the
strength of the signal, the ratio of that signal to both internal (such as
expectancy, level of physiological arousal) and external noise levels, the
instructions given to the subject, and the cost or benefit the subject will
receive upon correctly identifying the presence of the signal. For instance, if
subjects are told they will receive a painful electric shock each time they fail
to report the signal's presence, they are likely to say 'yes' all the time, to avoid
the risk of punishment. The decision on whether or not to report the signal as
present is therefore seen as composed of two factors: the subjects' sensory
sensitivity (d'), and their response bias or criterion (/3). The mathematics of
SDT allows the computation of d' and j3, so SDT would be well suited to
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distinguish between response bias and sensitivity components in perceptual
defence.
Given this relevance, it is surprising that few researchers have taken
advantage of SDT methods to study perceptual defence/vigilance. This
reticence is even more surprising when it is found that those studies which
have applied SDT to perceptual defence have found results favouring the
perceptual sensitivity hypothesis over the response bias hypothesis (Hardy &
Legge, 1968; Broadbent & Gregory, 1967; and, as mentioned earlier, Dorfman,
1967).
Hardy and Legge (1968) conducted two experiments to test the hypothesis
that emotional stimuli presented below awareness in one sensory modality
would produce higher awareness thresholds for neutral stimuli presented in
another sensory modality. The first experiment found awareness thresholds
for neutral visual stimuli to be significantly higher during the subliminal
auditory presentation of emotional stimuli. The second experiment reversed
the experimental roles of the two sensory modalities, and analysed the
performance in terms of SDT. Over a total of 64 trials per subject, subjects
were required to rate their confidence that a neutral auditory signal had been
presented, while simultaneously neutral or emotional words were presented
visually at a subliminal level. If sensitivity (d') was lower during emotional
stimulation than during neutral stimulation, then this would suggest that a
reduction in sensory sensitivity raised detection thresholds. On the other
hand, if response bias (/3) was higher during emotional than neutral
stimulation, this would suggest that emotional stimuli decreased the subjects'
willingness to report the presence of a signal, thereby raising detection
thresholds.
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Pooling the data from all subjects, Hardy and Legge found a d' of 1.73 SD
units during neutral subliminal visual stimulation, and 1.07 SD units during
emotional subliminal visual stimulation. Therefore, the lower d' values
during emotional stimulation indicated a decrease in the sensitivity of the
perceptual mechanism. (Incidentally, the finding that subliminal stimulation
in one sensory modality influences awareness for a stimulus in another
sensory modality provides support for Dixon's argument that central rather
than peripheral brain mechanisms are involved in perceptual
defence/vigilance.)
Broadbent and Gregory (1967) examined the question of how much word
frequency effects and response bias contribute to the apparent changes in
awareness thresholds for emotive words. An earlier study by Broadbent
(1967) identified that it was problematic to use SDT mathematics in cases
where different responses have different biases attached to them, as is the
case when using high-frequency and low-frequency (e.g. taboo) words as
stimuli. However, an approximation to SDT methods was obtained using
Luce's (1959) choice theory adaptation of SDT mathematics, and this was
applied to the perception of words of different degrees of emotionality.
In summary of a complex procedure, Broadbent and Gregory established
how many errors were made in each class of emotional quality (good,
neutral, bad), to each class of stimulus (good, neutral, bad), for high
frequency and then for low frequency words. They then compared the ratios
they found with those predicted by a random sample from the Thorndike-
Lorge Word Count (1944). While the ratios were very similar, there was a
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significantly worse error performance for the emotional versus the neutral
words.
Broadbent and Gregory concluded that emotional words did not behave like
words of low probability. Instead, there appeared to be a failure of the
stimulus information actually to reach the perceptual mechanism, so that in
terms of the relevant SDT parameters, the effect of emotional words was on d'
not on /3.
We can see that SDT has been usefully applied to distinguish perceptual from
response bias effects in perceptual defence/vigilance. It is unclear why these
findings have not been followed up. There are, however, several arguments
against using signal detection methods in the experiments planned for this
thesis; these will be discussed in the concluding section of this chapter.
5. Closed Locrp Control
This method was pioneered by Dixon (1958a, 1958b) in an attempt to
overcome the ambiguities of earlier studies of perceptual defence/vigilance.
These ambiguities were largely caused by the typical experimental paradigm:
1. the use of tachistoscopic presentation could cue the subjects as to when the
stimulus was being exposed; 2. the stimulus material had three roles: 'it is
that which affects the threshold for phenomenal representation of itself, that
which is represented, and that by which such representation is reported'
(Dixon, 1981, p.140); and, 3. the use of verbal report as a signal of recognition
was rather far removed from the earlier stages of sensory processing.
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Recent experimental support for this third point was reported by Marcel
(1990) in an unpublished paper presented at a conference on 'The
Phenomenal Mind'. Subjects were required to indicate whether a light had
flashed by three separate response modes: eyeblinks, button-presses, or
verbal responses. It was found that subjects showed most accurate
discrimination when their response was given in the form of eyeblinks;
button-presses were slightly less accurate, and verbal responses showed the
poorest discrimination performance. Though he was unable to make any firm
conclusions on the meaning of these findings, Marcel noted that they called
into question the assumptions that:
(a) such responses are functionally equivalent as reports
referring to phenomenal experience; (b) that reports cannot
affect the experience reported; (c) that phenomenal experience
is unitary, (p.2)
As a remedy to the ambiguities of some earlier studies of perceptual
defence/vigilance, Dixon argued for the use of awareness rather than
recognition thresholds, as the former would be expected to fluctuate if
perceptual defence/vigilance effects are sensory in origin. Also, the report of
awareness is independent of stimulus content, thus removing the response
biases associated with word familiarity, word preferences, and expectancy or
set, that had been a weakness of earlier studies. Further, the use of awareness
thresholds circumvents possible ethical objections against subjects
consciously seeing and even having to say words which may be disturbing or
embarrassing to them.
The closed loop control methodology achieves these improvements by
presenting stimuli at subliminal intensities to one eye while recording
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concurrent changes in sensitivity for a neutral stimulus presented to the other
eye. An example of how this worked in practice is seen in an experiment by
Henley & Dixon (1976). Emotional and neutral verbal and pictorial stimuli
were projected individually to the subject's right eye at an intensity 0.3 log.
unit below the previously identified awareness threshold for two neutral
stimuli (one verbal, one pictorial). At the same time, a spot of light was
projected to the left eye. Subjects (in this experiment, male schizophrenics)
were aware only of the presence of the spot of light, and were asked to raise
and lower the brightness of the spot so that it kept appearing and
disappearing, over a period of 30 seconds (for each stimulus exposure). Left
spot brightness provided a measure of perceptual sensitivity such that if the
subject was perceptually defensive to the emotive stimulus then the spot
would appear to the subject to become dimmer, so that he would adjust the
spot to be brighter; and if the subject was vigilant, the spot would appear
brighter and would be adjusted to a dimmer objective intensity. The results of
this study found that the thresholds for the spot of light varied significantly
as a function of the concurrent subliminal stimulation. For instance, mean
spot brightness for the word 'BREAST' was significantly higher than for
'RECANT', indicating perceptual defence to 'BREAST'.
There are, however, possible methodological weaknesses in this experiment.
Each subject was presented with the stimulus slides in a different order, and
the authors claim that the experimenter remained blind as to the slide order
until the end of each trial because 'luminous dots on one corner of each slide
made it possible for them to be shuffled, and placed in the apparatus the
correct way up without the experimenter ever having to be aware of their
content' (Henley & Dixon, 1976, p.163). This procedure may be criticised on
two counts. Firstly, hand shuffling is an inadequate method of
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randomisation; and secondly, researchers familiar with the phenomenon of
perception without awareness should realise that it is quite possible that the
experimenter could have perceived very faint cues as to the nature of each
slide, despite being completely unaware of having seen anything, and could
then have unconsciously cued the subject as to the nature of the stimulus
material. While this latter problem may seem unlikely to exert much
influence on the experimental findings, it would be wise to remove even the
faintest possibility of subliminal perception and unintentional cueing on the
part of the experimenter.
One may also criticise one of Dixon's claimed advantages of the closed loop
control design - the separation of input and output channels: 'one eye receives
the subliminal stimuli, the other provides a measure of threshold change'
(Dixon, 1981, p.141). But this advantage is more apparent than real due to the
physiology of the visual system: whereas many of the body's functions are
represented contralaterally in the brain (for example, motor control for the
right hand is located in the left cerebral hemisphere), the information from
each of our eyes is projected to both cerebral hemispheres. Visual information
from the right half of the retina of the left eye and the right half of the retina
of the right eye (known as the right visual field) project, via the optic
chiasma, to the visual cortex in the right cerebral hemisphere, and vice versa
for the left visual field. It is only at the visual cortex that higher level
processing of the visual information occurs at a level where meaning may be
attributed to the physical impulses generated by the visual information.
What this means for Dixon's method is that although input and output
channels are separate outside the subject's body, they are combined very
shortly after the visual information stimulates the cells of the retinas. For
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Dixon's design to approximate a separation of input and output channels, the
visual information would have to be projected to each visual field separately.
Because Dixon did find perceptual defence and vigilance effects quite reliably
with this technique, yet the information from the right and left eye combine
early in the processing of that information, this suggests that it is not
necessary to project stimuli to separate eyes.
There continue to be major advantages to Dixon's design, however. Although
he did not keep input and output channels physiologically separate, it is a
great strength to have awareness for a concurrent meaningless neutral
stimulus as an index of sensitivity to a subliminally-presented meaningful
stimulus. The functional separation of the roles of the two types of stimuli
helps to eliminate many of the problems associated with earlier studies of
perceptual defence.
Conclusions
In order to compare defensiveness and psi, it was firstly necessary to review
the different ways that defensiveness has been defined and measured in the
past. It was felt that the subliminal perception paradigm would be best suited
to the aims of this thesis: perceptual defence and perceptual vigilance are
defined quite precisely; they may be measured quantitatively; and subjects
may be quite unconscious of their differential reactions to the subliminal
stimuli, so that there is less likelihood that conscious motivations or response
strategies will influence subjects' reactions.
Chapter 2 reviewed the DMT-ESP studies that compared individuals' DMT
scores with their performance on psi tasks using neutral targets. It was noted,
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in passing, that the author of the first DMT-ESP study speculated that the
DMT-ESP correlation might be even stronger if emotional ESP target material
was used (Carpenter, 1965). Implicit in this idea is the assumption, that is
appealing to me, that by increasing the similarity between the defensiveness
and the psi testing situations one might boost the defensiveness-psi
relationship, perhaps because one is increasing the chances that the subject
will react similarly to two similar situations. Therefore, a consideration of
different subliminal perception methods, should include their suitability for
matching closely with psi testing methods.
This chapter reviews five different experimental paradigms that have claimed
to demonstrate perceptual defensiveness or vigilance to emotive stimuli:
response bias subtraction; EEG studies; dark adaptation/sensory scaling; SDT
methodology; and closed loop control. Each methodology has its particular
strengths and weaknesses that make it more or less suited to the aims of the
this thesis; from a practical point of view, especially, it was hoped to identify
a simple yet effective technique for identifying individuals as perceptually
defensive or vigilant. Response bias subtraction, EEG techniques, and
brightness scaling methods seemed less promising than SDT and closed loop
control techniques.
The method of response bias subtraction, while improving on earlier studies,
fails to give unambiguous evidence that the stimulus affects perception per se
rather than response tendencies. EEG studies demonstrating changes in
cortical arousal prior to reported awareness provide converging evidence that
defensiveness/vigilance effects are related to central brain mechanisms rather
than response systems. However, the crude nature of EEG measures makes
the development of further process-oriented studies difficult. Dark
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adaptation methods seemed cumbersome and stressful to the subject, but the
more elegant sensory scaling approach contained some rather arbitrary
assumptions which require further examination.
Although SDT methods have been successfully applied to the study of
perceptual defence/vigilance, it is felt that these methods are less amenable
to the comparison of defensiveness with psi scoring. One of the aims of this
thesis is to compare, as directly as possible, subjects' performance on a
subliminal perception task with their performance on a psi task. In order to
allow a close comparison, the two tasks require to be as similar as possible, so
SDT-like methods would need to be applied to each. The signal detection
paradigm requires literally hundreds of trials per subject in order to get a
reliable measure of sensitivity and criterion. One can, like Hardy and Legge
(1968), pool data from all subjects to get a single measure of d' and p, so that
each subject may conduct fewer trials. However, this method washes out
individual differences in sensitivity and response bias to give only a gross
measurement; if some subjects were perceptually defensive and others
perceptually vigilant, these would cancel each other out. Using a similar
methodology for a psi task, with hundreds of trials, subjects would quickly
succumb to boredom and fatigue - psychological conditions that are not
thought to be 'psi-conducive'. So the use of SDT methods would not appear to
facilitate the comparison of SP with ESP performance, unless the ESP task is
modified into a form that would not be expected to encourage good ESP
performance.
A second problem with the use of signal detection methods is that they
simply cannot account for psi-missing - scoring below chance expectation in
an ESP task. In their guide to the application of SDT, Pastore and Scheirer
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(1974) advise that there can be only two possible explanations for a subject
scoring below chance:
measurement error or...the subject performing the
discrimination and then emitting a response that is inconsistent
with the computed decision statistic...If a subject consistently
produces data that fall below the chance line, there is
justification to assume that the subject can perform the
discrimination, but is malingering (p.951).
Thus, the apparent anomalous phenomenon of psi-missing cannot be
accounted for within the theoretical framework of SDT. Yet psi-missing can
and does occur in parapsychological experiments, and psi-missing is an
important component of the defensiveness-psi relationship since, as chapter 2
showed, perceptually defensive individuals tend to psi-miss and perceptually
vigilant individuals tend to psi-hit.
A final argument against using SDT methods in this thesis is that they are
perhaps of greatest utility in disentangling the processes which underlie
perceptual defence effects, especially the different contributions of perceptual
sensitivity and response bias to perceptual defence effects. While this is an
intriguing question, it is outwith the remit for the current project, which must
restrict itself to an attempt to replicate conceptually the DMT-ESP findings,
and to look at target and personality variables as they relate to the ESP
process. As it is conceptualised within the subliminal perception literature,
perceptual defence is regarded (as the word 'perceptual' suggests) as a
physiological phenomenon, related to fluctuations in arousal and
corresponding threshold fluctuations at the stage of perceptual input. Response
bias effects do of course act upon reports of perceptions, but these are
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regarded as peripheral in the relatively narrow definition of perceptual
defence and vigilance within the subliminal perception tradition.
Dixon's method of closed loop control has several distinct advantages over
the other techniques, but it is unnecessarily complex. Were it not for this
complexity, other researchers might have adopted the closed loop control
technique. For instance, Cooper (1982) had intended to construct a similar
apparatus for his experimental investigation of perceptual defence, but
reported that 'this project had, unfortunately, to be abandoned because of the
unavailability of the optical equipment (and expertise) required to engineer
this rather complex apparatus' (p.175). As it is, the encouraging findings of
those studies which have used this equipment have not been followed up.
Today, Dixon's apparatus lies unused in a basement of University College
London and is considered to be largely obsolete (personal communication
with Jim Chambers, Chief Technician at University College, London). For this
thesis, it is proposed to develop a methodology which adopts some of the
basic strengths of the closed loop method while improving and modernising
other aspects of the design; the next chapter develops this point in more
detail.
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Chapter 4. The development of an improved
methodology for the study of perceptual
defence/vigilance.
Chapter 3 found that none of the reviewed methods for demonstrating
perceptual defence was completely satisfactory or suitable for the purposes of
this thesis. In devising a methodology for experiments in this thesis, it is
hoped to retain or even improve upon the positive aspects of Dixon's closed
loop method, while dropping its unhelpful or unnecessary components. An
unpublished undergraduate thesis on perceptual defence by Peter Gregor, a
psychology student at the University of Edinburgh (1972, supervised by John
Beloff), describes a simple method to study perceptual defence/vigilance
effects that goes some way to this end. This chapter firstly describes Gregor's
original apparatus, then points out difficulties with this methodology, and
finally describes the development of a methodology for indicating perceptual
defence/vigilance that seeks to overcome the flaws in Gregor's method.
Introduction to Gregor's Apparatus
This apparatus, consisting of a modified tachistoscope (known as 'Pandora's
Box'), presented both the subliminal stimulus and that which was used to
serve as an index of threshold to both eyes. The two-field tachistoscope
presented the subliminal and threshold stimuli at a gradually increasing
brightness, so that the dependent variable was stimulus intensity rather than
stimulus duration. One field of the apparatus was constantly illuminated, and
the subject's task was to discriminate the gradually brightening stimulus from
an already illuminated background field, rather than to detect the presence of
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light against a background of darkness. Therefore there was no need to
ensure that the subject was dark adapted.
The half-silvered mirror within the tachistoscope caused the stimulus slide, as
it gradually brightened, to appear to emerge as a brighter area at the centre of
the background field. Six of the stimulus slides in Gregor's experiment
portrayed structurally similar emotional or neutral words, and there was also
a dual-purpose blank slide for initial identification of the subjects' awareness
thresholds and to demonstrate the task to the subjects, and a nonsense pattern
structured like a word, but not constructed of real letters. As the intensity of
the stimulus slide gradually increased, the first thing that became visible to
subjects was a brighter rectangular patch, representing the area of the
transparency and its boundary with the cardboard mounting. If the
illumination of the slide was increased further, Gregor reported that a lighter
patch gradually became apparent at the centre of the rectangular patch, and
as intensity increased this could eventually be identified as a word.
Gregor used the illumination level at which subjects became aware of the
larger rectangular patch of light as the awareness threshold. This dependent
variable was neutral, and as the experiment was apparently conducted so that
subjects were never aware of the nature of the subliminal stimuli, this design
circumvented response bias and expectancy criticisms.
Subjects were presented first with the blank slide, so that a 'safe' upper
intensity level could be identified beyond which the stimulus slides would
not be illuminated so as to ensure that subjects were never at risk of
identifying the nature of the verbal stimuli. Each of the seven stimulus slides
was presented 3 times in a random series, with the intensity being gradually
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increased until subjects pressed a button to indicate awareness of the
rectangle. Gregor measured the awareness thresholds for each stimulus. The
button press returned the illumination of the stimulus field to zero, and after
a variable time interval the next trial was initiated. The variable time interval
between trials was intended to ensure that subjects did not become sensitised
to the length of time it would take before awareness. A control group was run
with an identical procedure, except that each slide was presented reversed
and upside-down. This provided a check on whether any differences in
sensitivity for the emotional versus the neutral slides were really due to the
slides' different meaning, rather than simply being due to differences in the
amount of light transmitted by the two classes of slide.
It was found that two of the three emotional words produced significantly
raised awareness thresholds as compared to their matched neutral words.
That is, subjects required a higher level of illumination before they reported
awareness of the rectangles. These findings could not be attributed to
K structural differences between the emotional and neutral stimuli nor to any
response suppression as during the experimental phase subjects never
1
f reported awareness of the nature or even the existence of the subliminal
,S stimuli. However, the nonsense slide showed the highest thresholds of all, a
finding that Gregor was unable to explain. Possibly, the words were reacted
to more quickly than the nonsense slide because the words were more
familiar and therefore more readily recognised (even unconsciously) than the
nonsense slide; less likely is the possibility that subjects found the nonsense
slide to be more emotional than the word slides.
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Weaknesses of Gregor's Study
Gregor claimed to have demonstrated perceptual defence effects using a
relatively simple apparatus that incorporates the main strengths of Dixon's
method, notably the use of awareness rather than recognition thresholds, and
with the subject reporting awareness of a neutral, non-meaningful stimulus
without explicit reference to the subliminal stimulus. It would, however, be
possible to improve upon Gregor's apparatus: most of the methodological
flaws are linked to manual stimulus presentation, manual control of the
apparatus, and manual recording of results.
Although some precautions were taken to lessen the chance of the
experimenter becoming aware of the nature of the stimuli and then
unintentionally cueing the subjects, manual slide insertion remains a
weakness in the design. The experimenter also increased the illumination of
the slides manually and there is a possibility that he did not do this
identically for each subject. The experimenter also manually recorded the
intensity at which each subject registered awareness of the rectangle, and it is
possible that some errors could have been made with this procedure.
Furthermore, as the experimenter was not blind to the subject's responses, he
might have unintentionally cued the subjects so as to reinforce the signs of
perceptual defence that they may have been showing. The inter-trial intervals
were meant to be varied so that the subjects could not begin to estimate the
time taken until awareness, but the experimenter varied these intervals
according to his own judgement. It is unlikely that the inter-trial intervals
were truly random, since humans are notoriously poor at judgements about
randomness (e.g. Lopes, 1986).
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An improvement would be to automate the procedures for stimulus
presentation and recording of results. This would remove any likelihood of
experimenter cueing, it would standardise stimulus presentation, and it
would reduce the likelihood of error or bias in the recording of subjects'
responses.
Modification and Computerisation of Pandora's Box
Gregor's methodology appears basically simple and sound; it includes the
main strengths of Dixon's closed loop control method, while being
methodologically uncomplicated. For a second opinion on this conclusion,
and in order to devise improvements on the weaknesses I identified, I sought
technical advice from Mr Jim Chambers, Chief Technician at the Psychology
Department of University College, London. Mr Chambers has over 20 years'
experience in the construction of apparatus for presenting subliminal stimuli,
notably through his work with Norman Dixon. Possible improvements to
Gregor's apparatus were considered. The 'remains' of Pandora's Box (that had
apparently already been 'cannibalised' for spare parts over the years) were
located in the Psychology Department of the University of Edinburgh, and
the modification of Pandora's Box was turned over to technicians in that
department, who were able to refer to Mr Chambers for specialist advice
where necessary. Geoff Baldwin was principally responsible for the circuitry
and James Duncan machined new parts.
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a - subject's viewer
b - half-silvered mirror
c - constantly lit electrolum. panel
d - entrance for slide image
e - slide
f - variably lit electrolum. panel
g - carousel slide tray
subject's response button
1. Overview of the Apparatus
Figure 4.1 illustrates the basic components to the modified and computerised
apparatus that was developed as an indicator of perceptual defence/
vigilance.
As is shown in the figure, the main component of Pandora's Box is a modified
two-field tachistoscope, with a constantly lit light source forming one field
(marked 'c' in the figure), a slide projector ('e') forming the other field, and a
half-silvered mirror ("h') that superimposes the two fields. A BBC computer
('h') controls slide presentation and brightness, and records the subject's
button-press ('i') response to each slide. The following section describes the
apparatus in greater detail.
2. Development of the Apparatus
The basic tachistoscope was modified and modernised so that a constantly
illuminated electroluminescent panel (see section 3 below for details)
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measuring 6"x4" formed the background field (marked 'c' on the figure). The
second field, that would contain the stimulus slides, was removed and
replaced by a black piece of plastic with a circular hole in it. In order to
automate stimulus presentation, a Kodak Carousel projector ('e') formed the
second field. The projector's lenses and usual light source were removed and
a second, smaller electroluminescent panel (2"x3.5") (marked 'f') was fitted
into the projector just behind the slide cradle. Therefore, both the background
field and the stimulus field were illuminated by electroluminescent panels. A
metal cylinder, painted matt black, was inserted into the projector in order to
cut down on extraneous light from the electroluminescent panel that, at high
illuminations, tended to reveal the passage between the slide cradle and the
outside of the projector. The hole in the side of Pandora's Box was almost
identical in diameter to the metal cylinder that projected about 0.5
centimetres from the projector. The cylinder opening was placed against the
hole in Pandora's Box ('d') (the two were separated by a thin plastic
magnifying lens that was introduced as a result of preliminary investigations
that showed the unmagnified slide to be difficult to see when fully
illuminated) so that virtually no light could enter Pandora's Box except from
the light source within the projector that formed one of the fields of the
apparatus, from the background field of the apparatus, and from the aperture
through which the subject looked. As, during use, background lighting was
extremely dim and subjects were asked to place their faces close to, or
touching, the shaped viewing mask, it is thought that very little extraneous
light could enter Pandora's Box.
The electroluminescent panel ('f') within the projector could be increased in
brightness in a series of 99 discrete steps from darkness, so that in this
application a slide could be gradually brightened. The two fields were
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Figure 4.2
General wiring layout for the modified Pandora's Box
subject's response button Microcomputer
effectively blended via the half-silvered mirror ('b'). Thus, as a slide was
gradually increased in intensity, this appeared to the subject as an area in the
centre of the background field that gradually brightened, took on a
rectangular shape (the overall shape of the transparent part of the slide) that
continued to brighten gradually until, approaching full illumination, the
contents of the slide could be recognised.
Figure 4.2 shows how the components of Pandora's box were connected to
one another.
3. Details of the Light Source Used
The 'Kard-O-Lite'™ electroluminescent panels (produced by Bonar Kard-O-
Lite, Inc., King of Prussia, PA 19406, USA) emit light when energised with an
a.c. supply voltage. The light frequencies that are emitted do not change with
voltage (unlike conventional filament light sources) nor is there a critical
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voltage below which light is suddenly not emitted (unlike fluorescent light
sources).
The circuit controlling the electroluminescent panels, shown in figure 4.3, was
designed by Edinburgh University Psychology Department Technician Geoff
Baldwin to give a variable voltage range of about 25 to 115 volts a.c. at 400
Hz. Full technical details of this circuit are reproduced in Appendix 1. The
smaller of the two panels, in the slide projector, has its applied voltage, and
thus its light output, controlled by signals from the BBC microcomputer. The
larger panel, within Pandora's Box, has its applied voltage controlled by a
manually operated potentiometer. The background panel, that could in
principle be varied in brightness, was manually set so that
Figure 4.3




the illumination by the panel measured approximately 9 lux (this
illumination figure was estimated through a procedure described below
under the heading 'monitoring light output from electroluminescent panels').
At this setting, the panel was dim but visible and provided constant
background illumination, therefore obviating the need for subjects' eyes to be
fully dark adapted during experiments.
Circuit Operation
With reference to figure 4.3 (the electroluminescent panels control circuit
schematic drawing), the sinusoidal a.c. voltages required by the two panels
are generated by two Waveform Generators, Type 8038. The output
frequency, in both cases, is set by the resistor/capacitor combination to be
approximately 440 Hz. The potentiometer/resistor networks connected to
terminals 1 and 12 of the waveform generators are used to remove any
sinewave distortion.
The output of each generator is buffered by a voltage follower, part of a Quad
Operational Amplifier LM324, whose output is fed to a voltage divider
resistor network which reduces the signal amplitude to approximately
1/200th of its original value.
The projector light source panel pre-amplifier has its gain set by a Digitally
Controlled Potentiometer, Type X9503 (see appendix 2 for full operational
details). This potentiometer has 99 discrete steps over its full range of 50 K
Ohms, and, together with the resistor values chosen, enables a gain variation
of from xl.5 to x6.5.
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The 5 watt power amplifier is of a standard audio amplifier configuration
with a gain of xlOO and supplies the voltage winding of a step-up transformer
with a turns ratio of 1:40. Full technical details of this amplifier are provided
in appendix 3.
Monitoring light output from electroluminescent panels
It was considered necessary to try to have an objective measure of light
output in standard units such as lux so that other researchers could gain an
idea of the illumination conditions used in this experiment. Also, the typical
life of an electroluminescent panel is given as half initial brightness after
running for 1000 hours at nominal recommended luminosity. The technician
who fitted the panels felt that as they would be used at very low levels of
light output, the decrease in light output with time would be much less than
the typical value. However, I felt it was still necessary to be able to check the
light output from the panels periodically, to ensure that lighting conditions
throughout the experiments conducted for this thesis would be constant, or
that any decrement in brightness over time would be detected.
The technicians had great difficulty in finding a sufficiently sensitive measure
of illumination intensity that could discriminate between the 99 incremental
steps in intensity caused in the smaller panel by varying the applied voltage.
In the end, a photodiode (i.e. light sensitive) Type BPW21 and a current-to-
voltage conversion circuit were mounted on a slide-sized board. These could
be positioned in place of a slide within the projector to measure the light
intensity as it reached the slide. With the system fully connected, the panel
could be put through its 99-step range and at each step the voltage applied to
the panel could be noted as well as the voltage output from the current-to-
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Figure 4.4
Calibration circuit converting illumination to volts
V out = IscRf
lsc=EvSk
Where
V out=signal output voltage, volts
Rf=feedback resistance, ohms
lsc=photodiode short circuit current, amps (A)
Ev=incident illumination, lux
Sk=photodiode sensitivity, A/lux
voltage converter. Tables completed during the testing of the system when
first built could be used to compare results and would show changes in light
output, if any. See appendix 4 for tables produced during initial calibration of
the apparatus in August 1989, prior to any experimentation with Pandora's
Box, and in November 1990, in the middle of the experimentation period. It
will be seen from appendix 4 that no significant change was found in the light
output of the stimulus slide electroluminescent panel (this was expected,
since the light output from this panel was very low in these experiments, thus
considerably extending the expected life of the panel).
Figure 4.4 shows the calibration circuit that was used to convert the
illumination from the stimulus electroluminescent panel to volts. Monitoring
106
the light output from the stimulus electroluminescent panel by the
photodiode, a voltage output is obtained which may be related to incident
illumination (lux) through the following equations:
Voltage output, Vo = IscRf (1)
and Isc = EvSk (2)
Substituting for Isc in (1)
Vo = EvSkRf
^ TJ Voand /. Ev =
SkRf
The value of Rf is 20 x 106 ohms
and Sk is typically 7 nA/lux (nanoamps/lux)
SkRf = 7 x 10"9 x 20 x 106
= 0.14
Ev = = Vo x 7.14 lux
0.14
In other words, one can estimate the incident illumination for the stimulus
slide in Pandora's Box by converting the voltage produced by the light
sensitive diode (whose circuitry is illustrated in figure 4.4) to lux, using the
above formula. It should be stressed, however, that any lux value calculated
using these methods is only an approximation, since the level of illuminations
being used are so low that it is difficult to measure them without highly
specialised equipment.
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4. The role of the Computer
Before choosing to work with a modified tachistoscope for stimulus
presentation, I considered the use of a computer to present stimuli, and
consulted an expert in this method, Mr Chambers, for his opinions. He saw
several problems were a VDU to be used in the way I had in mind. Most
importantly, there was little fine control over screen brightness with the
VDU. Secondly, the relatively slow scanning speed on a VDU screen meant
that, effectively, the stimulus was being presented sequentially (that is,
revealed in a sequence from the top to the bottom of the screen) rather than
the whole stimulus being shown simultaneously. This latter problem could be
overcome by using a vector oscilloscope, but this solution was prohibitively
expensive. It was therefore decided that using tachistoscope-like methods
would give more control over stimulus presentation and illumination than a
VDU. However, a BBC microcomputer is constructed to allow it to interface
with many auxiliary facilities and this makes it an ideal 'workhorse' for the
automation of the proposed methodology.
The BBC computer changed slides, controlled the illumination of the
electroluminescent panel in the projector, and recorded to disc the brightness
step at which the subject responded to each slide. In order to make the BBC
fulfil these functions, a program was written in BBC Basic. Dr Hamish
Macleod of the Psychology Department kindly wrote a 'skeleton' program,
that I then expanded and adjusted to fit the experimental requirements. The
main features of this program are noted below (and see Appendix 5 that
gives, for illustration, the program used for Experiment 7).
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When the program was run, it took the brightness of the projector
illumination down to zero, then changed a slide. The program then paused
for a random length of time (no more than 10 seconds, chosen with the BBC
Microcomputer's RND function, that uses a pseudorandom algorithm) before
beginning to brighten the projector panel, thus gradually illuminating the
slide. At each (approximately equal) brightness increment, the program
checked to see whether the subject had pressed the response button. If the
button had been pressed, the panel brightness was returned to zero and the
next slide was presented, again following a random time delay. If the button
was not pressed, the computer paused for one fifth of a second before
stepping the brightness up another increment and again checking for whether
the subject had responded. The pause between each brightness increment
effectively controlled the speed at which the slide appeared to brighten.
For the first five 'practice' slides, the subject changed the slides manually by
pressing the response button. The response to the fifth of the practice slides
was used to set a maximum upper brightness limit for all subsequent
stimulus slides (this was to ensure that the slide could not accidentally be
illuminated to the point at which the subject could begin to discern the
contents of the slide). This limit was set by programming the computer not to
brighten future slides beyond 10 increments above the level at which the
subject responded for the fifth practice slide. The figure of 10 extra
increments was chosen because it allowed room for some variation in
subjects' responses, but avoided any danger of brightening the slide too far
(as inferred from subjects' verbal reports of seeing nothing of the slide
contents and, as discussed below, based on observations of typical levels of
responding).
109
The results for the five practice slides (that would not be analysed) were
displayed on the BBC VDU, to enable the experimenter to check that the
subject was responding in a typical fashion and that the maximum limit was
'safe' (that is, within the range that preliminary investigations had suggested
maintained the subliminality of the slide contents). The typical range of
scoring in any one experiment could vary depending on the nature of the
stimulus slides, and on the instructions to participants regarding the response
criterion that they were required to adopt. For instance in experiment 3, for
slides that were dark in the background with the stimulus information
portrayed in light lines, and where participants were asked to respond not
when they first saw light indicating the presence of the stimulus slide, but
when that light assumed the rectangular shape of the transparency, scores
typically ranged from about 45 to about 55 brightness steps. Also in
experiment 3, and again using the 'rectangular shape of light' response
criterion, for slides that were light in the background and displaying the
stimulus information in dark lines (as used in all other studies in this thesis),
the typical range of responding was from about 28 to about 38 brightness
increments. For experiment 6, where participants were asked to let the slides
brighten until they could begin to see the contents of the slides (that is, to see
lines, shapes, blotches, even if they could not be recognised as meaningful),
the average brightness score was around 48. This was in accordance with my
preliminary explorations of how bright the slides had to get before any
stimulus information was seen, and so it is felt that by setting a ceiling of 10
brightness increments over the participant's average level of responding, the
slides may not brighten sufficiently for the participant to perceive any helpful
cues about the stimulus nature.
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Although, for the reasons just discussed, participants' brightness scores for
the practice slides were displayed on the experimenter's computer screen, the
results for the experimental trials, that would be analysed, were not
displayed on the screen, so that both the experimenter and the subject were
blind as to the subject's objective performance. It would be most unlikely,
therefore, that the experimenter could unintentionally cue the participant to
react in a way consistent with the experimental hypotheses. At the end of the
stimulus presentations, the subject's identity code, and the session number,
date, and time, as well as the time delay preceding each slide and the
subject's response to each slide, were automatically written to disc. Therefore
even at the conclusion of the defensiveness testing session neither the
participant nor the experimenter could accidentally see any of the
participant's results.
5. Development of Stimuli
Traditionally, verbal stimuli such as taboo and neutral words have been used
as stimuli in studies of perceptual defence/vigilance (perhaps because of the
relative ease of identifying word frequency, of selecting physically similar
words such as cancer and canter, and of producing physically similar controls
such as nonsense words or inverted /reversed words). Pictorial stimuli have
been used less frequently. However, since it is intended to attempt to
maximise the similarity of the subliminal and the extrasensory testing
situations for this thesis, and since words are rarely used as stimuli in ESP
experiments (meta-analyses and 'lab lore' suggest that rich ESP stimuli are
associated with higher ESP scoring than are relatively boring or
impoverished ESP targets: e.g. Delanoy, 1989; Watt, 1989; Honorton et al.,
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1990), it was decided to develop pictorial stimuli for use with the perceptual
defence/vigilance apparatus as well as for the ESP testing sessions.
It was therefore assumed that, so far as the ESP session was concerned,
pictorial stimuli would provide richer target material than verbal stimuli.
This assumption was based on the fact that verbal stimuli are relatively
familiar to participants and are relatively finite in their numbers (keeping to
one language). In contrast, pictorial stimuli may vary infinitely, and while
some pictures, like the Mona Lisa, are familiar to most participants, it is easy
to construct original pictorial stimuli that are likely to be more stimulating to
participants than well-learned words. Also, words are limited in their
complexity, while pictorial stimuli may vary widely in complexity or the
amount of information conveyed. While it can be argued that simple words
may evoke complex associations, the same can be said of pictures.
As a first step in developing stimuli for experimental purposes, 58 simple
black and white line drawings were produced. Art books and magazines
were often used as sources, with pictures there being adapted (by me) for use
in the present study. It would of course have been most suitable if one could
have located a set of emotional and neutral pictures that had been developed
by other researchers, but only one such source was found. I will describe it
briefly because it suggests how perceptual defence and vigilance may operate
in practical, 'real-life' settings and is therefore of interest in itself.
This was a study by Toch and Schulte (1961) on Readiness to Perceive Violence
as a Result of Police Training. Advanced police trainees, novice trainees, and
psychology students were presented with a series of 18 pictures (simple black
and white drawings) at exposures of 0.5 sec, though a stereoscope (so two
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pictures were presented simultaneously, one to each eye). Half the pictures
were 'neutral' and half 'violent' (the authors do not say how the pictures were
judged to be neutral or violent; the neutral pictures included 'a farmer' and 'a
worker', the violent pictures included 'three murders' and 'two suicides'). For
each exposure, a subject was presented simultaneously with one neutral and
one violent picture to each eye (and each pair was exposed twice to ensure
that each eye was exposed to each of the 18 pictures). Subjects were asked to
describe what they saw for each exposure, and most subjects perceived a
single picture for each pair that was presented as a stereogram. It was found
that, where there were actually 18 presentations of a neutral picture and 18 of
a violent picture, the advanced police trainees reported an average of 9.37
violent pictures whereas the novice police trainees and the psychology
students reported, respectively, an average of 4.69 and 4.03 violent pictures.
Therefore, all subjects appeared perceptually defensive to the violent pictures,
with the least defensive being the advanced police trainees who reported
seeing violent pictures significantly more often than the other two groups of
subjects. However, an exposure time of 0.5 seconds is hardly subliminal, and
as subjects were asked to describe what they saw, one could interpret these
findings not in terms of perceptual defence (that is, a decreased readiness to
perceive violence) but rather in terms of response set or bias (that is, a
decreased readiness to report violence). Further experimentation would be
necessary to clarify this point.
For the purposes of the present study, however, Toch was traced and asked if
he could provide his stimulus pictures. Unfortunately he could only locate 12
pictures, 6 violent and 6 neutral, but these were adapted (the original pictures
were solid-coloured in black, the adapted pictures were line drawings that
were not filled in with colour) and included in the pool of 58 simple line
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drawings to be rated for emotionality. Twenty individuals (friends and
colleagues) were asked to rate each picture as to 'the quality and strength of
emotion you associate with each picture'. The rating scale points ranged from
1 ('very strong pleasant emotion') through 4 ('no emotion') to 7 ('very strong
unpleasant emotion').
The mean rating and variance scores were calculated for each picture, and
these scores were then used to select (for initial experiments) 8 pictures that
were widely agreed to be fairly strongly unpleasant in emotional tone (mean
emotionality rating, 5.981, range from 5.74 to 6.25; mean standard deviation
0.909, range from 0.79 to 1.07), and 8 pictures that were widely agreed to be
neutral in emotional tone (mean rating 3.813, range from 3.55 to 4.15; mean
standard deviation 0.58, range from 0.49 to 0.69). It is interesting to note that
the negative emotional pictures generally elicited more variation in their
rating scores than the neutral pictures. The picture with the highest variance
(1.47, mean emotionality rating 3.2, i.e. mildly pleasant) depicted an erotic
scene which apparently elicited quite conflicting responses from raters. (Of
the 16 selected neutral and emotional pictures, 5 of the neutral pictures and 4
of the emotional pictures were adapted from Toch & Schulte's (1961) stimuli.)
Examples of the stimuli used in experiment 7 of this thesis are shown in
appendix 6.
So, stimuli were selected according to the responses of 20 raters. Of course,
each participant in the subsequent experiments would have their own
idiosyncratic emotional responses to each stimulus, and not all would agree
with the prior emotionality ratings. Perhaps it would be more effective to
produce a 'customised' selection of slides for each subject, where in a
preliminary session stimuli were chosen to reflect that individual's personal
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emotional reactions. The drawback here is that participants would then be
cued, prior to the actual experimental sessions, as to the nature of the stimuli
and therefore, perhaps, to the nature of the experimental hypotheses. As a
compromise, then, it was decided to use 'averaged' stimuli throughout; some
of the experiments to be reported later did ask participants to rate their
particular emotional responses to the stimuli, thus it was still possible to
examine reactions to slides which got especially high ratings.
Each of the neutral and emotional slides had its own 'control' slide. The
control was constructed by cutting up and rearranging the line drawing so
that the control covered approximately the same area as the meaningful
drawing, would transmit the same amount of light as the meaningful
drawing, but would have no meaning for the subject; that is, the control line
drawing was not intended to convey any recognisable information. It was felt
necessary to construct control slides so that if during experiments subjects
responded differently, say, to the emotional compared to the neutral
drawings, one would be able to evaluate whether this was due to simple
physical differences between the two classes of stimuli (e.g. all emotional
slides happened to be darker than neutral slides) or whether it was more
likely due to the meaning or emotional tone of the slides. Appendix 6 gives
examples of stimulus and control slides used in experiment 7 of this thesis.
Having selected the emotional and neutral stimuli, and having created
matched control stimuli from them, these line drawings were photographed
using Kodak Ektachrome Tungsten 160 film, at an exposure of 1/15 seconds,
aperture f 8 3/4, standard E6 processing (these film and exposure details
were chosen from preliminary investigations). The stimuli were then made
into transparencies and mounted to view.
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Conclusion
This chapter described the basic features of the apparatus developed as a
potential indicator of perceptual defence/vigilance. Seven experiments were
conducted using this apparatus, with slight modifications of stimuli and the
computer program that will be described when appropriate. An account of
these experiments follows.
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Chapter 5. Three preliminary experiments.
Initial exploratory work, involving the development and selection of stimuli
for the measurement of perceptual defence using the 'Pandora's Box'
apparatus, and the design of basic details of the computer program and the
testing procedure, produced a simple procedure that was then examined
more formally in three preliminary studies. These studies were principally
intended further to refine details of the apparatus and procedure for
measuring perceptual defence/vigilance, since this is essentially a prototype
methodology. There was, therefore, no attempt at this stage systematically to
compare psi performance with perceptual defence/vigilance. However, as
free-response ESP scores were available for the participants in experiment 2,
and as psychokinesis scores were available for the participants in experiment
3, it was possible to conduct exploratory correlations of psi performance with
perceptual defence and vigilance. This chapter reports on these three studies
and what was learned from them; details of apparatus and procedure which
have already been set out in chapter 4 will not be repeated here, but other
procedural details will be covered in greater detail, especially for experiment
1 as this sets a basic pattern for all subsequent studies.
Experiment 1: Subjective brightness judgements of
subliminally-presented stimuli.
The aim of this study was to examine whether Pandora's Box showed some
promise as an indicator of perceptual defensiveness or perceptual vigilance to
subliminally-presented emotional slides; secondary aims were to spot and
remedy 'teething problems', to refine interactions with participants, and to
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identify possible sources of noise in the data. Because this was an exploratory
study, there were no formal hypotheses; and because the apparatus was a
prototype, it was not possible to specify precisely how one would judge that
the apparatus 'showed promise' as an indicator of perceptual defensiveness or
vigilance. One might infer from the apparent focus in the literature on
lowering of perceptual thresholds that perceptual defence is more commonly
seen than perceptual vigilance. Little is known about the 'baseline' occurrence
of defensiveness and vigilance in the general population, however, so one
cannot certainly predict that, for instance, the emotional slides would, over all
participants in the present thesis, be associated with the highest brightness
scores (indicating perceptual defensiveness). If, as Brown (1961) suggests,
defensiveness and vigilance may be associated with personality
characteristics such as extraversion and introversion (and, in turn, with
people's 'baseline' levels of arousal), then it would be quite difficult to
predict, from any relatively small sample of individuals (without taking
personality measures) the 'defensive/vigilant/neither' ratio to be found in
that sample. If some individuals are 'defensive', some 'vigilant', and some
'neither', then average brightness scores would 'wash out' any effects of
defensiveness or vigilance. However, one might expect to find greater
variation in scoring for emotional compared to neutral or control slides, since
perceptual defence and vigilance would manifest, respectively, in relatively
high and relatively low brightness scores compared to the other stimulus
categories. Also, if the data reveal a real effect of defensiveness or vigilance,
rather than simple random variation in responses, then one might expect to
see some consistency in scoring, say from the first half of the session to the
second half. If there are no signs of distinctive responding to the emotional
slides compared to the others, this might indicate that the methodology is
unsuitable as a measure of perceptual defence or vigilance (for instance, the
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slides might not be sufficiently emotional to elicit defensive or vigilant
responses, or the slides might be too faint in intensity even for subliminal
perception); on the other hand, if there were no signs of perceptual defence or
vigilance this might suggest that the participants in the study are not
particularly defensive or vigilant. No firm prediction is made, though,
because this is the first time such a methodology has been tried.
Method
Participants. Twenty-one individuals (15 males and 6 females) took part in
this study (this was simply the number of people who were able to
participate during the period that the study was running); 16 were my friends
or colleagues, 5 (who were previously unknown to me) had taken part in an
earlier study conducted by a colleague of mine, and had indicated a
willingness to participate in further studies. I conducted the testing sessions.
Stimuli. The stimuli were 32 slides described in detail in chapter 4: 16
portrayed meaningful pictorial information [8 were of negative emotional
tone ('E'), 8 were of neutral emotional tone ('N')]; 16 were matched 'control'
slides that were meaningless re-arranged versions of the 16 meaningful slides
[8 emotional control slides ('EC') and 8 neutral control slides ('NC')]. See
appendix 6 for examples of the different stimulus categories, as used in
experiment 7.
Apparatus. The 32 stimuli were presented within a modified two-field
tachistoscope, described in detail in chapter 4, via a Kodak carousel projector.
A BBC computer controlled stimulus presentation and lighting, and recorded
results automatically. Participants made their responses by pressing a simple
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hand-held button that linked with the computer. Figure 5.1 depicts the layout
of the experimental room, the apparatus, and the positions of the
experimenter and participant.
The participant was seated at a height adjustable chair, facing 'Pandora's Box'.
The projector and the dark box were placed upon a raised platform that
presented the viewing port of the dark box at a comfortable height for the
participant. Concealed below this platform were the potentiometer and the
drive unit for the electroluminescent panels (both of which did not need to be
touched during experiments). The platform (constructed of chipboard) and
table were covered with black fabric, so that as participants looked into the
dark box, they were not distracted by light reflecting up from the table and
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platform. Adjacent to the table holding Pandora's Box was another, smaller
table, on which the BBC computer sat. The screen of this computer was
angled away from the participants, though they could see it if they desired.
The screen simply displayed the results of the practice trials, and monitored
the progress of the session with messages such as 'End of first run, press
response button when ready to commence second run'. The experimenter sat
beside the participant, so the experimenter could see both the participant and
the computer screen. The participant could hold the response button in either
hand, though most chose the right hand.
Procedure. Each participant completed two sessions on Pandora's Box,
roughly one week apart. Each session consisted of two runs of 16 slides (i.e., a
total of 32 slide exposures per session), preceded by one demonstration slide
and five practice slides. At the first session, half of the subjects responded to
half of the experimental slides together with their matched controls, and the
second half of the slides at the second session. This was reversed for the other
half of the subjects. Therefore, each of the 32 stimuli was shown twice. The
order of slide presentation within each run was randomly determined for
each subject individually, using the BBC computer's pseudorandom
algorithm: prior to the start of the study, I used the algorithm to prepare a
number of 'slide sequences'; each sequence was recorded on a slip of paper
and put in a manila envelope; when needed, a slip could be removed at
random from the envelope.
Prior to the participant's arrival, the experimenter loaded the slide sequence
for that participant into the slide tray, and covered the tray with a black
cardboard box in order to conceal the stimuli from the experimenter and the
participant. The experimenter was not blind to the slide order (since I had
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loaded the slides into the carousel tray), but it was thought to be extremely
unlikely that I would recall the numbered sequence, recall which slide
contents went with which number, and somehow communicate biasing
information to the participant during the experimental runs, (when I was
silent, and when both I and the participant were blind to the participant's
objective performance).
When participants arrived in the laboratory, they were offered light
refreshments. Participant and experimenter then proceeded to the dimly-lit
experimental room. Although it was not necessary for participants to be
totally dark-adapted for this study, it was felt that they should all experience
similar lighting conditions prior to commencing the experimental runs. It was
thought that this would help to ensure that participants who had experienced
different lighting conditions prior to arriving at the lab (say, a sunny day for
one, a dark night for another) would be more comparable to each other and,
more importantly since this was a within-subjects design, to themselves on
each of their two sessions. In order to maximise the similarity between the
lighting conditions experienced in separate sessions, the lights in the
experimental room would be gradually dimmed to just above their minimum
level during the 15 to 20 minutes of introductory chat and instructions. Then,
just before the participant began to respond to the stimuli in Pandora's Box,
the room lights were dimmed to their minimum possible level
(approximately 0.7 lux ca., as measured on a Gossen 'Lunasix 3' light meter).
In the experimental room, the procedure was explained and the participant's
questions, if any, were answered. It was not felt to be necessary or desirable
to deceive participants as to the nature of the experiment, so they were told
that it was a study of subliminal perception but that the apparatus was
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experimental so that there were no firm expectations for specific results.
Participants were also told that there was information of some sort on each
slide, but that the slides would be presented at such a weak intensity that
they would be unable to gain any impression of the slide contents. If
participants asked directly what sort of information was on the slides, they
were told that the slides were judged either to be emotional or neutral in
nature. They were not told whether the slides contained pictures or words, or
what effect the nature of the slide might have on their performance, but were
promised further details once both sessions had been completed. In fact, few
participants asked about the slide nature, and, although no formal analysis
was made of this, my impression was that this knowledge did not
significantly influence their performance.
Participants were asked to press the response button when they felt they
could see the smaller rectangle (that is, the stimulus slide) appearing
(brightening) in the centre of the background field. They were told that there
was a continuum of possible responses, from the first impression of
something appearing (at which stage it was difficult to distinguish internally-
generated from external images and so there was a risk of false alarms) to an
absolutely certain response to a bright and clear rectangle. As I was interested
in the 'marginal' area when the rectangle was just appearing, participants
were encouraged to respond when they were certain that what they were
seeing was objectively 'out there', though it need not be a fully-formed, clear
rectangle. Once they had chosen a particular response criterion, participants
were asked to attempt to hold that subjectively constant throughout the
experiment. It was stressed that this was not a test of speed, so participants
were not to feel in a hurry to respond.
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Participants were also informed of the random time delay before each slide
brightened (for this experiment, the delay ranged from 1 to 10 seconds), so
that they would not become anxious after long delays and they would not
waste time and energy trying various strategies for seeing what was not yet
there to be seen. The principal reason for this time delay, however, was to
circumvent problems of expecting to see something that appeared at regular
intervals - participants could begin to anticipate the appearance of a regular
stimulus and respond more according to their sense of timing than to their
visual perceptions; and this reason was explained to participants. Participants
were also informed that there was a maximum brightness limit so the slides
could not accidentally get to full brightness, but they were not informed that
the brightness limit was set according to their responses in the practice trials
(specifically, to the final practice slide). Having observed the brightness
scores of a variety of participants in preliminary sessions with the apparatus,
I had a good idea of the typical range of responding (as was described in
more detail in chapter 4), and could easily spot unusual responses. In
practice, there was only one occasion where, on the final practice slide, the
brightness level was unusually high (due to the response button
malfunctioning). On this occasion the session was re-started, and a standard
limit was set at the second attempt.
The order of events once the procedure had been explained to the participant
was as follows:
1. Adjust the participant's chair to a comfortable height for viewing inside the
apparatus.
2. Dim room lights to minimum level.
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3. Enter participant code, date, time and session number into computer.
4. Give the participants the response button, make them comfortable, and ask
them to press the button for the first (demonstration) slide. This (blank) slide
was gradually brightened to full illumination in order to demonstrate to the
participant the shape and position of the rectangle which they would be
looking for at lower illuminations in subsequent trials. At this stage,
participants who occasionally wore glasses decided whether or not they
might need to wear them for subsequent trials (depending on whether they
were short- or long-sighted, and on how clearly they could focus on the
demonstration slide without spectacles).
5. The participant pressed the button for the first of five practice trials. This
slide gradually illuminated and the participant was required to press the
button when they became aware of the slide's presence (at which point the
slide faded away, and a brightness score was shown on the experimenter's
VDU), and then to press again to initiate the next practice slide (the practice
slides all contained a simple black and white line drawing of a rectangle,
though participants did not report seeing this when they were asked at the
end of the session whether they had seen anything on any of the slides).
During the practice trials, participants were encouraged to ask questions, and
the experimental trials did not proceed until participants were completely
clear about what they had to do.
6. After the practice trials, the participant pressed the button to initiate the
first experimental run of 16 slides. For these, the participant was required, as
before, to press the button when they became aware of the presence of each
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slide. Once a slide had been responded to, the computer automatically
presented the next slide.
7. When the first run of 16 slides was completed, there was a short break
(usually ranging from 30 seconds to 4-5 minutes) so that the participant could
rest a little until, when they were ready, they pressed the button to initiate the
second run of 16 slides.
8. On completion of the second run, the participant was thanked, and an
appointment was set for the second session, about 1 week later.
The experimenter was present throughout the session. The introduction to the
experiment usually took 10-15 minutes and the slide presentation usually
took another 10-15 minutes. At the second session, participants were given a
brief reminder of the procedure, and at the end of the second session the
rationale of the experiment was described in more detail, if requested.
Treatment of the data. There were two measures taken during this
experiment. The principal one was the brightness level at which each
participant chose to respond to each slide. For this, the average brightness
level was calculated for each of the four categories of stimuli (E, EC, N, &
NC), for each participant. These scores were then ranked. If E slides ranked 1
(that is, on average they got brighter than other slides before the participant
responded to them), this was defined as perceptual defence. If E slides
ranked 4 (that is, on average they were responded to at lower levels of
illumination than the other categories of stimuli), this was defined as
perceptual vigilance. If responses to the slides were due more to the physical
brightness of the slides than to their meaning, then it was expected that the
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ranked scores for EC slides would tend to 'shadow' those for the E slides;
otherwise, the ranks for EC slides would be expected to vary
unsystematically. The second measure was the record of the random time
delay prior to the illumination of each stimulus (ranging from 1 to 10
seconds). The average brightness score was calculated for each of the 10
possible time delays, to see whether brightness scores were influenced by the
length of the random time delays.
Results of experiment 1
The aim was to get a general descriptive picture of any overall trends or
patterns in the data, and to try to identify possible sources of noise.
Consistency of scoring across sessions
1. General scoring trends. It was not felt to be appropriate to calculate test-
retest reliability scores, because of the relatively small number of participants
and stimuli exposures, and because different stimuli were presented at each
testing session. While there was a lot of individual variation in participants'
scoring from the first to the second testing session, there was a slight overall
trend for participants' brightness scores to decrease (by only .803 brightness
steps, on average) from the first testing session to the second. That is,
participants were pressing the response button slightly earlier, when the slide
was slightly dimmer, on their second testing session. Also, there was a slight
tendency for the amount of variation in the second testing session to be lower
than in the first (by .115 SD units, on average).
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2. Consistency of scoring for emotional stimuli. It will be recalled that one
measure of interest was the consistency of a subject's scoring from the first to
the second session, particularly for the emotional stimuli. If subjects'
responses were largely unrelated to the slide nature, then one would expect
to find no consistency in scoring across sessions; if the apparatus was
measuring perceptual defence or vigilance, one would expect (assuming that
perceptually defensive or vigilant responses to emotive stimuli are relatively
stable over time) to find consistency in responses to the emotive stimuli
across sessions. It is encouraging to note that 7 out of the 8 participants who
showed consistent reactions to the emotional slides across the two testing
sessions (that is, whose average brightness scores for these slides held the
same ranked position for both testing sessions) ranked these slides either 1 or
4 (that is, they appeared to be either perceptually defensive or vigilant as
defined in this study).
General scoring trends
As there appeared to be no gross changes in scoring between the two
sessions, the data from both sessions was collapsed to form a single data set
of 64 exposures (2 times 32 stimuli), and the following descriptive statistics
are based on this data.
Table 5.1 shows the overall mean brightness scores, and their standard
deviation, for the four categories of stimuli (emotional=E, emotional
control=EC, neutral=N, neutral control=NC).
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Table 5.1
Mean and standard deviation of brightness scores
E EC N NC
Mean 21.470 21.358 21.423 21.405
SD 3.302 3.241 3.346 3.219
E=emotional stimuli; EC=emotional control; N=neutral; NC=neutral control
It can be seen from table 5.1 that the differences in scoring between the four
categories of stimuli are quite small, but that the highest overall scores were
found for the emotional slides and the lowest for the emotional control slides.
This trend may be indicative of overall perceptual defence to the emotive
slides, in accordance to what is often found with other measures of
defensiveness. Also, the fact that the brightness scores for the emotional
control slides are least close to the scores for the emotional slides, compared to
the neutral and neutral control slides, suggests that these scores are unlikely
to be accounted for by the common optical properties of E and EC slides (that
each EC slide transmits the same amount of light as its matched E slide, and
that the area covered by the stimulus information on each EC slide closely
approximates that for its matched E slide). Table 5.1 also shows that standard
deviation scores for the meaningful (E and N) slides were slightly higher than
for the meaningless (EC and NC) slides.
These descriptive data are portrayed in another form in figure 5.2, which
graphs the frequency distribution of ranks for the four categories of stimuli.
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Figure 5.2
Bar chart showing frequency distribution of ranked brightness scores in experiment 2,






Thus, as can be seen from figure 5.2, the emotional slides tended to be ranked
1 or 2 more often than the other slides, perhaps indicating an overall
tendency towards perceptual defensiveness.
Effects of the random time delay
Another question of interest in this study related to the discovery of sources
of noise in the data. One possible source of noise (that is, extraneous variance)
could be the random time delay (from 1 to 10 seconds) before each slide
began to be illuminated. Perhaps participants would respond differently to
the slide after a short delay compared to a long delay. For this reason, the
mean and SD of the brightness scores for each of the possible time delays was
calculated, and the results are shown in table 5.2.
\
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4
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Table 5.2
Mean and standard deviation of brightness scores over time delays from 1 to 10
seconds































Table 5.2 shows a trend for shorter delays to be associated with higher
brightness scores, and that the amount of variation in scoring tends to
decrease with shorter time delays. Variance is greatest at the longest delay.
Both of these trends are statistically significant, with the Spearman correlation
between brightness and time delay giving rs=.818 (pc.Ol, 2-t), and the
correlation between SD and time delay giving rs=-.648 (p<.05, 2-t). Perhaps,
with the shortest time delays, the participant is 'caught by surprise' by the
brightening of the slide, so the slide can get brighter before the participant
responds. On the longer time delays, participants may begin to anticipate the
appearance of the slide, and with this higher expectancy they may respond to
the slide at lower levels of intensity.
Another possible source of noise in the scoring may arise from the fact that
each slide was only shown twice. If a trial result had to be rejected for any
reason (see the discussion of technical problems, below) that meant there was
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only one remaining response for that particular slide. A possible
improvement to this situation is suggested in the discussion section below.
Technical problems
On the whole, the study ran very smoothly from a technical point of view.
Occasionally the response button failed to register a participant's press; here,
the slide would brighten to its limit and would not be included in the later
analysis. Another problem was that the background field which was usually
constantly illuminated would, perhaps once in every 20 sessions, flicker
erratically. This problem recurred occasionally throughout the series of
experiments reported in this thesis, and technical investigations found no
solution. Thankfully this problem was sufficiently rare to enable the
discarding of affected trials without impinging greatly on the data set.
Another problem, that applies to this and to the following experiments, is
how to decide when to reject an individual brightness score as being an
outlier - that is, unusually low or high compared to the participant's standard
range of responses. Evidently, if one is expecting there to be particularly high
or low scoring for the emotional slides, one wants to avoid the danger of
discarding possibly meaningful extreme scores. The approach that was
adopted was to inspect the raw data before the slide sequence was known.
Brightness scores that had hit the upper limit were automatically eliminated
from analysis. Also, scores which were, based on experience of the typical
range of responding, ridiculously low (less than 10) were eliminated as likely
'false alarms'. This still left the occasional outlier, that could be seen in
relatively high standard deviation scores. In such cases, the outliers would be
removed one by one until the SD scores reached 'normal' levels. This may
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seem like massaging the data, but as removal of outliers took place before the
slide sequence was known, there is no risk that data are being selectively
retained or discarded so as to support or disconfirm hypotheses.
Discussion of experiment 1
This experiment succeeded in its aims of identifying teething problems and
possible sources of extraneous variance in the data. There were also some
indications that some participants were reacting idiosyncratically to the
emotional slides, perhaps suggesting signs of perceptual defensiveness or
vigilance to these slides compared to the other slide categories. This latter
effect was not strong, however this study gives several pointers towards
perhaps strengthening the perceptual defence/vigilance effect by reducing
the sources of noise in the data and strengthening the stimulus information
both physically and psychologically.
A future study might benefit from reducing the number of stimulus slides,
but increasing the number of times each is shown, as this would be expected
to lessen possible sources of noise in the data. On the assumption that
stronger perceptual defence and vigilance might be seen in response to
stronger emotional slides, it would be advisable to remove these emotional
slides with the least extreme emotionality ratings, as well as removing their
matched control slides and a comparable number of N and NC slides. Thus,
if one halved the number of slides and doubled the number of stimulus
presentations, so that 16 slides are presented 4 times each, this keeps the
session length to the same level as for the present study (that, on informal
discussion with participants, seemed to be a comfortable length).
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This experiment also demonstrated that the length of the random time delay
prior to slide illumination constituted a possible source of variation in
scoring, with both mean brightness scores and SD scores correlating
significantly with the length of the time delay. This may be because, after a
long time delay, participants can be more sure that they will soon see the
rectangle, and so they may tend to lower their response criteria in
anticipation, so responding at generally lower brightness levels for all slides.
At the shortest time delay, on the other hand, participants may be 'taken by
surprise' by the relatively quick appearance of the stimulus, so allowing it to
brighten a little beyond their usual criterion before responding. In a future
study it would seem appropriate to cut the extremes of the range of possible
time delays, to from 2 to 7 seconds. Thus there is still some variability in the
time before stimulus appearance, but not to the extent that participants are
caught unawares, or are keenly anticipating the stimulus.
Another way of possibly strengthening the stimulus intensity, while still
keeping it well within the 'safe' limits so that participants remain unaware of
stimulus nature, is to encourage the adoption of a less conservative response
criterion. In the present experiment, participants were asked to respond when
they were sure that what they saw was not an internally-generated
impression; for many participants this was reported subjectively as being just
a blob of light. This criterion could be relaxed a little by asking participants to
respond when they could clearly see a rectangle of light; this ought to allow
the slide to brighten further, while still keeping the slide contents outside of
awareness. It should be noted that in the present study no participants
reported any awareness of the contents or nature of the stimuli; indeed they
usually expressed surprise when they were shown the stimuli at the
conclusion of both testing sessions. Pilot work with this apparatus suggests
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that when participants are instructed to let the stimuli brighten until they can
begin to see (but not recognise) some contents, the average brightness score is
around 50 (compared to around 20 in this study). Thus there appears to be
room for relaxing the response criterion without risking revealing the
stimulus contents.
Also, one might boost the stimulus strength by speeding up the rate at which
the slide brightens. The present study had a one tenth of a second delay
between each of the 99 possible increments of brightness. This led to the
rectangle brightening fairly slowly, and my impression is that this gives
participants longer to consider and respond to the slide while it is still
relatively dimly illuminated. (This intuition is supported by evidence from
the present study that the lower illumination levels were seen after the longer
delays prior to illumination). A future study might therefore decrease the
delay between each brightness step, thereby speeding up the brightening
process overall. By this measure, one might again be able to encourage
participants to let the slide brighten further than at present, perhaps thereby
increasing the likelihood that participants are unconsciously processing the
semantic content of the slide.
A final consideration for improving stimulus presentation is that of
transparency brightness. In the present study the pictorial information was
dark grey, on a light grey background; in Gregor's original study, however,
the stimulus information was light grey against a dark grey background.
Thus for Gregor's study the slides were darker overall, and the stimulus
information would have been the lightest part of the slide. Light slides with
dark pictorial information were chosen for this study because preliminary
experimentation had suggested that these were most easily identified at full
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illumination levels. A future study should present both sorts of stimuli to see
whether or not this is an important factor in demonstrating perceptual
defence/vigilance.
Experiment 2: Perceptual defence/vigilance and free-response
ESP performance, before and after practice of
mental training techniques.
This study ran simultaneously with experiment 1, so it was not possible at
this point to incorporate the methodological changes suggested by
experiment 1. The study was undertaken principally as part of the overall
research interests of the Koestler Chair of Parapsychology, and I planned and
conducted the parapsychological side of the study together with Dr Deborah
Delanoy and Professor Robert Morris. The study involved training
participants in several mental skills and taking a regular measure of their
performance on a free-response ESP task.
This was a pilot study, intended to train the experimenters in administering
the various mental exercises, to explore the usefulness of these exercises, and
to try out different kinds of ESP targets and different ways of gaining
information paranormally (that is, using different kinds of mental imagery,
focusing of attention, and relaxation exercises as strategies for responding to
the target). No analyses were formally stated in advance, but care was taken
to ensure that no participants or experimenters could know the identity of the
ESP target until participants had recorded their ESP impressions and had
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judged them against the possible target; thus the ESP measures were
considered to be free of artefacts that might artificially inflate ESP scores.
Because of my particular interests in perceptual defence and vigilance, I
introduced a session on Pandora's Box prior to commencement of mental
training, and a second session on Pandora's Box after the final ESP
measurement at the end of the study. This report will be mainly restricted to
a brief outline of the mental training aspect of the study, and will focus on the
perceptual defence/vigilance results and how these related to ESP
performance. It is also interesting to examine whether training intended to
increase participants' ability to relax and to notice more about their thoughts
and feelings will relate to any changes to apparent perceptual defence or
vigilance. Little is known about how individuals' perceptual defence or
vigilance might change over time, but as defensiveness is generally regarded
as a way of coping with stress by denying or shutting out the stressful
information, one might predict that training in relaxation and self-awareness
would tend to lessen the use of defence as a coping strategy and to increase
the use of vigilance. This study will enable a preliminary look at this
question. Also, of course, this study will enable a comparison of perceptual
defence/vigilance with free-response ESP performance; as was pointed out
when discussing the defensiveness-psi correlation in chapter 2, there have
been relatively few studies comparing defensiveness with free-response ESP
performance, and the findings of those studies comparing Defence
Mechanism Test scores with free-response ESP scores have been inconsistent.
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Method
Participants. The study began with 9 volunteer participants; for personal
reasons two individuals were unable to complete the experiment, and their
results are not included in the write-up below. The 7 who completed the
study were 5 females and 2 males, mean age 40 years, range 21 to 51 years.
Procedure. The procedure for measuring perceptual defence/vigilance was
identical to that for experiment 1, with the exception that around 2 months
separated the two testing sessions, compared to only 1 week in experiment 1.
Participants attended the lab for a total of 10 weekly sessions. The first two
sessions were introductory, and at the second of these I administered the first
measure of perceptual defence/vigilance. The Eysenck Personality Inventory,
which gives measures of neuroticism and extraversion, was also administered
at the introductory sessions. At the following 8 sessions, participants were
introduced to a variety of mental training techniques, such as mental and
physical relaxation exercises, mental imagery exercises, self-esteem exercises,
and concentration (focusing of attention) exercises. Participants were
encouraged to practice these exercises at home, sometimes in conjunction
with an ESP task. There were weekly measures of free-response ESP in the
lab, using dynamic video clips as targets. At the final session, I administered
the second part of the test of perceptual defence/vigilance.
Results of experiment 2
Because of the small number of participants in this experiment, results are
likely to be unreliable in themselves. When taken in conjunction with
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experiment 1, however, they may help to confirm or throw into doubt the
trends seen in that study.
Table 5.3 shows the overall mean brightness and SD scores for all participants
for each category of slides, together with a breakdown of the scoring for the
first and second testing sessions, that took place before and after
administration of the mental training exercises. From the table it can be seen
that, when the two testing sessions were taken together, there were no
obvious trends in this data, especially no extreme scoring for E slides. As in
experiment 1, however, SD scores were higher for the meaningful (E and N)
slides than for the meaningless (EC and NC) slides. Also as in experiment 1,
there was a tendency for scoring to be slightly higher in the first session than
in the second session.
Table 5.3
Mean brightness and standard deviation scores for each slide category, for sessions 1
and 2, and overall (sessions 1 and 2 combined).
E EC N NC
Session 1 (pre-training)
Mean 23.446 23.357 22.982 23.464
SD 2.048 1.881 1.803 1.600
Session 2 (post-training)
Mean 22.143 22.497 21.847 22.554
SD 2.198 1.925 2.285 2.028
Overall
Mean 22.764 22.857 22.400 22.998
SD 2.591 2.156 2.459 2.276
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Considering how responses to E slides (the indicator of perceptual defence or
vigilance) altered after administration of the mental training exercises, it can
be seen that in Session 1, E slides were ranked 2 overall, perhaps indicating a
/tendency towards defensiveness; in Session 2, E slides were ranked 3 overall,
t session; 2 participants showed no change in responses to E slides, and 1
participant appeared to become more defensive in the post-training session.
While this slight trend is what one might expect after training to encourage
relaxation and an openness to internal impressions, it would be premature to
take it seriously as an indication of changes in defensiveness after training.
This would, however, be an interesting point to examine more systematically
in a future study.
For comparison with experiment 1, figure 5.3 depicts the overall frequency
distribution of ranks for the four categories of stimuli. Unlike what was
found in experiment 1, there is no suggestion of extreme scoring for E slides;
instead, there is a tendency for the control slides (EC and NC) to be ranked 1
more often than the other slides.
Table 5.4 shows the overall mean brightness and standard deviation in scores
for all slides for each length of time delay prior to slide brightening.
indicating a change towards vigilance. Looking at this trend more
^closely, we see that 4 out of the 7 participants showed a change towards
vigilance from the pre-training to the post-training defensiveness testing
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Figure 5.3
Bar chart showing frequency distribution of ranked brightness scores to the four
categories of stimulus slides
Number of Ranks
■ E
Rank 1 Rank 2 Rank 3 Rank 4
Table 5.4
Mean brightness and standard deviation scores over time delays from 1 to 10 seconds
Time delay Mean Brightness SD
1 sec 23.436 1.527
2 sec 22.689 2.448
3 sec 23.016 2.085
4 sec 22.146 2.170
5 sec 22.146 2.170
6 sec 22.713 2.224
7 sec 22.717 2.173
8 sec 22.857 2.617
9 sec 22.188 2.351
10 sec 22.838 2.625
Again with caution due to the small number of participants in this study,
table 5.4 appears to confirm the trend found in experiment 1, for shorter time
delays to be associated with higher brightness scores and lower variance,
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while longer time delays are associated with lower brightness scores and
higher variance. The correlation between brightness scores and time delay is
positive, though, unlike the correlation in experiment 1, not statistically
significant (rs=.136). As was found in experiment 1, the amount of variation
in scoring was significantly correlated with time delay (rs=-.700, p<.05, 2-t)
This supports the recommendation from experiment 1 to reduce the range of
possible time delays, based on the assumption that extremely short and long
time delays introduce a source of extraneous variance into the data.
ESP results. The ESP task was for the participant to gain impressions of a
brief video clip (the 'target') that was being shown in another, sensorially
isolated, room. At the conclusion of the experiment, two independent
experienced judges, who were blind to the actual target identity, rated the
participants' mentations for their degree of correspondence with a pool of
four video clips for each ESP session, one of which was the target. Thus, there
was a 25% likelihood of selecting the correct target by chance alone. The
video clips in a target pool were then ranked such that the film that had the
closest correspondence with the participant's mentation was ranked 1, and
the clip that was least like the mentation was ranked 4. Mean chance
expectation for target ranks was therefore 2.5.
The 7 participants each completed 8 formal ESP sessions, giving a total of 56
trials, with a mean target ranking of 2.6. Thus, ESP scoring overall was
slightly negative, but not significantly so (sum of ranks Z=-0.597). Four out of
7 participants showed an improvement in ESP performance over time, but
since 3 of these participants' scores were below MCE in the first half of the
study, the improvements in their scores could simply be regression to the
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mean of 2.5. Therefore, there was no significant ESP performance overall, and
no evidence of any improvement in ESP scoring with training.
Defensiveness-psi relationship. Experiment 2 provided the first opportunity
to correlate performance on the prototype measure of perceptual
defence/vigilance with psi performance. As the independent judging of
participants' mentations on the ESP task did not take place until after the
conclusion of the entire study, I could not have had any knowledge of the
ESP scores that the judges allocated to each participant at the time of the
defensiveness testing, and so one cannot argue that I could have somehow
biased participants' responses on the post-training defensiveness testing
session in accordance with my expectations.
There was a nonsignificant correlation (Spearman's rho) in the expected
direction of -0.514 between participants' overall free-response ESP
performance and their responses to the E slides on the measure of perceptual
defence/vigilance (summed across both defensiveness testing sessions). That
is, those participants whose brightness scores for the E slides were the highest
(perhaps indicating perceptual defensiveness) tended to score relatively
poorly at ESP, while those participants who appeared to be perceptually
vigilant tended to score relatively well at ESP. This finding provides some
independent support for the defensiveness-psi relationship described in
chapter 2.
The correlation between responses to the EC slides and ESP performance was
rs=0.156, therefore the relationship between ESP performance and
performance on the prototype indicator of perceptual defence /vigilance was
as one would expect if participants were perceptually defensive or vigilant to
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the emotional slides: a greater correlation was found for the emotional slides
than for the matched emotional control slides.
Looking more closely at the pre-training session on Pandora's Box and ESP
scores from the first half of the study, there was a significant correlation in
the expected direction between ESP and responses to E slides on Pandora's
Box (rs=-.764, p<.05, 1-t), while that for EC slides was -.318. For the post-
training session, scores on Pandora's Box correlated with the ESP scores from
the second half of the study, rs=-.039 for the E slides, and rs=.333 for the EC
slides. Therefore, the defensiveness-psi relationship in experiment 2 was
found only for the pre-training measure. This is what one might expect, based
on the assumption that practice with mental training exercises that are
intended to improve relaxation and self-esteem might reduce an individual's
characteristic defensive reactions.
Personality measures. Finally, it will be recalled that participants completed
measures of extraversion and neuroticism during their introductory sessions.
These scores were correlated, using the Spearman correlation coefficient, with
perceptual defence/vigilance scores. For extraversion, rs=.064 for Emotional
slides, and unexpectedly rs=.817 for emotional control slides (significant at
p<.05, 2-t). For neuroticism, rs=-.145 for emotional slides, so that the more
defensive individuals were more neurotic, and rs=-.154 for emotional control
slides. This defensiveness-neuroticism correlation is as one might expect,
since, as described in chapter 1, defensiveness/repression has been linked
with neuroticism both theoretically and empirically.
Given the small number of participants, these figures must be taken with
caution, but it is planned to continue to examine the personality correlates of
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apparent perceptual defensiveness/vigilance in later experiments. This is an
important consideration in the development of the prototype apparatus for
measuring perceptual defence and vigilance: if one can identify theoretically-
relevant correlations between responses on this pilot apparatus and other
well-validated measures of individual differences such as neuroticism, then
this will help to validate the pilot apparatus as a measure of
defensiveness/vigilance.
Discussion of experiment 2
As with experiment 1, this study suggested that any effects of perceptual
defence or vigilance to subliminally-presented emotional stimuli were very
weak. Nevertheless, it was encouraging to find correlations in the expected
direction (one of which was statistically significant) between responses to E
slides on Pandora's Box and free-response ESP performance, whilst there
were no consistent or significant correlations for the control stimuli.
It was also encouraging to find that the main defensiveness-psi effect in this
study occurred for the pre-training measure; this is what one might expect if
the mental training exercises had reduced participants' habitual defensive
responses to emotional stimuli. This study is the first to permit an
examination of the defensiveness-psi correlation using the prototype
indicator of perceptual defence/vigilance; given the small number of
participants, one can only tentatively suggest that this study appears to
support the findings of the DMT-ESP studies reviewed earlier.
Experiment 2 has also been useful in confirming the need for the
methodological changes suggested by experiment 1. A fundamental problem
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of this methodology remains the weak effect, and the apparent susceptibility
of the measure to sources of extraneous variance in scoring. The third
preliminary experiment attempted to address this problem.
Experiment 3: Perceptual defence/vigilance and
psychokinesis (PK) performance.
The aim of this study was to strengthen the weak signs of perceptual
defence/vigilance which appeared in experiments 1 and 2. Several
methodological changes were made (as detailed below) with this end in
mind. Also, as several of the participants in this study had previously acted
as subjects in PK experiments conducted by a colleague (Loftur Reimar
Gissurarson), it was possible to correlate these individuals' PK and
defensiveness scores.
Method
Participants. In an attempt to increase the power of this study, it was
decided to set a criterion for inclusion of participants' results in the final
analysis. If a participant, in either the first half or the second half of the
session, had emotional slides ranked 1 or 4, then their data would be
included (thus, it was hoped to include those participants who showed
particular signs of perceptual defence or vigilance). It was decided in advance
/y'
to run sufficient individuals through the procedure so that I would have the
data of 24 'criterion' participants to work with. The results below are all based
on the results of these criterion participants, with the exception of the data on
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the effect of the random time delay on slide responses, which is for all
participants.
31 individuals took part in this study. Of these, 7 were colleagues who had
previously participated in my experiments 1 or 2. The remaining 24 had
taken part in computer PK studies conducted between 1 and 3 years
previously, who at the time had indicated a willingness to take part in future
studies. 29 participants were required to meet the criterion number of 24.
Data were collected from all 31 participants, but the data of the final 2 was
not scored (because by then the criterion number of participants had been
reached). Of the 24 criterion participants, 13 were female and 11 were male.
Stimuli. The stimuli were 16 slides, half of those used in experiments 1 and 2,
that were shown 4 times each. Thus, there were a total of 64 stimulus
exposures, the same as in experiments 1 and 2. The slides that were discarded
were those that some participants had had difficulty identifying at full
brightness, or those that had the least extreme emotionality ratings, plus their
matched controls. The aim was to strengthen the impact of the emotional
slides. Whereas the mean emotionality rating for the E slides used in
experiments 1 and 2 was 5.981 (with a maximum rating of 7), that for the
slides used in this study was 6.16.
One additional change in the procedure was to use two stimulus conditions,
to address the point raised in experiment 1 about the nature of stimuli used in
the original study by Gregor. In the LIGHT condition, the slide background
was light and the picture was dark, as in experiments 1 and 2; in the DARK
condition, the slide background was dark and the picture was light, as
Gregor (1972) had done. The latter condition was introduced to see whether
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any stronger effects would be gained when the stimulus information was
actually the brightest part of the slide, rather than the darkest.
Apparatus. The apparatus was identical to that used in experiments 1 and 2,
with 2 exceptions. The computer program was modified so that each slide
brightened slightly faster than in previous studies (this change was
introduced in the expectation that it would allow the slides to get brighter
before participants responded to them). Secondly, the random time delay
prior to slide brightening was changed from the 1 to 10 seconds used in
experiments 1 and 2, to 2 to 7 seconds (this was in order to reduce the
apparent influence of extremely short or long delays on participants'
responses).
Procedure. Whereas in the first two experiments participants completed two
separate sessions on Pandora's Box, at least 1 week apart, in this study these
two sessions were collapsed into one (this change was introduced in the
expectation that it would reduce intra-individual variation in scoring, since
the pariticipant's general mood, alertness, and perhaps also perceptual
sensitivity, would be expected to remain relatively stable in a single session).
In order to counteract possible fatigue from a slightly longer session, care was
taken (as detailed below) to allow participants to rest periodically during the
session.
Apart from the changes already detailed, the overall procedure remained
very similar to that used in experiments 1 and 2. Half of the participants saw
LIGHT slides only, the other half saw DARK slides only. The session was
divided half-way by a rest break into two runs of 32 slides each. The length of
this break was determined by the participant, as they were encouraged to
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continue when they felt refreshed, but it usually ran from about 2 to 10
minutes. Each run was also divided half-way by a shorter break. Also, as
suggested in the discussion to experiment 1, participants were encouraged to
adopt a less stringent response criterion. In experiments 1 and 2, they had
been asked to respond when they began to see a brightening area that they
were confident was 'out there' rather than being internally-generated visual
imagery. For this experiment, participants were asked to let the stimulus slide
brighten beyond their first visual impressions, until they felt they could begin
to see the rectangular shape of the stimulus slide. The aim of this change was
to let the slides brighten further than before, though still ensuring that the
participants remained unaware of the stimulus contents, in the hope that this
would strengthen participants' possibly defensive or vigilant unconscious
reactions to the stimuli.
Because stimulus slides were expected to brighten further in this study, care
was taken at the end of the session to ask every participant whether they had
at any time seen anything apart from the rectangular slide shape to which
they were responding.
Results of experiment 3
Again, as this was regarded as a preliminary experiment, no analyses were
pre-planned. The results that were felt to be most informative are reported
below.
11 out of 14 participants in the LIGHT slides condition met the criterion
requirement (that is, their mean brightness scores to the E slides were ranked
either 1 or 4 in either half of the session, possibly indicating signs of
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defensiveness or vigilance), and 13 out of 15 participants in the DARK slides
condition met the criterion requirement.
Table 5.5 shows the overall mean brightness scores, and their SDs, for the
DARK slides and the LIGHT slides. For the DARK slides there were no signs
of distinctive responding to the E slides compared to the others. For the
LIGHT slides, there was some suggestion of overall defensiveness to the E
slides, as these had the highest brightness scores of all four categories of
stimuli. Unlike experiments 1 and 2, that had found slightly higher SD scores
for the meaningful (E and N) slides compared to the meaningless control
slides, this study found no clear trend for SD scores.
Table 5.5
Mean and standard deviation of brightness scores to the four categories of stimuli, for
LIGHT and DARK slide conditions
E EC N NC
DARK Slides
Mean 50.450 50.716 50.894 49.632
SD 5.653 5.376 5.507 5.871
LIGHT Slides
Mean 34.602 34.280 33.892 33.890
SD 6.443 6.820 6.841 6.810
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Figure 5.4
Bar chart showing the frequency distribution of ranked brightness scores for DARK
slides
Figure 5.5




Figures 5.4 and 5.5 show the frequency distribution of the rankings found for
the brightness scores for the DARK and LIGHT slide categories.
As figure 5.4 shows, the ranked brightness scores for E slides in the DARK
slide condition were fairly evenly distributed, so apparently there was no
overall extreme scoring for the E slides. For the LIGHT slides condition,
however, figure 5.5 shows that a high proportion of participants had the
highest brightness scores for the E slides. In fact, 9 out of 11 participants in
this condition responded most slowly to the emotional stimuli compared to
the other stimuli, suggesting overall defensiveness to the emotional stimuli.
Table 5.6 shows mean brightness and SD scores for all participants (not just
criterion participants), depending on the length of time delay prior to slide
brightening, and over light and dark slides separately. It will be recalled that
experiments 1 and 2 suggested that extremely short or long time delays might
introduce extraneous variance into subjects' responses, therefore for this
experiment the range of possible time delay was restricted to from 2 to 7
seconds.
It appears from table 5.6 that the reduced range of time delay has reduced the
variability in scoring which had been seen at extreme delays. For the LIGHT
slides condition, mean slide brightness correlated rs=.77l with time delay,
which is in the same direction as in experiments 1 and 2, but which is not
statistically significant in the present analysis with an n of only 6. SD
correlated only .086 with time delay in the LIGHT slides condition. For the
DARK slides condition, mean slide brightness correlated only .2 with time
delay, and SD correlated -.029 with time delay. These non-significant
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Table 5.6
Mean brightness and standard deviation scores for LIGHT and DARK slide
conditions, over time delays from 2 to 7 seconds
LIGHT Slides DARK Slides
Time Delay Mean Brightness SD Mean Brightness SD
2 sec 34.650 2.719 51.032 3.873
3 sec 35.176 2.616 50.430 3.838
4 sec 34.492 2.377 50.793 3.814
5 sec 34.212 2.701 50.794 3.896
6 sec 34.115 2.754 50.895 3.886
7 sec 34.370 2.499 50.465 3.518
correlations confirm, therefore, that by reducing the range of the random time
delay from 1-10 seconds to 2-7 seconds, a source of extraneous variance in the
data has been reduced.
Perceptual defence/vigilance correlated with PK performance. Although
this experiment was not planned with a view to comparing perceptual
defence/vigilance to psi scoring, it happened that all participants in this
study had at one time or another attempted a computer PK task, 'Synthia',
devised by Loftur Reimar Gissurarson. It was decided, therefore, to take the
opportunity to look back at Gissurarson's records and correlate PK
performance with perceptual defence/vigilance. I was unaware of
participants' PK scores at the time the defensiveness sessions were conducted,
so it cannot be argued that my knowledge could have biased the outcome of
the defensiveness testing (recall also that for experiment 2 the independent
judging of participants' free-response ESP mentations took place after the
defensiveness testing session).
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The computer PK task 'Synthia' consisted of a VDU display of four windows,
one of which was designated the 'target' window by the computer, and the
participant's task was to press the space bar on the keyboard and try to make
the computer 'select' that window. When the space bar was pressed a random
number was generated to randomly select a window. Thus, the participant's
implicit aim was to bias the output of the random number generator so as to
select the designated target window. If the target window was selected then a
hit was scored. There was a one in four chance of selecting the target window
by chance alone. In most versions of Synthia, participants did two runs of 40
trials each, therefore MCE was 20 hits. Spearman correlation coefficients were
calculated between PK scores and responses to Light E, Light EC, Dark E,
Dark EC, and all E and all EC slides respectively.
As for the data above, only the results of the 24 criterion participants are
included in this analysis. While there is a long history of correlating
defensiveness with ESP, so that one-tailed probability values may be used,
PK has never before been correlated with defensiveness, so two-tailed
probability values should be used. The results of the Spearman correlations
between PK scores and ranked brightness scores for E and EC slides on
Pandora's Box are shown in table 5.7.
It can be seen from table 5.7 that there is a small positive correlation between
PK scores and responses to emotional slides, such that individuals who are
perceptually defensive tend to score less well at the PK task than individuals
;v
who are vigilant. For all participants, this correlation is .291, a value that is
not statistically significant on a two-tailed test, given that there are only 24
pairs of observations (one would need a correlation of .407 for p<.05, 2-t with
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Table 5.7
Spearman correlations of PK scores and brightness scores on Pandora's Box, for the
DARK slides and the LIGHT slides conditions, and for both conditions together
DARK slides (n=13)
Rank E Rank EC
PK .124 -.431
LIGHT slides (n=ll)
Rank E Rank EC
PK .188 .162
All slides (n=24)
Rank E Rank EC
PK .291 -.183
n=24). As one would expect, there appears to be no consistent correlation
between reactions to the emotional control slides and PK scores.
Discussion of experiment 3
This experiment attempted to strengthen signs of perceptual
defence/vigilance by: 1. cutting out sources of noise in the data (by halving
the number of stimuli and doubling the number of stimulus exposures, by
conducting only 1 long testing session rather than 2 short sessions, and by
reducing the possible range of the random time delay prior to slide
brightening); 2. by boosting the psychological and physical strength of the
stimuli (by using stimuli that had higher emotionality ratings than in
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experiments 1 and 2, and by adopting measures intended to let the stimuli get
brighter before participants responded to them); and 3. by exploring whether
light or dark slides might give a stronger perceptual defence effect, since the
original study by Gregor used dark slides. Fortuitously, it was also possible
to correlate scoring on a computer PK task with perceptual defence/vigilance.
Reducing the possible range of the random time delay prior to slide
brightening appeared, as planned, to remove a source of noise from the data:
correlations between mean brightness and SD scores, and time delay, were
not statistically significant in the present study with a 2-7 second time delay,
whereas they had been significant in experiments 1 and 2, with a 1-10 second
time delay.
Judging from the overall mean brightness scores, participants were doing as
requested and allowing the slides to brighten further than in experiments 1
and 2 before pressing the response button. Taking the brightness scores for
the LIGHT slides, for instance, mean scores were around 34 brightness steps
for the present study, compared to around 22 brightness steps for
experiments 1 and 2. Mean brightness scores were around 50 for the DARK
slides in experiment 3 because these slides, transmitting less light than the
LIGHT slides, had to be exposed to considerably stronger light before
participants could see the small rectangle of light to which they were
responding.
When asked whether they could see anything on the purportedly subliminal
slides, one participant felt he had some visual impressions that may have
corresponded with one of the stimulus slides when he was able to see that
slide clearly at the end of the session. However, this particular participant
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was already familiar with the stimulus materials, methodology, and
hypotheses of this study, so he may have had greater expectations of the slide
contents than most of the other participants. Four other participants reported
having some vague visual impressions, but when they saw the stimuli they
considered that their impressions had not been related to the contents of the
stimuli. Thus it appears that, on a subjective level, the participants were not
consciously aware of the nature of the stimuli (indeed many participants
expressed surprise and disbelief when they later learned that there had been
images on each slide).
Whereas there was no distinctive pattern of responding to the DARK slide
condition, 9 out of 11 participants in the LIGHT slide condition responded
most extremely to the emotional stimuli, compared to the other slides. While
far from conclusive evidence of perceptual defensiveness and vigilance to
emotional compared to other slides, it is interesting to note that there was a
higher correlation between perceptual defence/vigilance and PK
performance in the light slide condition than in the dark slide condition. This
was the first attempt to correlate PK scores with defensiveness, and the
overall correlation of .291 is of a moderate size for the behavioural sciences
(Cohen, 1977), though with only 24 participants it is not statistically
significant. This correlation is, however, congruent with the overall
defensiveness-psi relationship that has been suggested by the studies
reviewed in chapter 2.
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Conclusions
These three preliminary experiments have begun to refine the prototype
procedure for measuring perceptual defence/vigilance. It has been seen that
any relatively high or low brightness scores on the subliminally presented
emotional slides (which are taken to be indications, respectively, of
perceptual defence and perceptual vigilance), compared to those for
emotional control slides, are extremely weak and certainly not of the
magnitude one would have hoped for given Gregor's results. It is possible
that the attempted methodological improvements over Gregor's method have
'thrown the baby out with the bathwater'; alternatively, Gregor's results may
have been inflated due to the possibilities for artefact which existed with his
method.
Nevertheless, despite these weak effects some encouraging correlations were
found between psi scoring and perceptual defence/vigilance. There was a
nonsignificant correlation in the predicted direction between responses to
subliminally presented emotional slides and free-response ESP (rs=-.514),
while that for the emotional control slides was rs=.156. Also, experiment 2
found a weak correlation in the expected direction between Eysenck's
neuroticism and perceptual defence/vigilance (rs=-.145; more defensive more
neurotic). With only 7 participants, the results for experiment 2 must all be
considered preliminary. Experiment 3 permitted the correlation, for the first
time, between performance on a computer PK task and perceptual
defence/vigilance. Again, the results were encouraging, with a moderate
sized correlation in the expected direction (more vigilant scored better at PK)
of rs=.291, whilst that for the control slides was rs=-.183; because there were
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only 24 criterion participants in experiment 3, this correlation was not
statistically significant.
In chapter 2,1 argued the need for a conceptual replication of the DMT-ESP
studies. While experiments 2 and 3 make a small step in this direction, it is
desirable to attempt a more rigorous replication, using an ESP measure that is
designed to be quite similar to the subliminal perception measure, thus
perhaps increasing the likelihood of any similarities between subliminal and
extrasensory perception emerging. This is one aim of experiment 4.
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Chapter 6. Experiment 4: Perceptual defence/vigilance
and forced choice ESP performance.
This chapter will review the rationale for a comparison of perceptual
defensiveness/vigilance and ESP performance, and will outline again the
particular methodology developed for this purpose, before reporting on such
an experimental comparison.
A variety of measures, described in chapters 2 and 3, have been used to
identify individuals as 'defensive'. These measures range from 'paper and
pencil' tests where subjects are required to introspect about their reactions in
hypothetical situations that may evoke defensiveness, to questionnaires on
'openness', to measures of fluctuations in perceptual thresholds in response to
weakly-presented emotive stimuli. I have chosen to study defensiveness as it
is defined within this last context of subliminal perception research (e.g.
Brown, 1961; Dixon, 1981): individuals are presented, under difficult
perceptual circumstances, with emotional and neutral information; those who
take longer to report awareness of emotional than neutral stimuli are
described as 'perceptually defensive', while others who are 'perceptually
vigilant' report awareness of emotional stimuli more quickly than for neutral
stimuli. Thus, differential reports of awareness for emotional and neutral
stimuli are the indicator of defensiveness/vigilance.
The subliminal perception paradigm was chosen for the studies in this thesis
because it shared some similarities with, but had some advantages over, the
Defence Mechanism Test. The DMT had been systematically used in a series
of studies demonstrating a relationship between defensiveness and psi, but
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there was a need for independent replication of these 'DMT-ESP' studies. It
was argued that difficulties associated with the use of the DMT, including the
need for extensive training in test administration and scoring, had
discouraged other parapsychologists from attempting to replicate the DMT-
ESP studies, and thus from following-up the interesting process-related
questions of how and why defensiveness relates to psi performance. The
subliminal perception paradigm resembles the DMT in that it uses weakly-
presented emotive stimuli that may evoke perceptual defence.
The strength of methods such as the DMT and subliminal perception
techniques is that they apparently enable the observation of defensiveness in
action (as seen in the distortions of perceptions, or reported perceptions),
without any self-consciousness or introspection on the part of the subject.
However, compared to the psychoanalytic assumptions underlying the DMT,
the definition of 'perceptual defence' and 'perceptual vigilance' as used within
subliminal perception studies is quite narrow - relating simply to the
apparent fluctuations in perceptual thresholds for emotive compared to
neutral stimuli. Consequently, using this latter objective definition,
defensiveness can be quite simply measured by a variety of subliminal
perception techniques. A number of these were reviewed, their strengths and
weaknesses were noted, and a prototype indicator of perceptual
defence/vigilance was identified as a potentially useful tool for further
exploring the defensiveness-psi relationship. Chapter 5 described three
preliminary experiments that showed some promising indications of
relationships in the expected direction between performance on this
prototype indicator and performance on psi measures (both free-response
ESP and PK), and on a personality measure of neuroticism.
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It should be noted that this subliminal perception indicator of
defensiveness/vigilance may be tapping into something different from the
DMT. The latter test is based on the Freudian theory of defence mechanisms
and the complex scoring of the DMT is thought to reflect the operation of
these defence mechanisms, such as 'repression' (often considered analogous
to perceptual defence, e.g. Dixon, 1981; Wagstaff, 1974a). Cooper and Kline
(1986) found no correlation between responses on the repression scale of the
DMT (that they expected would be most likely to correlate with perceptual
defence) and a measure of perceptual defence, a finding that they concluded
'cast(s) doubt on the validity of this scale of the test' (p.19), and that reinforces
the possibility that the DMT is measuring something different to measures of
perceptual defence (assuming that repression ought, theoretically, to be
similar to perceptual defence).
While the DMT is based on assumptions of a motivational basis to test
responses, studies of perceptual defence and vigilance have, as we have seen,
usually attempted to demonstrate that the differential responding to
emotional and neutral stimuli are due to fluctuations in perceptual sensitivity,
rather than to motivational or response bias effects; for example, early studies
into subliminal perception that asked subjects to signal their recognition of
taboo or neutral words by saying the words aloud were criticised because it
was felt that subjects might hesitate to say taboo words aloud - this hesitation
might look like perceptual defence (that is, raised perceptual thresholds), but
in fact it could be a response effect. The distinction between physiological and
motivational explanations for defensiveness may be more apparent than real -
perhaps these are simply two different aspects of a single phenomenon, two
different levels of explanation, two different theoretical viewpoints. Whether
one is more 'important' than the other is difficult to say, and it is not the aim
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of this thesis to try to answer that question. Having adopted the paradigm of
subliminal perception because of its strengths, I must also adopt the narrow
definition of perceptual defence/vigilance, as fluctuations in sensory
thresholds, that is associated with this paradigm. It is not, however, necessary
at this stage to be able to explain why thresholds apparently fluctuate for
emotional compared to neutral stimuli. The main question for this thesis
concerns the identification of a methodology that enables further exploration
of the defensiveness-psi relationship.
Adopting this particular definition of perceptual defence/vigilance enables
one to overcome some of the drawbacks associated with the DMT identified
earlier:
1. Subliminal perception techniques may be rapidly and automatically
administered and objectively scored, thus requiring little specialist
knowledge or training;
2. Studies of the defensiveness/psi relationship may allow more detailed
examination of situational, methodological and personality variables which
perhaps contribute to psi-hitting or psi-missing. For instance, Delanoy (1989)
and Watt (1989) have pointed out the need for systematic research into what
makes a successful ESP target. There is theoretically no restriction on the
nature or quantity of stimulus material which may be used in the subliminal
perception task used to identify individuals as perceptually defensive or
vigilant. The DMT, on the other hand, usually scores individuals' responses
to only two supposedly threatening pictures. One could argue therefore that
the former method allows more scope for exploration of the nature of the
defensiveness-psi relationship, especially where target variables are
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concerned. The detailed scoring scheme of the DMT may, however, provide
more insight into what aspects of defensiveness are particularly associated
with success at ESP tasks, and this question is to be addressed following
completion of the 10th Icelandic DMT-ESP study (Haraldsson, 1991, personal
communication). For instance, although the DMT-ESP studies have shown a
steady decline in the size of the defensiveness-psi correlation over the years,
it may be that one or more of the sub-scales of the DMT - repression for
instance - would correlate more strongly with psi performance. Depending
on the theoretical assumptions underlying the various Freudian defence
mechanisms, one might be able to begin to hypothesise why a particular scale
of the DMT correlates relatively strongly with psi performance, and perhaps
such a hypothesis might in turn suggest something about the psi process.
3. The DMT-ESP studies typically used a relatively neutral forced choice ESP
target such as a choice of four windows on a computer screen, or a sequence
made up of four letters of the alphabet. Perhaps the defensiveness-psi
correlation would be strengthened by incorporating emotionally negative
targets in the ESP measure. The rationale here is that, by maximising the
similarity of the defensiveness and the psi testing situations, one might also
maximise the chances of observing the defensiveness-psi correlation. This is
not a new idea; in fact it was suggested in the first ever DMT-ESP report: 'If
the ESP targets were constructed out of threatening figures rather than
geometric designs, would the effect be stronger?' (Carpenter, 1965, p.73). The
defensiveness-psi correlation might be further increased by using similar, if
not identical, stimuli both for the measure of perceptual defence/vigilance
and for the ESP task. While this would be difficult using the DMT, the use of
a subliminal perception task to identify individuals as perceptually defensive
or vigilant permits experimentation with various stimuli.
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4. Several parapsychologists have drawn parallels between perceptual
defence/vigilance seen in subliminal perception and psi-missing/hitting seen
in extrasensory perception (i.e., scoring consistently below or above chance
expectation; Beloff, 1974; Irwin, 1979; Roney-Dougal, 1987). For many
researchers these parallels are congruent with the assumption that, although
the mechanism whereby psi information reaches an organism may be
different to the mechanism whereby subliminal information reaches the
organism, both do so initially at an unconscious level, and both are
consequently subject to similar distortions and transformations prior to
emergence in conscious awareness. However, these parallels have not, to my
knowledge, been directly studied.
The DMT, though identifying individuals as 'defensive', is a projective
psychological test using two emotional stimuli that are initially subliminal
but are later visible. This methodology does not allow for the identification of
individuals as perceptually defensive or vigilant as defined in the subliminal
perception literature. Wiklund (1975) compared 'openness to preconscious
processing', as identified by a subliminal perception task where 'open'
individuals reported seeing a visual illusion, to ESP performance. Post hoc, it
was found that 3 individuals who were apparently resistant to subliminal
perception psi-missed at the ESP task, but this was not an unambiguous
conclusion, and the subliminal perception task was not one that traditionally
is used to identify individuals as perceptually defensive or vigilant.
For all of the above reasons, three preliminary studies, reported in chapter 5,
were conducted with the aim of developing a prototype methodology for
indicating perceptual defensiveness/vigilance. Two of these studies
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incorporated measures of psi and both showed nonsignificant but suggestive
correlations in the predicted direction between apparent perceptual
defence/vigilance and psi scoring.
The present experiment aimed to follow up on these findings, using ESP
measures specifically designed for maximum similarity to the subliminal
perception measure. In addition, two personality measures would be
administered. 1. Byrne's (Byrne, 1961; Byrne, Barry, & Nelson, 1963)
Repression-Sensitization (R-S) Scale, that claims to identify as 'repressors'
individuals who tend to respond to threatening stimuli by avoiding (denying,
repressing) them, and as 'sensitizors' those who tend to approach
(intellectualize, obsessionalize) threatening stimuli. Though there have been
criticisms of the validity (Cooper, 1982) and the application (Chabot, 1973) of
the R-S scale, I was curious to see whether the R-S scores correlated with the
subliminal perception measure of defensiveness taken in this study, since on
the face of it 'repression' appears to resemble perceptual defence and
'sensitization' appears to resemble perceptual vigilance. 2. The Eysenck
Personality Inventory (EPI), giving a measure of extraversion and
neuroticism, that was also used in experiment 2. It will be recalled that
experiment 2 showed a correlation between apparent perceptual
defensiveness and neuroticism (but not extraversion); this correlation could
be important to the development of a measure purporting to identify
individuals as perceptually defensive or vigilant, since both perceptual
defence and neuroticism might be regarded as maladaptive responses to
stress (Costa & McCrae, 1992). Neuroticism is a well-established personality
factor, and if the prototype measure of defensiveness consistently correlates
with neuroticism then this may suggest that there is some construct validity
to the defensiveness test.
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When they originally volunteered to participate in a study with the
parapsychology unit, each participant filled out an extensive 'Participant
Information Form' (PIF). This confidential questionnaire includes several
questions about belief in and experience of psi phenomena. Participants who
believe in and/or have experienced what they interpret as psi phenomena are
traditionally called 'sheep'; 'goats' are those who disbelieve in psi phenomena
and who have not interpreted any of their experiences as psychic.
Parapsychologists have found that sheep tend to score consistently positively
at psi tasks, while goats tend to score consistently negatively (that is, below
mean chance expectation [Palmer, 1982]). Participants' responses to these
'sheep-goat' questions could therefore also be investigated to see if the sheep-
goat effect would be replicated, and also to explore whether sheep and goats
differed in their responses to the prototype indicator of perceptual defence
and vigilance.
The PIF questionnaire also contained some questions that might give some
insight into the 'mental health' of potential participants, including questions
about their sleep patterns (whether participants felt they usually got enough
sleep), their participation in 'formal self-improvement programs' (such as
psychotherapy), and whether they had experienced mental illness in the past
(or at present). It was felt that these questions might be of interest for how
they related to the measure of perceptual defence or vigilance: in other
words, they might be able to say something about how an apparent tendency
to be perceptually defensive or vigilant to emotive stimuli is associated with
self-reported mental adjustment. A summary of the respective responses of
perceptually defensive and vigilant participants will therefore be given later
in this chapter.
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Experiment 3 had made some attempt to increase the power of the study by
selecting for analysis those participants whose mean brightness scores to the
emotional slides were either highest or lowest (i.e. ranked 1 or 4) compared to
those for the other slide categories, in either halfof the testing session. It was felt
that, for the light slides condition, this method had produced promising
results, as 9 out of 11 participants in this condition showed apparent
perceptual defensiveness or vigilance overall. It was decided for the current
study to attempt to increase further the power of the study by adopting a
more strict criterion for the inclusion of data in the main defensiveness-psi
analyses. Only those participants who, over the entire session, responded most
slowly or most quickly to the E slides compared to the other slide categories,
would have their data included for the defensiveness-psi correlations. These
would be designated 'criterion' participants, and it was decided in advance to
continue the study until 24 individuals had responded according to this
criterion. The data for all participants would be included in the remaining
ESP and personality analyses.
Method
Overview ofprocedure
Individuals who had previously contacted the parapsychology unit
expressing their interest in the subject and in helping with experiments were
contacted and invited to participate. They were told that the study was to
compare subliminal perception and extrasensory perception, and were given
some details of the procedure. As with experiments 1, 2, & 3, participants
I
were never deliberately misinformed about any aspects of the study, but care
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was taken to withhold details that might cue participants on the nature of the
subliminal stimuli and the experimental hypotheses. Often this 'honesty with
discretion' policy was achieved by describing aspects of the experiment in
general terms, for instance: 'it is thought that people tend to respond similarly
to subliminal and extrasensory perceptions'.
The volunteers took part in two testing sessions, usually about a week apart.
The first session measured perceptual defence/vigilance using the method
established in preliminary experiments reported earlier (further details
below). In order to make the best use of both lab. time and participants' time,
participants completed the EPI and R-S questionnaires at home between
sessions. While this presumably introduced some variability in the conditions
in which the questionnaires were completed, it was felt that, if anything,
participants would be more relaxed and less self-conscious at home, and so
they might answer the questionnaires more honestly than if they were in the
lab. Participants then returned the questionnaires when they arrived for the
second session that measured ESP (further details below). Participants were
asked to bring in a friend to act as sender for the ESP session and most did so.
For those few who did not bring in a sender, a student or staff member with
the parapsychology unit acted as sender (with the participants' prior
knowledge and consent).
The measure ofperceptual defence/vigilance
As described earlier, individuals are asked to respond to weakly illuminated
stimulus slides, some of which are emotionally unpleasant, by pressing a
button when they first become aware of the presence of the slides.
Preliminary experiments have shown that at this 'subjective awareness
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threshold' the participant reports no awareness of the presence of any
information other than the overall rectangular shape of the slide. Fluctuations
in the illumination level at which the participants report awareness of the
slide may represent an index of their (possibly physiological) reactions to the
subliminally-presented emotional, neutral, and control information, thus
enabling them to be identified as perceptually defensive or vigilant.
Individuals who respond, on average, most slowly to the emotional slides are
regarded as perceptually defensive; those responding most quickly to the
emotional slides are regarded as perceptually vigilant.
Stimuli for measuring perceptual defence/vigilance. These were identical
to those used in experiment 3 - simple black and white line drawings, or
jumbled up 'control' drawings: there were 4 emotional slides (E), 4 emotional
control slides (EC), 4 neutral slides (N), and 4 neutral control slides (NC). The
emotional slides had been chosen from a larger number which had been rated
for emotionality; the slides rated as most emotional were selected. Whereas
the emotionality rating for the E slides in experiments 1 and 2 was 5.981 (with
a maximum rating of 7), that for the present study was 6.16 (as for experiment
3). (For purposes of illustration, appendix 6 shows the full set of stimuli that
were used in experiment 7 of this thesis). Each slide was shown 4 times, so
there were 64 stimulus exposures in total. Each participant had a different
pseudo-random slide order.
The experimenter loaded the slides prior to the session, so it is possible she
could remember the slide order. However, as she was blind to the
participant's responses during the session, it was considered extremely
unlikely that she could have nonverbally biased the participant's responses in
line with her expectations. In order for such bias to take place, the
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experimenter would have to remember the numbered order of the 64 target
slides, remember which slide contents were associated with each slide
number, communicate the slide nature to the participant nonverbally and
nonvisually (since the experimenter makes no comment while the participant
is responding to a run of slides, and since the participant is looking into the
dark box during each run of slides), and, further, while blind to the
participant's scoring, to have communicated whether the participant should
'act defensive' or 'act vigilant' to the emotional slides in a manner that would
produce a correlation in the expected direction with the participant's
performance on a psi task that would take place the following week!
Apparatus for measuring perceptual defence/vigilance. As described in
more detail earlier, the apparatus for presenting the subliminal stimuli is a
modified two-field tachistoscope: one field, forming the background for the
slide presentations, is constantly illuminated; the other field, within a
carousel projector, gradually increases in brightness, thereby gradually
illuminating a stimulus slide. The apparatus is known as Pandora's Box. A
BBC computer controls stimulus presentation and illumination, and records
the participant's responses to disk, keeping the experimenter blind to the
participant's scoring. Participants respond by pressing a hand held button
when they first become aware of the rectangular shape of the slide
superimposed on the background field. Participants' subjective judgement
about when to report awareness of the slide is known as their 'response
criterion', which they are asked to keep as consistent as possible throughout
the session. A random time delay prior to slide illumination introduces some
variability in the timing of slide presentation, thus encouraging participants
to respond according to their visual impressions rather than to their sense of
anticipation. The computer program sets an upper limit to the slide
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brightness, which is intended to prevent the participant from accidentally or
deliberately letting the slide brighten to the stage where the slide nature can
be identified.
Procedure for measuring perceptual defence/vigilance
After initial conversation and refreshments the procedure was discussed.
Without revealing details of stimulus nature or experimental hypotheses, the
task was presented to participants as 'a sort of eye test, where I am measuring
when you first see something, but where there are no right or wrong
answers'. It was explained that while participants were attempting to respond
consistently to each slide, it was only natural that there would be some
variations in their responses, and I would be measuring these variations.
Most participants accepted this rationale without question; those who wished
more information were given more (for instance, they could be told that there
was 'information' on each slide that they were not expected to be able to see
consciously), but care was taken at this stage not to reveal the nature of the
stimuli (that some of them were considered to be emotionally unpleasant, for
instance) or specific hypotheses (that those who reacted relatively slowly to
the emotive slides were expected to have relatively low ESP scores, for
instance). No systematic records were taken of exactly what information was
revealed to each individual participant, but the overall impression was that
perhaps 90% of participants were satisfied with the initial explanation of the
procedure; there was no impression that the more curious 10% performed
any differently on the task than the others, though this was not formally
tested.
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Once initial queries had been satisfied, participants looked into Pandora's Box
and were first shown a blank 'demonstration slide', to show them the shape
and position of the rectangular light area to which they would subsequently
be responding. They then did 5 practice slides, where the stimulus slide
(containing a neutral rectangular shape that was reportedly not seen)
gradually brightened and participants were required to press the response
button when they could see the rectangular light area indicating the presence
of the slide (an example of this practice slide is included in appendix 6). The
experimenter (me) was able to see the brightness scores for these practice
slides, and to give feedback to the participants on their responding. Feedback
consisted of telling participants their brightness scores, and pointing out any
trend in their scoring on the practice slides (for instance, scores were typically
high to begin with, then decreased to a fairly steady level). Participants were
usually assured by the experimenter that their performance in the practice
slides was 'quite normal'; if the participant's scoring seemed unstable the
experimenter gave further guidance on how to adopt a stable response
criterion [for instance, to look for a sharp corner to the rectangle of light (the
overall shape of the transparency) as a guide to when the stimulus had
reached a certain brightness].
The aim of the practice slides was to enable participants to adjust to the visual
experience, and to practice adopting a stable response criterion. Typically,
participants' scores gradually decreased to a stable level around the 4th or 5th
practice slide. Figure 6.1 shows the mean brightness scores for the 5 practice
slides for the 48 participants in the present experiment; this graph verifies the
gradual decline and stabilisation of participants' brightness scores over the
practice slides. The standard deviation of brightness scores over the practice
slides also declined (slide 1 SD=11.534, slide 2 SD=9.998, slide 3 SD= 8.324,
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slide 4 SD=6.979, and slide 5 SD=6.751), thus indicating a gradual
stabilisation of scoring.
When participants were quite clear about what they were being asked to do,
we proceeded to do 4 runs of 16 experimental slides each, with a short (c. 2
mins) break after the 1st and 3rd runs, and a longer (c. 5 mins) break at the
halfway point. The aim of the breaks, whose length was determined by
participants, was to reduce the possible effects of tiredness or boredom on the
results.
At the end of the slide presentations, participants were asked whether they
had seen anything other than the rectangular light area which they were
looking for. They were then shown a selection of the stimuli, and the aim of
the procedure (to see whether individuals were perceptually defensive,
vigilant, or neither) was explained. Finally, a description was given of the
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procedure for the second (ESP) session, so that the participant could inform a
potential agent, or sender, of what to expect.
The measure of ESP
There were in fact two independent measures of ESP in the second session.
The first, that may be called 'unconscious ESP', is an unorthodox measure that
is designed for maximum similarity to the previous week's subliminal test.
The second is a more traditional forced-choice ESP task (which may be called
'conscious ESP'), that is more similar to the subliminal perception task than
has been the case for previous defensiveness-psi studies.
Overview of ESP measure. Figure 6.2 depicts the layout of the experimental
suite and the location of experimenter, participant, and sender for the ESP
session. The participant is seated in the partially sound attenuated
experimental room, looking into Pandora's Box. Simultaneously, the sender is
seated in a nonadjoining partially sound attenuated room, looking at a
standard slide projection screen, upon which will be projected a sequence of
24 'target' slides. A different pseudo-random slide order is used for each
participant (produced in the same way as the slide orders for the
defensiveness-testing session, using the pseudorandom algorithm of the BBC
computer to produce a number of possible target sequences that were noted
down and placed in a manila envelope for later selection and loading), and
the ESP slides are loaded by someone otherwise uninvolved with the
experiment. The slide tray cover is opaque, so the sender, participant, and
experimenter cannot inadvertently glimpse the ESP targets. The experimenter
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Figure 6.2
Layout of the experimental suite, including location of sender, participant, and





















remains blind to the ESP target order, so cannot consciously or unconsciously
bias the scoring.
The BBC computer is linked not only to Pandora's Box, but also to the slide
projector in the sender's room (through ducting for electronic cabling), such
that every time the participant presses the button to change a slide within
Pandora's Box, the slide projector in the sender's room also changes a slide.
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In a crucial difference to the previous week's session, the slides that are
projected within Pandora's Box are blank, whereas those that the sender sees
are either neutral (a plain drawing of a rectangle) or emotionally unpleasant.
Thus, while the participant is responding to a blank slide within Pandora's
Box (so far as the participant is concerned, the slides look no different from
the previous session when each slide conveyed some information), the sender
is simultaneously looking at a slide (at full illumination) which is either
neutral or emotional.
Unconscious ESP measure. For the first measure of ESP (unconscious ESP),
the participant simply responds to the blank stimulus slide according to the
same criteria for the previous session. That is, they allow the slide to brighten
until they can see a light rectangular shape, they press the button, and they
try to be as consistent as possible in their judgements of when to respond to
each slide. Simultaneously, the sender is looking at a neutral or an emotional
slide.
If there were no ESP, then any variations in the participants' brightness
judgements for identical blank slides should be quite random; if there were
ESP, then you would expect the participant to respond differently to the
blank slide depending on whether a neutral or emotional slide is being
viewed concurrently. That is, there would be some signs of differential
responding to blank slides depending on the nature of the target slides. For
this experiment, participants are aware that there is some possibility that their
responses to the blank slides may be related to the nature of the ESP target
slides, but they are asked to try to ignore this possibility, concentrating like
the previous week on responding consistently. In other words, participants
were discouraged from thinking about this first response as an ESP measure.
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Forced-choice ESP measure. Once participants have pressed the button to
indicate they have seen the blank slide, the slide fades away; then, instead of
the computer automatically advancing on to the next slide, as happened in
the previous session, there is a pause while the participant considers the
nature of the slide the sender is viewing. This is the second, forced-choice, or
conscious ESP measure.
Participants may take as long as they like, and may adopt any strategy they
like (short of physically visiting the sender's room to take a peek at the
screen), to come to a conclusion about whether the sender's slide is neutral or
emotional. Note that although their own (blank) slide has faded away, the
sender's slide is still seen by the sender. The experimenter, who remains with
the participant throughout, records the participant's choice manually on a
printed response sheet. The participant is asked to indicate two things for the
conscious ESP task: 1. whether the target is emotional or neutral (a two-choice
ESP task, with a 50% likelihood of a correct guess by chance alone); and, 2.
whether their decision is based on a feeling or impression about the nature of
the slide, or whether they are simply guessing. The rationale behind asking
participants to state whether or not they were guessing was that if
participants scored more highly when they reported they had 'impressions'
than when they were 'guessing', this would suggest that people may have
some insight into when they are responding to ESP impressions; this was felt
to be an interesting question that could readily be studied using the present
methodology. When participants have recorded their choice with the
experimenter, and they are ready to proceed to the next slide, they press the
response button and this advances the sender's slide and their own slide and
the two-stage process begins again.
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Prior to the start of the ESP session, participant, sender, and experimenter
chat together about ESP in general, and about the session in particular. The
sender is given advice on how to send. Their goal is to help the participant
make the correct decision about what kind of target the sender is viewing:
emotional or neutral. For the neutral target the sender is asked to try to
remain calm and peaceful, giving the message to the participant that there is
nothing of consequence to this target. For the emotional target, the sender is
i
C asked to attempt, like an actor, to experience the emotion portrayed, so that
the participant will pick up the message that this target has some emotional
impact.
There are two sets of 12 ESP slides, with a rest break at the half-way point. It
was decided to use only 24 experimental slides (compared to the 64 used for
the defensiveness testing session) for the following reasons: 1. there would be
only two kinds of stimuli for the ESP session - emotional and neutral -
compared to the four kinds (E, EC, N, & NC) used for the defensiveness
testing session; 2. with a forced-choice ESP experiment where there are only
two possible target types, there is a risk of the sender, the participant, and the
experimenter, becoming bored or tired with the procedure (and such
motivational factors have been shown to be related to declining ESP
performance, Palmer, 1978); it was felt that with only 2 short runs of 12 trials,
the novelty of the procedure was less likely to wear off and thus depress ESP
scores.
Once all 24 slides have been responded to, the experimenter and the
participant rejoin the sender and all three view the ESP slides, so that the
participant gets immediate feedback on their forced-choice ESP performance.
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The experimenter records the correct guesses ('hits'), and these are later
double-checked. The participant and sender exchange their thoughts about
the session and the targets, and the experimenter answers any further
questions they may have. The session ends with a promise to send the
participant details of the outcome of the study when the analysis is
completed.
Stimuli for ESP measure
1. Participant's stimuli. Just as with the defensiveness testing session, the
participant first responds to 1 demonstration (blank) and 5 practice slides
(each depicting an identical simple black and white drawing of a rectangle),
to refamiliarise themselves with the task of pressing the button when they
first see the light rectangular slide shape within Pandora's Box. The practice
slides are followed by 24 identical blank slides, presented in two runs of 12,
with a short (c. 5 mins) break at the half way point.
2. The question 'what are the characteristics of a successful ESP target?' has
yet to be answered by parapsychologists, though there is some agreement on
what target dimensions may be important in this respect - for instance
degree of complexity, degree of familiarity/novelty, and the degree to which
the target is dynamic (e.g. a film clip) or static (e.g. a still picture) (Delanoy,
1989; Watt, 1989; Honorton et al., 1990). For the present study, synchronised
with the participant's slides, the agent sees 6 slides identical to the
participant's practice slides, and then 24 slides (the ESP targets), 12 of which
have previously been judged to be of negative emotional tone, and 12 of
which show a neutral rectangle (identical to that used for the practice slides).
Because of my interest in what makes a good ESP target, the 12 emotional
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slides are composed of 3 separate slide sub-categories: 1. Familiar Simple (FS)
- 4 simple black and white line drawings, as previously used in the
defensiveness testing session (mean emotionality rating 6.16); 2. Unfamiliar
Simple (US) - 4 simple black and white line drawings not previously seen by
the participant (these were rated for emotionality together with the FS slides
in prior pilot work, mean emotionality rating 5.83); and, 3. Complex - 4
colourful slides developed for use by the Maimonides Dream Laboratory
(these were rated for emotionality separately from the simple black and white
line drawings, being presented together with another 23 Maimonides slides
to 13 individuals; the mean emotionality rating of the 4 selected slides was
5.86). The 8 simple targets were chosen because of their similarity to the
Emotional stimuli used for the defensiveness testing situation (the underlying
assumption being that by maximising the similarity between features of the
defensiveness testing session and the ESP testing session one may maximise
the likelihood of a correlation emerging between participants' responses to
the stimuli in each session). The 4 complex slides were included because they
contrasted physically with the simple slides, yet had similar emotionality
ratings to them; by using complex emotional target slides, therefore, one
might address the question of whether target complexity or target
emotionality was most associated with successful ESP performance.
Hypotheses and Exploratory Questions
The main hypotheses of this study concerned the relation between apparent
perceptual defensiveness/vigilance and ESP. It was decided in advance to
include in these analyses only those participants whose responses to E slides
on Pandora's Box compared to the other 3 slide categories were either slowest
(indicating defensiveness) or quickest (indicating vigilance). It was planned
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to terminate the experiment when 24 individuals had passed this 'criterion'
(hereafter referred to as 'criterion' participants). The data from all participants
would be included in the remaining exploratory analyses. While 4 categories
of stimuli are used for the measure of perceptual defence/vigilance (E, EC,
N, & NC), the analyses will contrast scoring on Emotional slides with scoring
on the matched Emotional Control slides. This is because it is important to
establish whether any differential scoring on the E slides is due to the
emotional meaning associated with the slides or to the physical
characteristics of the slides (for example, their brightness, or the number or
size of shapes they depict). The EC slides served the function of controlling
for the overall physical characteristics of the E slides, by having the stimulus
information cover approximately the same area as the E slides and by having
the same light transmitting properties as the E slides. The EC slides, as they
looked simply like jumbled shapes and lines, might be considered analogous
to 'nonsense words' used in earlier perceptual defence experiments, and
might also be regarded as 'neutral' stimuli, as would N and NC slides. The
main function of N and NC slides, then, was to enable a spread of scoring, so
that one could select for analysis those whose scores were relatively extreme:
brightness scores for E slides could be ranked in comparison to three other
sets of 'neutral slides' (that is, EC, N, & NC). As will be discussed in the
conclusion of this thesis, however, the role of the N and NC slides, and the
necessity to include them at all, could be questioned.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 address the main concern of this experiment - the
relationship between scores on the prototype measure of perceptual
defence/vigilance and ESP performance.
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HI. There will be a significant correlation between responses to Emotional
(but not Emotional Control) slides during the defensiveness testing session
and conscious (forced-choice) ESP scores, such that apparently defensive
individuals score relatively poorly at conscious ESP while apparently vigilant
individuals score relatively well at conscious ESP.
H2. Predicts a significant correlation in the same direction as for HI, between
apparent defensiveness/vigilance and unconscious ESP (as indicated by the
participants' brightness scores for blank slides while simultaneously ESP
targets slides are being viewed by a sender).
Hypotheses 3,4, and 5 concern the relationships between Byrne's Repression-
Sensitization (R-S) scale (Byrne, 1961; Byrne, 1964; Byrne, Barry, & Nelson,
1963), the prototype indicator of perceptual defence/vigilance, and ESP.
Earlier it was noted that, on the face of it, 'repression' resembled perceptual
defence and 'sensitization' resembled perceptual vigilance. If this were so,
then one might expect R-S scores to correlate with perceptual
defence/vigilance scores, and also to correlate with ESP in the same way as
perceptual defence/vigilance might. These hypotheses are, however, based
on the assumption that one cannot be 'perceptually defensive' and,
simultaneously, 'perceptually vigilant', or 'repressing' and, simultaneously,
'sensitizing': are these concepts ranged along single dimensions, or
orthogonal to one another? The literature does not as yet answer this
question, and there seems to be a need for conceptual clarification; Byrne, for
instance, regards both repression and sensitization as indicative of
defensiveness, but the scoring scheme for the R-S scale does not permit one to
be, simultaneously, both a repressor and a sensitizor. The definition of
perceptual defence and perceptual vigilance within the subliminal perception
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paradigm also does not permit one to be both defensive and vigilant at the
same time. It has been suggested, though, that defensiveness and vigilance
may lie on an 'inverted-U' curve so that, as subliminal stimulus emotionality
changes, an individual's threshold regulation may change from defensive to
vigilant, or vice versa (Brown, 1961; Dixon, 1981). For present purposes,
therefore, one must adopt the position that, since the scoring used for the
prototype measure of perceptual defence/vigilance and the R-S scale do not
permit the identification of individuals as both defensive/repressing and
vigilant/sensitizing, we should treat these concepts as uni-dimensional. At
the same time, however, it should be noted that this assumption is made for
pragmatic purposes, and that further research is needed on the
conceptualisation of defensiveness and vigilance.
H3. There will be a significant correlation between brightness scores for E
(but not EC) slides in the defensiveness testing session and scores on the
Repression-Sensitization (R-S) scale, such that apparently defensive
individuals on Pandora's Box are also apparently 'Repressors' on the R-S
scale, while apparently vigilant individuals are also apparently 'Sensitizors'
on the R-S scale.
H4. There will be a significant correlation between R-S scores and conscious
(forced-choice) ESP scores such that relatively 'Repressive' individuals will
tend to score relatively poorly at conscious ESP while relatively 'Sensitive'
individuals will tend to score relatively well at conscious ESP.
I
I
H5. Predicts a significant correlation in the same direction as for H4, between
R-S scores and unconscious ESP.
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Exploratory questions included: would there be overall significant ESP
scoring?; what is the relationship, if any, between apparent
defensiveness/vigilance and EPI scores?; what is the relationship between R-
S score and EPI scores?; is there any difference in ESP scoring for the
different emotional slide types?; is there any difference between ESP scores
when the participant's call was a 'guess' than when it was based on an
'impression'? How does belief in psi relate to ESP and personality scores? The
data might suggest further exploratory questions.
Results and discussion
Forty-eight individuals took part in the study (mean age 39, range 19-66
years). Of the 24 criterion participants, 10 were apparently defensive (3
males, 7 females), 14 were apparently vigilant (2 males, 12 females), and the
remaining 24 'non-criterion' participants consisted of 15 males and 9 females.
Males and females were unevenly distributed on the measure of perceptual
defence/vigilance (%2(2df)=9.614, p<.02), with the greatest imbalance due to
there being only 2 vigilant males, compared to 12 females; there was also a
disproportionate number of males (15) who failed to show strong signs of
defensiveness or vigilance compared to females in this category (9).
Participant Information questionnaires were completed by all but one of the
participants (a 'defensive' male), so the results below for belief in ESP (sheep-
goat scores) and for questions related to 'mental health', are for 47
individuals. The other questionnaires were completed by all participants.
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Table 6.1
Spearman correlation coefficients between scores on Pandora's Box (rank E and rank
EC slides), ESP scores, and Repression-Sensitization (R-S) scores
Rank E Slides Rank EC slides R-S
Conscious ESP .192 -.069 .088
Unconscious ESP .269 -.398 > .088
R-S -.361 .016
Main hypotheses
Table 6.1 shows the (Spearman) correlation coefficients between Rank E and
Rank EC slides, and conscious ESP, Unconscious ESP, and R-S scores, for the
24 criterion participants. While defensiveness/vigilance correlated in the
expected direction with ESP performance (rs=.192 for conscious or forced
choice ESP; rs=.269 for unconscious ESP), this correlation was not statistically
significant, so there was only weak support for Hypotheses 1 and 2. As
expected, there was only a very small correlation (rs=-.069) between EC
brightness scores and conscious ESP performance, but surprisingly there was
a sizeable correlation (rs=~.398, ns, 2-t) between EC score and unconscious
ESP. It is difficult to know how to interpret this last finding, though one
should note that the rank of mean EC scores is not independent from that of
E scores: for instance, if E slides are ranked 1 overall then the possible range
of ranks for EC slides is restricted to 2, 3, or 4. Therefore if there is a sizeable
correlation in one direction between rank E scores and ESP, there would be a
tendency for a correlation in the opposite direction for rank EC scores and
ESP.
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As one may question the validity of calculating a correlation coefficient on
crudely-ranked scores on the subliminal perception task (since there are only
4 possible ranks), f-tests were calculated comparing the ESP scores for
defensive and vigilant participants. On conscious ESP, £=-.773, therefore the
difference between forced choice ESP scores for individuals who were
apparently perceptually defensive and individuals who were apparently
vigilant is in the predicted direction but not significantly so. For unconscious
ESP, £=-1.634, p=.059, 1-t; therefore there is a statistically significant
difference in the unconscious ESP scores of 'defensive' and 'vigilant'
individuals, in the predicted direction.
How does the defensiveness/ESP correlation change when the data of all
participants is included, rather than that of those who scored most extremely
on defensiveness/vigilance? For conscious ESP, as one might expect, the
correlation is weakened, though still in the predicted direction: rs=.149 for E
slides, rs=-.117 for EC slides. The same applies for unconscious ESP: rs=.257
for E slides; rs=~.325 for EC slides; with n=48, the last correlation is
statistically significant (p<.05, 2-t).
The correlation of -.361 between defensiveness/vigilance and Repression-
Sensitization scores is opposite to the predicted direction for which a one-
tailed test of probability had been planned, and therefore is not statistically
significant. Thus, those who were 'Sensitizors' were apparently perceptually
defensive; 'Repressors' tended to be perceptually vigilant. A f-test of the
difference between defensive and vigilant participants' R-S scores gives
£=1.970, p=.069, 2-t. Hypothesis 3 was therefore not supported.
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Hypotheses 4 and 5 predicted significant correlations between Repression-
Sensitization and ESP. Table 6.1 shows that there was no sizeable relationship
between these measures (rs=.088 for both forced choice and unconscious
ESP), thus hypotheses 4 and 5 were not supported.
Exploratory questions
Unless otherwise indicated, the following analyses were conducted on the
data of all 48 participants. Personality measures will be considered first, then
ESP results, and finally sex differences.
Personality measures
Scoring on Eysenck's Extraversion ranged from 2 to 19, with a mean of 11,
and a Standard Deviation of 4.2; Neuroticism scores ranged from 1 to 23,
with a mean of 10.5, SD=5.6; and Repression-Sensitization scores ranged
from 3 to 102 (with high scores indicating sensitization), with a mean of 39.9,
SD=22.2.
Table 6.2 shows the correlations between Eysenck's extraversion and
neuroticism, and R-S, ESP, and defensiveness/vigilance. The table has
several items of interest. While extraversion did not appear to relate to
defensiveness/vigilance (and there was no sizeable correlation between
extraversion and responses to EC slides), neuroticism did show a strong
significant correlation with defensiveness/vigilance (rs=-.381, p<.0l, 2-t)
(more defensive, more neurotic), while the correlation for EC slides was
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Table 6.2
Spearman correlation coefficients between extroversion, neuroticism, ranked
brightness scores for E and EC slides, R-S scores, and ESP scores
Extraversion Neuroticism
Responses to E slides .099 -.3811
Responses to EC slides -.064 .238
R-S score -.5232 .7662
Conscious ESP -.276 -.078
Unconscious ESP .011 -.018
1 pc.Ol, 2-t
2 p«.01, 2-t
not statistically significant. It will be recalled that experiment 2 also showed a
correlation between defensiveness/vigilance and neuroticism (rs=-.145); thus
this experiment provides confirmation for this relationship, where
individuals with relatively high neuroticism scores tended to be perceptually
defensive. This is perhaps an encouraging sign that there may be some
validity to the Pandora's Box technique for identifying perceptually
defensive/vigilant individuals, since both neuroticism and perceptual
defence might be viewed as maladaptive responses to anxiety (or, more
neutrally, as similar ways of reacting to stress). Kreitler & Kreitler (1990)
point out that 'more theoretically oriented discussions of repression
emphasize favorably its status as a major element of a neurotic personality
style (p.559), and defensiveness is considered to be an important factor in
repression (defined by Weinberger et al., 1979, as low anxiety, high
defensiveness); Kline, too, would consider repression to be related to
defensiveness (e.g. Cooper & Kline, 1986).
The apparent lack of relationship between extraversion and
defensiveness/vigilance found in this study also confirms the findings of
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experiment 2, and the nonsignificant correlation for EC slides in this
experiment (with 48 participants) casts doubt on the significant correlation
found in experiment 2 (rs=.817) (with only 7 participants).
Since the exploratory analyses reported in table 6.2 were calculated with the
data of all participants, it is interesting to look at the criterion participants'
data to see whether the above trends are stronger for those individuals
defined as perceptually defensive or perceptually vigilant. The correlation
between perceptual defence /vigilance (E slides ranked 1 or 4) and
extraversion is .105, while that for EC slides is -.018. A f-test comparing
extraversion scores for defensive individuals (E ranked 1) with those for
vigilant individuals (E ranked 4) gives t=-.673, p=.508. Thus there is no
indication of a stronger relationship between extraversion and
defensiveness/vigilance for the criterion participants compared to all
participants. The correlation between defensiveness/vigilance (responses to
E slides) and neuroticism for the criterion participants is -.478 (p<.01, 1-t),
while that between the control (EC) slides and neuroticism is only .110. A t-
test comparing the neuroticism scores for defensive individuals with those
for vigilant individuals gives t=2.776 (p=.015,1-t). Thus, as one might expect,
the relationship between defensiveness/vigilance and Eysenck's neuroticism
is greater for those individuals who showed the most extreme responses to
the emotional subliminal stimuli than it is for all participants.
Table 6.2 also shows that the Repression-Sensitization scale correlated very
highly with the EPI: rs=-.523 for extraversion (p«.01, 2-t; repressors more
extraverted); and rs=.766 with neuroticism (p«.01, 2-t; repressors less
neurotic). The magnitude of the latter correlation especially throws doubt
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over what exactly the R-S scale is measuring, and should be taken into
account when interpreting the outcome of the test for hypothesis 3.
Extraversion showed a marginally non-significant correlation (rs=-.276) with
ESP, such that extraverts scored relatively poorly at conscious ESP (with only
a very small correlation for unconscious ESP, rs=.058). A recent meta-analysis
of extraversion and ESP performance (Honorton, Ferrari, & Bern, 1991) found
a significant correlation (N=11 studies, r=.21, p-.000005) for free-response
ESP performance, with the more extraverted scoring more highly at ESP. The
meta-analysis also found that the correlation between forced choice ESP
performance and extraversion was an artefact of order of completion, with
there being no relationship (N=16 studies, r=~.02) when (as with the
experiments reported in this thesis) extraversion was assessed prior to the
participants receiving knowledge of their ESP scores. This study goes further,
to suggest a slightly negative relationship between forced-choice ESP
performance and extraversion; evidently there is a need for further
investigation of the ESP-extraversion relationship, and follow-up
experiments in this thesis will continue to take 'artefact-free' extraversion
measures to look at this question. One might also have to consider how
comparable the forced choice measure of ESP in the present experiment is to
those in the studies reviewed by Honorton et al.
Table 6.2 also shows that there was no correlation between neuroticism and
either ESP measure. A 'vote counting'-style review by Palmer (1977) found 18
out of 24 series showed a relationship between neuroticism and ESP in the
predicted direction (neurotic individuals tended to score poorly at ESP). At
first inspection, then, the current experiment appears to be a failure to
replicate Palmer's finding. However, Honorton et al. (1991) caution that, as
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with the forced-choice ESP and extraversion studies, it is possible that the
neuroticism-ESP relationship is an artefact of the order in which the
personality and ESP measures were taken. In the light of this caution, the
present results (which are free from the order artefact) add weight to the call
for a re-examination of the neuroticism-ESP studies.
Finally, it will be recalled that 37 out of the 38 participants completed the
Participant Information Form, which included some questions about belief in
and experience of psi. Scoring on these 'sheep-goat' questions ranged from 22
to 47.5 (with high scores indicating high belief in and experience of psi), with
a mean score of 34.2 (SD=5.9). Sheep-goat scores were correlated with the
other major measures taken in this study. There was a nonsignificant
tendency for believers in psi ('sheep') to be more extraverted than
disbelievers in psi ('goats') (rs=.135), and there was no correlation between
neuroticism and belief in ESP (rs=.082). There was also little relationship
between belief in ESP and responses to the measure of perceptual
defence/vigilance (rs=-.012 for E slides; rs=-.165 for EC slides).
ESP Results
1. Forced Choice ESP performance. Table 6.3 gives the results for all participants'
forced choice ESP performance, plus a breakdown into the categories of
defensive, and vigilant participants. Z-scores were calculated for those trials
when participants said they had an 'impression' of the target nature, and for
those where they were guessing. Looking at slide type, Z-scores were
calculated for emotional and neutral slides, for a breakdown of the three
emotional slide types: familiar simple (FS), unfamiliar simple (US), and
complex; and (collapsing FS and US scores, which are not significantly
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Table 6. 3
Forced choice ESP results (Z-scores)
All Defensive Vigilant Male Female
Overall ESP .059 -.907 .055 -.457 .504
'Impressions' .634 -.636 .882 -.769 1.517
'Guesses' -.817 -.562 -1.341 .249 1.375
Emotional -.836 -.552 -.466 -1.167 .055
Neutral 1.361 -.642 .621 .453 .825
Familiar simple -1.016 -.649 -1.361
Unfamiliar simple -1.231 -.481 -.135
Simple -1.686 -.905 -1.145
Complex .800 .160 .674
different), simple emotional slides. Table 6.3 also gives basic results for male
and female participants.
None of these ESP results is significant at the two-tailed level. Some
suggestive trends will be noted, however, as these may be related to previous
research findings, and may yield predictions for follow-up experiments.
Overall conscious (forced-choice) ESP scores were at chance levels, but those
calls described as 'impressions' scored positively, while those described as
'guesses' scored negatively. There is some suggestion, therefore, that
participants are able to discriminate between successful calls and
unsuccessful calls (even though participants were rarely confident of their
impressions). There is little precedent in the parapsychological literature for
asking participants to report their phenomenological experience of whether a
forced choice call is an impression or a guess. However, one study (of which I
learned after the completion of this experiment) has used a similar method
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(Honorton, 1987). In this experiment, the participant was asked to report
whether his call was an impression ('your choice was based on a distinct
cognitive impression such as an image or verbal association'), a feeling ('you
had no cognitive impression, but felt drawn to your choice'), or a guess ('your
choice was based neither on an impression nor a feeling. You cannot identify
any specific reason for your choice'). Honorton found that significant psi-
hitting occurred when the participant's calls were based on impressions, but
not when they were based on feelings or guesses. The finding in the present
study that impressions scored higher than guesses is therefore in broad
agreement with a previous similar study, though in the present study the
response category 'impression' would include both 'impression' and 'feeling'
as defined by Honorton. 'Feeling' calls nevertheless scored more highly than
'guesses' in Honorton's study.
Price (1990) remarks that in subliminal perception experiments requiring
participants to make forced-choice discrimination judgements about the
presence or absence of a weak stimulus, there has been little exploration of
the participants' phenomenological experience associated with their
responses. In what was probably the first subliminal perception study of its
kind, Price used questionnaires and semi-structured interviews to examine
what participants' experiences were when they reported they were guessing.
He found that there was a wide variation in reported experiences for guesses,
ranging from the participant having no idea why they made their guess, to
the participant having some partial sensory cues (e.g. visual impressions)
from the stimulus. In conversation with the participants in my experiments, I
too have found that, despite the recommendations I have made as to what
constitutes a guess and what constitutes an impression, participants vary
widely in their personal criteria for labelling their responses as impressions
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and guesses. Belief in ESP seems to be an important factor here: as one might
expect, 'goats' tended to describe more of their calls as 'guesses' than sheep
(rs=-.260, ns, 2-t), and sheep called more 'impressions' than goats (rs=.260),
perhaps suggesting a calling bias. In the introduction to this chapter the
'sheep-goat effect' was described - the tendency for sheep to score positively
at ESP tasks, whereas goats tend to score negatively. This study did not
replicate the sheep-goat effect because there was no correlation between
sheep-goat scores and ESP scores (rs=.031).
Scoring on familiar simple emotional slides was not significantly different
than for unfamiliar simple emotional slides (both scored negatively); the
highest scoring, however, was for the complex emotional slides. Previous
investigations of the characteristics of successful ESP targets (e.g. Delanoy,
1989; Watt, 1989; Honorton & Schechter, 1987) suggest that rich ESP targets
elicit relatively high ESP scores. So, although the present trend is not
statistically significant, it is in accord with previous research findings.
There is less agreement over whether emotional or neutral targets are
associated with higher ESP scores; in this study scoring tended to be negative
for the emotional targets and positive for the neutral targets. A slight calling
bias existed over all participants, with slightly fewer calls for emotional
targets (n=550 calls) than for neutral targets (n=595 calls). This would be
expected to contribute to the trend of negative scoring for emotional targets,
since, by chance alone, there were fewer calls for these targets than for the
neutral targets so that there would be slightly less chance of scoring a 'hit' for
the emotional than for the neutral targets. Defensive participants scored
negatively for both kinds of target whereas vigilant participants scored
negatively for emotional targets and positive for neutral targets. This latter
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trend does not seem to be caused by a calling bias since the 10 defensive
participants called 'emotional' on average 11.9 times in a session and the 14
vigilant participants called 'emotional' on average 11.4 times in a session so
that, by chance alone, one would expect defensive participants to have scored
slightly more highly on emotional targets than vigilant participants.
Looking at sex differences in ESP performance, males tended to score
negatively, and females tended to score positively. The highest scoring was
for females when they felt they had an impression of the target and the
lowest scoring was for females when they reported they were guessing;
males did the reverse, scoring negatively on 'impressions' and slightly
positively on 'guesses' (perhaps this trend gives some support to the popular
notion of 'female intuition').
Finally, there was little relationship between participants' age and their ESP
performance (rp=-.057), but those who participated early in the study tended
to have lower ESP scores than those who participated later in the study
(rp=.278, p=.056, 2-t), thus the ESP scores in this study improved slightly as
the study progressed, in contrast to the 'decline effect' that is sometimes seen
with forced choice ESP studies.
2. Unconscious ESP. It will be recalled that participants indicated when they
first became aware of the presence of blank slides, while simultaneously the
sender was viewing the ESP target slides. It was decided that these
brightness scores might be a novel indicator for 'unconscious' or 'implicit'
ESP, contrasting with the conscious cognitive effort which characterised the
forced choice ESP task. Mean brightness scores for emotional ESP targets
were compared with those for neutral ESP targets; it was decided that,
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regardless of which gave the higher or the lower brightness scores, the
magnitude of the difference in scoring for the two target types might be
related to degree of ESP. Thus a relatively large difference in brightness
scores would indicate more ESP than a relatively small difference in
brightness scores. The reason for adopting magnitude (rather than direction) of
difference in brightness scores as the unconscious ESP measure was that of
avoiding any possibly unwarranted assumptions about the directionality of
unconscious ESP scoring (for instance, all participants favouring E over N
slides, or vigilant favouring E over N, or vice versa).
It was found that, for all participants, there was a non-significant correlation
in the expected direction between unconscious ESP and perceptual
defensiveness/vigilance (rs=.257; defensive individuals showed less
discrimination in their brightness scores than did vigilant individuals);
puzzlingly, however, there was a significant correlation between unconscious
ESP and responses to the subliminal emotional control slides (rs=-.325, p<.05,
2-t). Looking at this correlation for only the 24 criterion participants, there
was, as one might expect, a slightly higher correlation between
defensiveness/vigilance and unconscious ESP (rs=.269, ns); once again,
though, the correlation for EC slides was higher still (rs=-.398), though this
time it was not statistically significant. A t-test comparing unconscious ESP
scores for the 10 perceptually defensive participants with those for the 14
perceptually vigilant participants gave f=-1.634, p=.059, 1-t). Thus, the
unconscious ESP-defensiveness correlations are encouraging but only
marginally statistically significant. It is not clear, however, how to explain the
larger correlations between unconscious ESP and responses to subliminal
control slides; as mentioned earlier, one factor to bear in mind is that the
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ranked scores for E slides are not statistically independent from those for EC
slides.
A final question relates to the validity of this unusual ESP measure. One way
of looking at this is to correlate unconscious ESP scores with conscious
(forced choice) ESP scores: one would expect the two to correlate positively,
and indeed this is the case (rp=.540, p=.000074, 2-t). This is an important
finding, because it suggests that the novel measure of unconscious ESP may
be measuring the same or a related phenomenon to the forced choice or
conscious ESP measure. Thus even though overall scoring on the two
measures was not suggestive of ESP, there are internal patterns and
consistencies in the ESP data that suggest meaningful ESP scoring.
Summary and Conclusions
This study explored the relationship between defensiveness as indicated by a
novel measure of perceptual defence/vigilance and: conscious ESP as
measured by forced choice responses to emotionally negative or neutral
slides; and unconscious ESP as measured through fluctuations in subjective
awareness thresholds for blank slides while emotional or neutral slides were
simultaneously being viewed by a sender.
None of the main hypotheses of this study was significantly confirmed,
though the data showed some suggestive trends in the expected directions.
There was only a modest correlation between apparent defensiveness/
vigilance and conscious ESP (rs=.192 for criterion participants; rs=.149 for all
participants); it is encouraging, however, that this correlation is in the
predicted direction, that it is greater for those participants identified as more
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extremely defensive or vigilant, and that it is greater than the correlation for
the meaningless emotional control slides. There was a moderate correlation
between apparent defensiveness/vigilance and the novel measure of
unconscious ESP (rs=.269 for criterion participants; rs=.257 for all
participants). Again, this was in the expected direction, and again it was
greater for the selected criterion participants than for all participants.
However, participants' responses to EC slides also correlated moderately
with unconscious ESP (rs=-.398 for criterion participants; rs=~.325 for all
participants). While the ranked mean brightness scores for EC slides are not
independent of those for the E slides, one would not expect there to be higher
correlations for the control slides than for the critical slides, unless random
variation in the data happened to be consistent with the trend thus
contributing to the effect size.
Apart from this unexpected finding, these results suggest that the 'Pandora's
Box' methodology may be a promising tool for examining the relationship
between defensiveness/vigilance and ESP performance - the correlation
found in this study compares favourably with that found in the meta-analysis
of DMT-ESP studies reported in chapter 2 (rs=.16 for all 16 studies).
However, the number of participants in the present study was much smaller
than for the DMT-ESP studies as a whole, so as yet the DMT-ESP correlation
must be regarded as more reliable than that found for the present study.
Further support for validity of the prototype measure of perceptual
defence/vigilance being examined in this thesis comes from the statistically
significant neuroticism-defensiveness correlations: for all participants
rs=-.381; for criterion participants rs=-.478. It is encouraging that these
correlations are in the expected direction, that there is a stronger correlation
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for the participants identified as more extremely perceptually
defensive/vigilant, and that the correlations for the EC slides were smaller
and non-significant. I am not aware that earlier measures of perceptual
defence or vigilance have been consistently related to neuroticism. Certainly,
performance on the DMT is generally found to be unrelated to the other
major personality factors (e.g., Haraldsson & Houtkooper, 1992).
So far there has been no consideration of those questions in the Participant
Information Form (completed by all but one of the participants in the present
study) that may suggest something about the self-reported 'mental health' of
participants. The questions that were judged to be of particular interest here
(based on the advice of a clinical psychologist, Dr. Ian Tierney) were those
relating to sleep disturbance, participation in 'formal self-improvement'
programs (e.g. psychotherapy), and experience of 'mental disorder'. I also felt
that if there was some indication that participants had practised some 'mental
discipline' (such as meditation, relaxation, or hypnosis), then this would
imply that there had been a perceived need for such mental discipline, which
could suggest that participants felt that their mental health could be
improved. Once I knew participants' responses to the prototype measure of
perceptual defence, I felt, with the benefit of hindsight, that many of the
'defensive' participants were in my opinion less 'well-adjusted' than the
'vigilant' participants. It was decided, therefore, to see if there would be any
support for this impression, by looking at participants' responses to the
participant information questionnaire and contrasting the 'defensive' and
'vigilant' participants' responses to those questions that might be relevant to




Responses to Participant Information Form questions on mental health, for
perceptually defensive and perceptually vigilant participants (details of each
question are given below the table).
Mental Formal Self- Regular Hours of Enough Mental
Discipline? Improvement? Sleep? Sleep Sleep? Disorder?
'Perceptually
Defensive'
Meditation/ Psychosynthesis Yes 9 Yes -
Relaxation
Hypnosis Yes (no details) No 7 Yes -
Relaxation/ Psychotherapy No 5 Yes Depression/
Meditation/ Anxiety
Hypnosis
Relaxation No Yes 7.5 Yes -
Meditation No No 6 No -
- No Yes 8 Yes -
Meditation/ Psychotherapy Yes 7.5 Yes -
Relaxation




Yes 6 No -
'Perceptually
Vigilant'
- No Yes 8.5 Yes -
Meditation No Yes 8 Yes -
- No Yes 7.5 Yes -
Hypnosis/ Psychotherapy No 4.5 Yes Yes
Relaxation (no details)
Meditation No Yes 7.5 Yes -
Meditation/ No No 8 'Yes?' -
Relaxation
- No Yes 6.5 Yes -
Meditation/ No Yes 8 Yes -
Relaxation
Relaxation/ No Yes 7 Yes -
Autogenics
Relaxation/ No Yes 7 Yes -
Meditation
- No Yes 8 No -
- No No 7 Yes -
Relaxation No Yes 8 No -
- TA Yes 7 No -
The 'mental discipline' question was: 'Have you ever practised any form of mental discipline/exercise, e.g.
meditation, biofeedback, hypnosis, relaxation exercises?' The 'self-improvement' question was: 'Have you ever
taken part in a formal self-improvement program such as TM, psychotherapy, etc.?' The 3 'sleep' questions
were: 'Do you have regular sleep habits?'; 'On average how many hours a night do you sleep?'; 'Do you usually
feel you get enough sleep?'. The 'mental disorder' question was: 'Occasionally our research might require our
having some information about various medical problems. Please tick any of the following of which you have
had experience in the indicated period' (the 'mental disorder' option was embedded among others such as
Tieart trouble' and 'high blood pressure').
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Summarising table 6.4, all but one of the 'perceptually defensive' participants
(89%) had practised one or more forms of mental discipline such as
relaxation or meditation, compared to only 57% of 'perceptually vigilant'
participants. Similarly, 67% of defensive participants had undergone a
'formal self-improvement' program (such as psychotherapy), compared to
only 14% of vigilant individuals. There were three questions on sleeping
patterns: only 67% of defensive participants were regular sleepers compared
to 79% of vigilant individuals; the defensive participants estimated they slept
an average of 7.2 hours per night, while the vigilant participants slept
approximately 7.3 hours per night; and 67% of defensive individuals felt they
got enough sleep, compared to 77% of vigilant individuals (excluding one
participant who was not sure if he got enough sleep). Finally, from table 6.4,
2 out of 9 defensive participants (22%) specifically reported having
experienced a 'mental disorder', compared to 1 out of 14 vigilant participants
(7%).
While these findings must be interpreted cautiously due to the small
numbers involved, there is a clear and consistent pattern: that those
individuals who were identified as 'perceptually defensive' on the prototype
indicator being developed in this thesis tended to show more signs of sub-
optimal mental health (i.e., they had sought a 'calming' mental discipline,
they had taken part in formal self-improvement programs, they had (slight)
sleep disturbances, and they reported having experienced 'mental disorder')
compared to those individuals who had been identified as 'perceptually
vigilant'. This therefore confirms my informal impressions that it seemed in
retrospect that some of the 'perceptually defensive' participants were less
'well-adjusted' than the vigilant participants. This may therefore give further
support to the potential validity of the 'Pandora's Box' methodology as an
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indicator of perceptual defensiveness, because, as has been described earlier,
defensiveness is often regarded as a maladaptive response to stress.
However, because this experiment also found a correlation between
neuroticism and defensiveness, table 6.4 may principally be showing the 'true
life' manifestations of relatively high neuroticism among perceptually
defensive participants. This possibility cannot be discounted at this stage,
since the 9 defensive participants whose data was included in table 6.4 scored
a mean of 15 (SD=6.2) points on the neuroticism measure, compared with a
mean of only 7.6 (SD=3.8) for the 'perceptually vigilant' participants.
Experiment 7 will look again at this question with a larger number of
participants.
Despite the fact that there was no overall significant forced choice ESP
scoring in this study, a few (non-significant) trends emerged which were
consistent with previous research findings: over all participants, calls
described as 'impressions' were more accurate than those described as
'guesses'. Scoring was negative on emotional targets, and positive on neutral
targets, though a slight calling bias in favour of neutral targets may have
contributed to this effect. There was, however, a difference in the scoring of
defensive and vigilant participants on emotional and neutral targets that
could not be accounted for by calling bias. Of the emotional slides, scoring
was negative on the simple targets, and positive on the more complex targets.
ESP target familiarity appeared to have no effect on scoring patterns. The
novel 'unconscious ESP' measure correlated strongly (r^=.540, p=.000074, 2-t)
with forced choice ESP.
Of the unexpected findings in this study, one - the dearth of vigilant males -
invites further comment. The question of sex differences in perceptual
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defence/vigilance has been raised by other researchers (Brown, 1961;
Wagstaff, 1974a, 1974b), who have suggested that males and females may
differ in their pattern of responses to subliminal emotional stimuli: males
may show a linear increase in threshold as a function of stimulus
emotionality (so that they become more perceptually defensive as the
stimulus becomes more emotional), whereas females may show a curvilinear,
inverted-U function (so that their defensiveness increases to a point, then as
stimulus emotionality increases further they become perceptually vigilant
and thresholds lower). The research on this is by no means unambiguous, but
parapsychologists studying defensiveness and psi should be aware that sex
differences may be an important factor. All the Icelandic DMT-ESP studies
had male non-psychology students as participants; the 3 US studies did not
report the sex of their high school pupil participants; Dutch I had 3 females
and 15 males, all first year psychology students; Dutch II also used first year
psychology students, but their sex is not reported; and no details are given
for the participants in Dutch study III. The ability to generalise from these
studies' findings may be weakened if males and females do differ
significantly in their strategies for coping with emotional or stressful stimuli.
Without wishing to make any strong claims about the 'objective'
subliminality of the stimuli administered via Pandora's Box, it should be
pointed out that only one of the 48 participants in this study, when asked at
the conclusion of the defensiveness testing session whether anything was
seen other than the small illuminated rectangle, reported seeing anything else
(she saw 'an area of darkness' on two of the slides but was unable to identify
which slides she saw when looking at them later). Most participants were
surprised to see that there was information on the slides and expressed doubt
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that they could possibly be unconsciously perceiving and responding to that
information.
Experiment 4 has suggested that Pandora's Box may be a promising method
for exploring the relationship between defensiveness/vigilance and ESP
performance, but the correlation found was weak (although it was greater
than that found for all 16 DMT-ESP studies) and not statistically significant.
Perhaps signs of defensiveness/vigilance could be strengthened by further
increasing the emotionality of the subliminal stimuli. Also, one might ask
individual participants, after the ESP and defensiveness measures have been
taken, to rate the emotional stimuli for emotionality so that one could
examine ESP scoring for those stimuli that were particularly emotional for
participants. This latter measure might be a compromise between the
drawbacks associated with pre-rating stimuli so as to select those which
participants find particularly emotional, and the drawbacks associated with
stimuli selected to be emotional 'on average', whose emotionality is
necessarily 'diluted'.
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Chapter 7. Experiment 5: Perceptual defence/vigilance
before and after the practice of mental techniques
reputed to enhance free-response ESP performance.
Experiment 2, described in chapter 5, enabled the comparison of free-
response ESP performance with perceptual defence/vigilance before and
after training with various mental techniques reputed to enhance free-
response ESP performance. This study found a significant correlation
between perceptual defence/vigilance and ESP before training, but no
correlation after training. With only 7 participants, these results obviously
have to be treated with caution, but an opportunity arose to look again at
mental training, free-response ESP, and defensiveness. The labour intensive
nature of ESP training studies continues to impose practical restrictions on the
number of individuals who can participate (even allowing for multiple
experimenters), but meta-analytic techniques enable similar small studies to
be combined and treated as a single larger study. Therefore, although the
conclusions of experiment 2 were only tentative, it is worthwhile to conduct
another, similar study.
Folklore, reports from gifted psychics (e.g. White, 1964), some experiments
(e.g. Braud, 1975), and surveys of techniques reputed to develop psi (e.g.
Mishlove, 1983; Morris, 1977) all show some consensus regarding the type of
person, attitude and routine recommended for developing psi. The
individual should be confident, mature, and accepting of psi. Relaxation
followed by mind clearing and imagery or meditation techniques to facilitate
the psi process were often recommended. Experiments attempting to train
ESP have, however, had mixed results and as yet there exists no well-
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replicated technique for training ESP (George & Krippner, 1984; Palmer, 1978,
1982; Schmeidler, 1988). The present study, which I co-designed and
conducted with Professor Robert Morris and Dr Deborah Delanoy, explored
some mental training techniques, ESP performance, and perceptual
defensiveness/vigilance.
Following their involvement in my experiment 4, 14 individuals took part in
an intensive psi training study with the Koestler Chair of Parapsychology.
This was regarded as a preliminary study, following up on that reported in
my experiment 2, which was not intended formally to evaluate the
effectiveness of mental training techniques for ESP performance. Therefore
there was no 'no training' control group and each participant was free to vary
the emphasis they put on the various mental techniques. Naturally, this limits
the conclusions which may be drawn from the study as regards the efficacy of
particular mental techniques for enhancing ESP, but the study's principal
aims were: to identify promising participants for future studies; to see
whether any improvement might be seen in ESP performance over the
duration of the study, and to gain some informal impressions of which
mental training techniques might be most useful to explore in more detail in
later experiments.
Like my experiment 2, this experiment provided an ideal opportunity to
study pre- and post-training perceptual defensiveness/vigilance and free-
response ESP. Since experiment 2, of course, a forced choice and an
'unconscious' ESP method had been designed specifically for use with
Pandora's Box, and these measures would also be used in this study.
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The data of the participants in Experiment 4 who went on to do the training
study were taken to be the 'pre-training' measure of ESP and defensiveness,
and following the conclusion of the training participants once again took my
measure of defensiveness and conscious and unconscious ESP with emotional
and neutral targets.
The training study is described in more detail elsewhere (Delanoy, Morris, &
Watt, 1991); this report focuses mainly on those aspects of the study which
are most directly relevant to this thesis, namely the relationship between
perceptual defensiveness/vigilance and ESP performance.
Method
Participants
Fourteen individuals completed this study (2 others dropped out at a
preliminary stage before any free-response psi measures had been taken, and
2 dropped out after 2 and 4 training sessions). All had previously participated
in my experiment 4. Participants were selected primarily on the basis of their
having the time and motivation to take part and of having a suitable
environment in which to practice the exercises they would be given. Each of
the three experimenters took on the role of 'trainer' for 4 or 5 individuals, and
acted as 'assistant' for another 4 to 6 individuals who were being trained by
the other two experimenters. The assistant was present at the start of each
session and was responsible for setting out and sending (if requested) the ESP
target. The assistant left after giving the participant feedback about the target
identity, so that they were not involved in the subsequent mental training
component of the session.
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Stimuli
Targets for my post-training sessions were identical to those used in
Experiment 4, though in a different pseudo-random order for each
participant (as before, I remained blind to the ESP target order until each
session was completed). Targets for the free-response ESP measures taken
during the training study consisted of approximately postcard sized art prints
and photographs; the participant and the assistant used duplicate target
packs so that there was no possibility of sensory cueing (e.g. 'greasy fingers')
as to the actual target identity, and the trainer and the participant were kept
blind as to the target identity until this was revealed by the assistant after the
judging of each free-response ESP trial.
The selection of targets for the free-response ESP measures was randomly
designated by a person not otherwise involved in the study, using a standard
random number table (Rand Corporation, 1955). The target designations were
kept in a locked box for which the three experimenters had the only keys. The
target orders for the forced choice ESP measure, like experiment 4, were
constructed using the pseudorandom algorithm of a BBC computer.
Psi measures
The pre-training psi measures were as described in chapter 6 for experiment
4: forced choice conscious ESP and unconscious ESP for 12 emotionally
negative and 12 neutral targets. The post-training psi measures were identical
to those used for the pre-session, except for one difference: no sender was
used for the post-training measures. The training part of the study used three
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different free-response psi measures: 1. participants practised informally at
receiving impressions of targets given to them to work with at home (without
a sender); 2. they also recorded their impressions of 'remote' targets that were
set out in the office of their experimenter (the experimenter was blind as to
the target's identity); 3. there was also one 'in-house' ESP trial conducted
when the participant came into the lab for a training session.
To begin with, all participants had a sender for this third 'in-house' ESP
measure; later, participants were allowed to choose whether or not to work
with a sender. The 'remote' and the 'in-house' ESP measures were conducted
under strict security conditions (detailed in Delanoy, Morris, & Watt 1991),
but only the in-house measure will be correlated with defensiveness, as the
in-house measure is most similar to that used in experiment 2. The forced-
choice and unconscious ESP measures that took place in conjunction with the
Pandora's Box methodology were also strictly controlled so that neither
participant nor experimenter could know the target identity prior to or
during the recording of the participant's calls.
Procedure
%
Overview of procedure. Following the pre-training measure of perceptual
defensiveness/vigilance and conscious and unconscious ESP, participants
took part in the training study, which consisted of 2 preliminary sessions (PI
& P2), 12 training sessions (T1-T12) and one follow-up session. The post-
training measure of perceptual defensiveness/vigilance was administered at
the end of T12. During the course of the 12 training sessions, participants
were encouraged to spend approximately 30 minutes daily practising various
exercises at their homes. The first 14 sessions took place at approximately
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weekly intervals. The final follow-up session was scheduled to take place 3-4
months after completion of the training study.
Each of the training sessions followed a similar procedure: chat about
previous week's mental exercise practice; in house psi exercise; judging of
remote psi target; chat about previous week's at home psi practice;
introduction to new mental exercise to be practised during the coming week.
An abbreviated description of the contents of the preliminary and training
sessions follows:
PI. Participants meet the three experimenters; trainer is assigned; study is
described.
P2. Confirm participation and implications thereof; choose or assign assistant;
mock-up of in house psi session, including instructions on how to make
mentations and how to judge; Myers Briggs Type Indicator is administered
(Myers & McCaulley, 1985).
Tl. Introduction to relaxation: safe harbour imagery, deep breathing,
Jacobson Progressive Relaxation.
T2. Further relaxation: autogenic relaxation and mind clearing techniques.
Introduction to interview technique for gaining psi impressions.
T3. Strategies for learning new skills: stress reduction; self-esteem/internal
dialogue; attitudes to success and failure; attitudes to psi.
211
The following 6 sessions formed two groups of three. The order of
presentation of each of these groups was counterbalanced between
participants, so half of them received the 'focusing of attention' exercises first,
and half received the 'imagery' exercises first.
T4. Introduction to simple visual imagery exercises.
T5. More complex imagery trips using multiple senses and sometimes
involving ESP target.
T6. Creative use of rich imagery trips, specifically aimed at gaining
information about ESP target.
T7. Introduction to simple 'passive' focusing of awareness, using internal
physiological process or image as focus.
T8. 'Active' focusing of awareness using same focus as previously and
sometimes attempting to keep mind blank.
T9. Introduction to White's (1964) 'Waiting Technique' for gaining ESP
impressions.
No more new exercises were introduced after T9. The final three sessions
were intended to allow review, refinement and consolidation of those
techniques which the participants felt had been most helpful and most
successful with regard to gaining ESP impressions.
212
T10. Review. Handout detailing practical (non-psi) applications of the various
exercises participants had been given over the weeks.
Til. Further review.
T12. Debriefing questions.
Following the conclusion of T12, participants then took part in the post-
training measure of perceptual defensiveness/vigilance and conscious and
unconscious ESP. Whereas in experiment 2, participants did half of the
subliminal test before training and half after, in this experiment participants
completed the entire subliminal measure both before and after training. Prior
to training, there were two sessions on Pandora's Box, (separated by one
week), as described previously. After training, both sessions were run
together (because participants were already familiar with me and with the
procedure, the session took less time than before). The first half of the post-
training session consisted of the ESP measure (without an agent this time, and
using a different slide order than in the pre-training session); the second half
consisted of the measure of perceptual defence/vigilance (using a different
slide order from the pre-training sessions). Because I wanted to get some
indication of each individual's personal emotional reaction to the emotional
ESP target pictures, participants filled out a 7-point rating scale for each of the
pictures (before they knew whether or not they had had an ESP 'hit' for that
picture). The scale asked them to: 'Please circle a number from 1 to 7 to
describe the quality and strength of emotion you associate with each picture.'
Scale points ranged from 7 ('Very Strong Unpleasant Emotion') through 4
('No Emotion') to 1 ('Very Strong Pleasant Emotion').
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Hypotheses and exploratory questions
Main hypotheses
The first two hypotheses relate to the training aspect of the study:
HI. Forced choice (conscious) ESP scoring will be more positive on the post-
training measure compared to the pre-training measure.
H2. Magnitude of discrimination between E and N slides (the unconscious
ESP measure) will be greater on the post-training session compared to the
pre-training session.
The following three hypotheses are predicted from the trends that were
observed in the ESP scores for experiment 4 (part of which consists the pre-
training session in this experiment), and relate specifically to the post-training
conscious ESP measures:
H3. Conscious ESP scoring will be higher for calls that participants reported
were based on 'impressions' than those based on 'guesses'.
H4. Conscious ESP scoring will be higher for the complex emotional targets
than for the simple emotional targets.




Although experiment 2 did correlate perceptual defensiveness/vigilance with
free-response ESP performance before and after training, predictions to the
current study cannot confidently be made because there were so few
participants in experiment 2 (only 7). It is even less clear what to expect for
post-training correlations between defensiveness and conscious and
unconscious ESP, since there is no precedent for this situation. The analyses
relating to perceptual defence/vigilance and free-response ESP and to post-
training correlations between defensiveness and forced choice (conscious)
and unconscious ESP will therefore be purely exploratory.
Also for the first time, participants' individual ratings of forced choice ESP
v
target emotionality will be examined, to see whether extremely emotional
targets are associated with higher or lower ESP scoring than mildly emotional
targets.
Results and discussion
Fourteen individuals participated in this study (10 females, 4 males, mean
age 45.2, range 20-66 years). All participants had previously taken part in my
experiment 4, and their subliminal perception and ESP data from that
experiment forms the 'pre-training' data in this study. Four participants (3
females, 1 male) dropped out of this study at an early stage, two before they
had done any free-response ESP sessions, and two after 2 and 4 free-response
ESP sessions. It is important to consider whether the loss of these individuals
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(and, hence, their data) might have selectively biased the findings of this
study, and this will be discussed at the appropriate points below.
Change in ESP scoring after training
As there was no 'no training' control group, any improvement in scoring
cannot be confidently attributed to the effects of training, but such an
improvement would encourage a more rigorous follow-up study into the
effects of training. The first two hypotheses related to the training aspect of
the study for the forced choice (conscious) ESP and unconscious ESP
measures.
Table 7.1 gives the results for ESP performance before and after training. For
forced choice ESP, pre-training Z=.549 (based on 172 hits out of 333 trials),
and post-training Z=1.693 (p=.0452,1-t) (based on 184 hits out of 336 trials). A
Wilcoxon test of the difference in ESP scoring from pre- to post-training gives
W=32 (n.s.). There is therefore some indication of an improvement in forced
choice ESP scoring after ESP training, and some support for hypothesis 1, but
the magnitude of the effect is not statistically significant.
Table 7.1










Considering the possible impact of not including the forced choice ESP data
of the four participants who dropped out of this study, the mean number of
forced choice ESP hits for these participants (for the pre-training measure,
which was the only one they did) was 13.25. Therefore these participants
scored slightly above chance and so had their data been included they would
have slightly increased the forced-choice ESP scoring for the pre-training
measure.
Unconscious ESP scores, as measured by the magnitude of discrimination
between blank slides' brightness scores when E or N ESP slides are
simultaneously displayed in another room, were marginally lower on the
post-training session, therefore hypothesis 2 was not supported. The
combined results for both the pre-training and the post-training forced choice
ESP score give Z=1.625, which is marginally statistically significant (p=.052,
1-t).
For free-response ESP (for which no specific hypotheses were made as
regards this thesis, though the three experimenters hypothesised an
improvement in scoring for the study as a whole), the Z score for sessions Tl-
6 was .63, while for sessions T7-12, Z=.83. Thus there was a small non¬
significant improvement in free-response ESP performance over the duration
of the study. Considering the possible impact on the above results of the two
participants who dropped out of the study after completing 2 and 4 free-
response ESP sessions (and whose data was not included in the above
analysis), both of these participants had results exactly at chance level (mean
target rank 2.5) so there is no possibility that the loss of their data either
selectively increased or decreased the remaining ESP scores.
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Based on the trends observed in experiment 4, it was predicted that conscious
ESP calls based on 'impressions' would score more highly than 'guesses';
Table 7.2 shows (for the post-training session only, as the pre-training session
formed a sub-set of the data of experiment 4) that Z=1.890 (p=.0294, 1-t) for
impressions, and Z=0 for guesses. A Wilcoxon test of the difference in scoring
for impressions and guesses gives W=50 (n.s.). There is therefore some
support for hypothesis 3, but not to a statistically significant extent. It was
also predicted from experiment 4 that conscious ESP scoring would be higher
for the complex emotional targets than for the simple emotional targets,
pehaps due to the greater stimulation and interest associated with more
complex material. As is seen in table 7.2, complex targets gave Z=1.213, while
simple targets gave Z=0; the difference in scoring for complex and simple
targets is not statistically significant (W=20), so there is some support for
hypothesis 4, though not to a statistically significant degree. No predictions
were made for scoring on emotional and neutral targets, and it was found
that scoring was positive for both (Z=1.161 and Z=1.625, respectively), with
the highest scoring for the neutral slides.
Z scores for forced choice ESP performance (on post-training session) for















Finally on the ESP scores, it was predicted from experiment 4 that in the post-
training session conscious ESP would correlate positively with unconscious
ESP. It was found that rs=-.377; this is a nonsignificant correlation in the
direction opposite to that predicted (one would need a correlation of .539 for
p<.05, 2-t, for 14 participants), so hypothesis 5 is not supported.
Exploratory questions
Experiment 2 found that fewer participants appeared to be perceptually
defensive after training to improve relaxation, imagery, and self-esteem than
was the case before this training. One might expect this if one accepted the
assumption that such training might be expected to reduce characteristic
defensive tendencies. Since there were only 7 participants in experiment 2,
little credit could be given to this trend. However, the present study found
the same trend: out of 14 participants, 7 in the pre-training session had
brightness scores for emotional slides ranked 1 or 2 (tending towards
defensiveness) (and 7 participants had brightness scores ranked 3 or 4,
tending towards vigilance); after training, 4 participants had ranks 1 or 2 for
E slides, and 10 participants had ranks 3 or 4 for E slides. There is therefore
some support for the trend seen in experiment 2, though again the small
numbers in the present study mean that one must be cautious in interpreting
this trend.
Considering the possible impact on the defensiveness data of those
participants who dropped out of this study at an early stage, two (one male,
one female) were perceptually vigilant, one (female) was perceptually
defensive, and one (female) was slightly vigilant. It is unlikely that the loss of
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these participants' defensiveness scores would have significantly altered the
pattern that was observed in this study.
No firm predictions were made as regards the post-training correlations
between perceptual defence/vigilance and ESP performance and neuroticism,
and the pre-training relationship between free response ESP and perceptual
defence and vigilance was also uncertain (so these are 2-tailed analyses).
Table 7.3 summarises the findings of these analyses. The table shows, firstly,
that the correlations between brightness score on emotional control slides and
the ESP and neuroticism measures are, as one would expect, small and
nonsignificant (rs=-.047 for conscious ESP; rs=-.021 for unconscious ESP;
rs=.045 for free-response ESP; and rs=.018 for neuroticism).
Table 7.3
Perceptual defensiveness/vigilance correlated (Spearman's rho) with ESP
performance, before and after training
Pre-training rs
Rank E Rank EC Notes
Forced choice ESP .336 -.047 (subset of expt 4's data)
(total hits)
Unconscious ESP .207 -.021 (subset of expt 4's data)
Free response ESP .4981 .045
(Tl-6)
Neuroticism -.6992 .018 (subset of expt 4's data)
Post-training rs
Forced choice ESP -.395 .036
(total hits)
Unconscious ESP .5131 -.124
Free-response ESP -.389 -.227
Neuroticism -.5121 -.273
1 n.s. (for n=14, one would need rs=.539 for p<.05, 2-t)
2 (p<.0005,1-t)
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Pre-training measures. Not surprisingly, given that they formed part of
experiment 4's data, there were correlations in the predicted direction
between perceptual defence/vigilance (responses to emotional slides) and
forced choice ESP (rs~.336), unconscious ESP (rs=.207) (neither correlation is
statistically significant), and neuroticism (rs=~.699, p<.0005, 1-t). For the first
half of the free response ESP trials, however, the nonsignificant correlation of
.498 was in the direction opposite to what one might expect (the method of
scoring free response trials means that a positive correlation indicates that the
defensive participants had higher ESP scores than the vigilant participants.)
Post-training measures. None of these analyses was statistically significant at
the two-tailed level (recall that no firm predictions were made for these post-
training analyses), but it can be seen that the defensiveness-neuroticism and
defensiveness-unconscious ESP correlations continue to be in the predicted
direction {rs--.512 and rs=.513, respectively). The defensiveness-forced choice
ESP correlation is, however, negative after training (that is, the direction of
the correlation is reversed from that found in the pre-training session), giving
rs=-.395. The defensiveness-free response ESP correlation changes direction
from the pre-training measure to indicate a slight tendency for vigilant
individuals to score more positively than defensive individuals on post-
training free-response ESP; rs=-.389).
Target emotionality and ESP. The final exploratory question related to the ESP
slide emotionality ratings that, for the first time, had been collected from each
participant in the study. Of the 12 emotional targets, 8 were simple black and
white line drawings, and 4 were more colourful and complex pictures and
photographs. The mean emotionality rating given to the simple slides by
participants in this study was 5.45, while for the complex slides the mean
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rating was 5.5. The pre-rating that had been completed for these slides by
other individuals had given an average emotionality rating of 6.16 for the
same slides. (On the rating scale, point 5 was described as 'mild unpleasant
emotion', while point 6 was 'fairly strong unpleasant emotion'; the maximum
rating of 7 was 'very strong unpleasant emotion').
Thus the 14 participants in this experiment found the slides to be slightly less
emotional, on average, than did those 20 individuals who initially rated the
slides prior to commencing experiment 1 for this thesis. There could be at
least two possible reasons for this: the original raters may have given a
slightly more extreme rating to the selected slides because these slides were
rated alongside a large number of other slides, many of which were less
extremely emotional - so in relative terms the selected stimuli were judged to
be more emotional because of their milder context; alternatively, one could
argue that, as emotionality ratings in the present study were taken after
participants had experienced two ESP testing sessions with these stimuli (so
they had looked at them during feedback twice), the participants were more
accustomed to the selected stimuli. Also, obviously, simple individual
differences in the personality characteristics of the two samples of raters
could contribute to the different emotionality ratings.
The reason for gathering individual participants' emotionality ratings was to
explore how ESP performance was related to degree of target emotionality. In
experiment 4, it was seen that overall participants scored slightly negatively
for the emotional targets (Z=-.836) and positively for the neutral targets
(Z=1.361). When the results for the emotional targets were broken down, it
was seen that there was fairly strong negative scoring for the simple
emotional targets (Z=-1.686), and mildly positive scoring for the complex
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targets (Z=.800). Looking only at the post-training ESP measure for the
present study (since the pre-training measure forms a sub-set of experiment
4's data), it was found that participants scored positively for both emotional
and neutral targets (Z=1.161 and Z=1.625, respectively), and that scoring was
higher for the neutral than for the emotional targets. Thus the present
participants' scoring for the emotional targets followed the same trend as in
experiment 4 (scoring higher for neutral than emotional targets), but scores
were increased all round. And as we have already seen, for the present study
scoring for the simple emotional targets was exactly at chance (Z=0), while
for complex targets Z=1.213; so again the pattern of ESP scoring for this
experiment is higher but follows the same trend as for experiment 4,
suggesting that there is some consistency in participants' reactions to the
forced choice ESP task (the difference between scoring for simple and
complex targets was in the predicted direction, but was not significant on a
Wilcoxon test, W=20).
The question arises as to whether the higher ESP scores for the complex
emotional targets could be due to their increased informational complexity
(so that they are more stimulating and interesting to participants as compared
to the simple emotional targets), or to their slightly higher emotionality
ratings. This was looked at quite simply by selecting the three slides which
had the most extreme emotionality ratings (1 simple and 2 complex slides,
mean rating 5.92) the three with the most mild emotionality ratings (1 simple
and 2 complex slides, mean rating 4.63). So, we have a sub-group of slides
that are matched for complexity, but different on emotionality.
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Figure 7.1
Stem-and-leaf display showing number offorced choice ESP hits for the sub-group of










Figure 7.1 gives a stem-and-leaf display showing the number of forced choice
ESP hits for the selected weak emotional and strong emotional targets. It can
be seen that there is very little difference in scoring for the two categories of
emotional slides: combining the forced choice ESP scores for both testing
sessions, the most emotional slides were successfully guessed 46 times by
participants, and the least emotional slides were successfully guessed 45
times. As can be seen from the figure, there are no outliers to distort this
picture. Therefore this preliminary exploration suggests that degree of slide
emotionality is not related to ESP scoring, and that perhaps the higher scoring
for the complex slides could be due to their cognitively stimulating
complexity rather than to their emotionality.
Summary and Conclusions
Like experiment 2, this study took the opportunity to compare defensiveness-
psi correlations before and after training that was intended to enhance psi
performance. This study doubled the number of participants from
experiment 2 (from 7 to 14) and included the forced choice and unconscious
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ESP measures that had been developed for experiment 4. Like experiment 2,
there were some slight nonsignificant indications of improved free-response
ESP performance over the duration of the study; and forced choice ESP scores
were significantly positive in the post-training measure. Unconscious ESP
scores were marginally lower in the post-training measure. Also as in
experiment 2, there was a trend for fewer participants to show signs of
perceptual defensiveness after training in relaxation and self-esteem than
before such training. These trends must be treated with caution, since they
are based on only two experiments with, respectively, 7 and 14 participants,
and since there is no 'no training' control group for comparison purposes;
however, the apparent decrease in defensiveness would be what one would
expect if one assumed that the mental training exercises might reduce or alter
some participants' habitual defensive reactions.
None of the defensiveness-psi correlations was statistically significant (2-
tailed), so the picture of how the defensiveness-psi relationship may alter
with training is still unclear (experiment 2 found no correlation between free-
response ESP and defensiveness after training, but a significant correlation
before training; this study found defensiveness to be slightly related with
positive free-response ESP scoring before training, and slightly related with
negative free-response ESP performance after training). The defensiveness-
neuroticism correlation found in experiment 2 (rs=-.145, n.s.) was found more
strongly in experiment 4 (rs=-.381, p<.01, 2-t, n=48), and in the group of
participants from experiment 4 who took part in the present study (rs=~.699,
p<.01,2-t, n=14, before training; rs=-.512, n.s. 2-t, after training).
This study has not been able to clarify further the relationship between
defensiveness-vigilance and ESP before and after training, due in part to
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there being a relatively small number of participants (this will always be a
problem with labour-intensive training studies of this sort). One can only
suggest that, as more such studies are conducted, their results might be
cumulated so that a pattern might begin to emerge. It is encouraging to note,
however, that the defensiveness-neuroticism correlation continues to appear
before training, and to a lesser extent after training.
On the question of ESP target emotionality (as judged by the experimental
participants themselves) and psi performance, this study compared the
average emotionality ratings for all 14 participants on simple and complex ESP
targets. It would, of course, have been preferable to look at the
correspondence between each individual participant's target slide emotionality
ratings and psi performance, because individual differences may be obscured
when all 14 participants' scores are averaged. However, taking individual
emotionality ratings rather than average ratings turned out to be problematic
because, as participants rated each slide on an interval scale (with only 3
points on the 'negative emotional' side - points 5, 6, & 7) rather than on a
continual scale, it was common for individuals to give several identical
ratings to different pictures. It would often be difficult, therefore, to select out
individual slides for extreme emotionality ratings; it would also be difficult,
given the limited range of rating scale points that participants could use, to
counterbalance emotionality and complexity. With averaged scores, however,
it was possible to do this, and this analysis suggested that the higher scoring
for the complex emotional targets was not related to their degree of
emotionality, but rather to their greater visual complexity. This question will
be explored again in experiment 7, with a larger number of participants.
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In considering any changes in performance from pre- to post-training in this
study, it should be noted that there were some changes in participants and in
methodology from the pre- to the post-training sessions: 1. on the pre-training
measure participants were unfamiliar with both the defensiveness-testing
procedure and with the ESP testing procedures, therefore participants may
have been more relaxed and comfortable on the post-training measures; 2. the
pre-training forced choice and unconscious ESP measures were done with a
sender, while a clairvoyance design was used for the post-training measures,
therefore participants' mental set, expectations, and the strategies they used to
do the ESP tasks may have been different on the post-training session
compared to the pre-training session. (The clairvoyance design was used in
this experiment because the participants were experienced and comfortable
with this psi technique.) These changes, together with the fact that there was
no 'no training' control group, mean that any trends in scoring from pre- to
post-training may not at this stage solely be attributed to the mental training
exercises themselves rather than to any other factors that changed from pre-
to post-training. While the relationship between training and perceptual
defensiveness/vigilance and ESP will not be studied further in this thesis (as
it is not the main object of interest), experiments 2 and 5 have nevertheless
shown some suggestive trends that might stand up to further, more rigorous,
experimentation.
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Chapter 8. Experiment 6: Subjective reports of visual
experiences when the response criterion to weak stimuli
is relaxed; and a consideration of alternative indicators
of defensiveness/vigilance.
Experiments 2, 3, 4, and 5, have mostly shown the predicted correlations
between apparent perceptual defence /vigilance and/or psi performance
(both ESP and PK) and neuroticism. However the effect remains quite weak,
especially for the defensiveness-psi relationship. Evidently there are still
some questions to be resolved over the effectiveness and validity of the
Pandora's Box methodology. To help resolve some of these issues, part 1 of
this chapter will describe an experiment designed to explore participants'
subjective visual experiences when an aspect of the subliminal perception
methodology used thus far is altered. Part 2 will consider the use of different
scoring systems for the subliminal perception measure. The concluding
section of the chapter will include an evaluation of the statistical power of the
studies conducted in this thesis.
Part 1: Experiment 6
Could signs of defensiveness/vigilance be strengthened (in the hope that this
would lead to strengthened defensiveness-psi correlations)? Measures were
taken to increase the subliminal stimulus emotionality in experiments 3, 4,
and 5 (as compared to experiments 1 and 2) by using those stimuli with the
highest emotionality ratings. In studies 1 to 5 an extremely conservative
response criterion was used (participants were asked to respond when they
became aware of the presence of the stimulus slide, not when they became
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aware of its (as yet unrecognisable) contents); in these studies, therefore, the
stimulus intensity was very weak. It is possible that a second avenue for
strengthening the stimulus might be to ask participants to adopt a less
stringent response criterion, that is, to allow the slides to brighten further
before responding to them, so that the stimulus intensity is stronger.
The reason for the extremely stringent response criterion for the studies
reported in this thesis was to make sure there was absolutely no chance of the
participant discovering the nature of the subliminal stimulus slides:
perceptual defence/vigilance is, by definition, meant to be a non-conscious
reaction to anxiety-arousing stimuli; if participants get some idea of the slide
nature, that awareness would likely change their attitude to the test, which
could, in turn, change their responses to the stimuli. As Gregor's original
study had apparently shown perceptual defence using a very stringent
response criterion, such a criterion was adopted for my experiments 1 to 5.
Given that these studies have not had strong results, it appears worthwhile to
conduct a study asking participants what they can tell of the stimulus nature
when they are responding less stringently, so that the stimulus slides are
physically more intense, more visible. The aim is to see whether the rationale
behind choosing a conservative response criterion for the studies so far - that
even partial stimulus cues may reveal something of the slide nature and so
participants should be asked to adopt a very conservative response criterion
so that the nature of the stimuli remain unconscious - was well-founded.
In other words, my previous experiments asked participants to respond to the
slides while the slides were still so dim that nothing could apparently be
perceived of their contents; the present experiment asks participants to allow
the slides to brighten until the participants have first impressions of the
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stimulus contents. The question is whether, using this latter methodology,
participants may receive partial stimulus cues (unidentified lines, shapes,
etc.) without any risk of participants recognising the slide nature (that the
stimuli are pictorial, for instance, or that some of the stimuli are emotional) or
even recognising the slide contents (a hanging man, for instance). By asking
participants to report their subjective visual experiences to the stimulus
slides, this experiment takes on board Price's (1990) comment that details of
participants' subjective experiences in subliminal detection tasks are often
neglected.
Method
The apparatus (Pandora's Box) and stimuli used in this experiment were
identical to those used in the defensiveness testing sessions for experiments 4
and 5, and the 'one testing session' procedure for experiment 5 was used
again here. In brief, then, participants did 4 runs of 16 'experimental' slides,
preceded at the outset by one demonstration and five practice slides, and
with another set of demo, and practice slides at the half-way point. The main
change was in the instructions given to the participants on when to respond
to each stimulus slide. Instead of being asked to press the response button
when they became aware of the light rectangle indicating the presence of the
slide, participants were asked to allow the slide to brighten until they got
their first impressions of seeing something on the slide. They were asked to
press the button at this point, and it was stressed that they were not
attempting to recognise the slide contents, simply to indicate when they first
became aware of the slide contents. Participants were aware that the aim of
the study was to find out what they experienced of the slide's contents at this
response criterion, and they were asked to make comments on their
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subjective visual experiences both while they were responding to the slides,
and later when discussing the experiment with me.
Secondly, with a view to strengthening the subliminal stimulus emotionality
in the next experiment, participants were asked to rate a number of simple
black and white line drawings for emotionality (using the same scale as in my
previous experiments). From these ratings, some new emotional stimuli
would be selected for inclusion in experiment 7.
There was no attempt to take any ESP measures or any personality data in
this study - the sole focus was on the measure of perceptual
defence/vigilance and on exploring participants' subjective visual
experiences to stimulus slides when these slides were permitted to brighten
further than in the previous studies reported in this thesis. If it turned out
that participants appeared to perceive very little of the nature of the stimulus
slides even though they were allowing the slides to brighten to the point
where they could see something (lines, shapes), then this more relaxed
response criterion might be compared with psi and neuroticism scores in a
subsequent study. Another exploratory question would be whether, by
asking participants to adopt a more relaxed response criterion, a new source
of noise or extraneous variance would be introduced into the data. Standard
Deviation scores for the brightness scores of participants in this study would
therefore be contrasted with those found with the more stringent response
criterion, since higher SD scores in the present study would indicate more
variable data. Such variation need not of course be extraneous or noisy, since
if the new response criterion strengthened signs of perceptual defence or
vigilance then one would predict more extreme scoring for the emotional
slides compared to the others. To be more specific, then, if SD scores are
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raised for all slide categories, then this would suggest that the new response
criterion was introducing a new source of noise into the data; if SD scores are
relatively high for the emotional slides compared to the others, then this
would suggest that allowing slides to brighten further might increase signs of
perceptual defence or vigilance (in this latter case, the problem would remain
of whether such increased variation was due to perceptual factors - that is,
fluctuating sensory thresholds - or response factors - that is, hesitation to
respond to slides that have been consciously perceived as emotional).
As this was purely an exploratory study, no hypotheses or analyses were
formally planned in advance, though as already suggested trends in the data
would be interpreted; friends and colleagues (a few of whom had
experienced pilot versions of the Pandora's Box methodology before) acted as
participants, and no details were taken of participants apart from their
names, sex, and age.
Results
21 individuals took part in this experiment - 9 females, and 12 males, mean
age 29.8, range 18-49 years.
Information pick-up with the new response criterion. One of the questions I had
was whether participants would pick up much information about the nature
of the slides using a less conservative response criterion. Only 2 participants
said they had only the vaguest impressions of the slide contents and they
couldn't name what they saw. At the other extreme, one participant
recognised and could name the contents of nearly all the slides that were
recognisable (i.e. not controls); he had found focusing a problem, and for him
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the slides were unfocused to begin with and then they suddenly 'snapped'
into focus at a stage when they were easily seen.
Most other participants did not find focusing a problem. Most participants
said they sometimes could see a solitary figure or figures. This is not
surprising because there were several slides with the same basic shape (man
standing with briefcase, man hanging, man shooting himself, plus their
controls) which could become familiar from repeated exposure (familiar
information is more readily recognised). The other slides were reported as
just vague shapes. People frequently misidentified slides, suggesting the
projective nature of the stimuli (with the response criterion adopted for this
study, the visual impressions of the stimuli presumably are more similar to
those fragmentary glimpses experienced with the Defence Mechanism Test).
Psychological responses to the new response criterion. Nobody made any
comments about the emotional nature of the stimuli. Several people reported
that it was difficult to resist the temptation to try to identify the slide
contents, even though it had been repeatedly stressed to them that this was
not their task. The task was to respond to each slide as soon as something,
anything, was seen on the slide; nevertheless, I suspect that some individuals
were allowing the slide to brighten further than necessary. I never had this
impression using the more strict response criterion in the previous
experiments. Short of concocting an elaborate 'cover-story', there seems to be
no way round the natural human curiosity which is piqued by using the less
stringent response criterion.
Brightness scoring with the new response criterion. In experiment 4 (the one with
the largest number of participants, 48, and so presumably the most reliable
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data of the studies so far) the slides reached brightness step 28 on average,
when participants responded to them. In the present study, brightness scores
were around 48 (this is around the level at which in my preliminary work
with Pandora's Box I felt I began to get impressions of the slide contents; thus,
the present study gives some objective confirmation for my subjective
impressions).
Standard Deviation of brightness scores with the new response criterion. The
amount of variation in people's scoring to the slide categories in experiment 4
was around 2.5 SD; for the present study it was around 5 SD. So there was a
great deal more variability in scoring within individuals in this study
compared to experiment 4. However this variability did not seem to be
related to slide nature: if the new methodology increased signs of
defensiveness or vigilance one would expect higher SD scores for the
emotional slide category compared to the others, and more participants to
show overall brightness scores ranked 1 (='defensive') or 4 (='vigilant') for E
slides; neither of these was seen. It appeared that the less conservative
response criterion introduced more noise into the data, caused by the
temptation to let some slides brighten further, to try to recognise the slides,
tempered by recollection (and reminders) of the actual task instructions.
Picture emotionality ratings. In order to select some new, possibly more
emotional stimuli, for the next experiment, 18 participants each rated 12
pictures for emotionality. Four of these pictures were newly drawn (a foot
stepping on broken glass, fingers being guillotined, a threatening face, and a
skull and crossbones), and were intended to be emotional. Other pictures
were already in use, so the new could be rated in context with the old. The
results showed that of the four most emotional pictures, three were already in
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use; the new 'foot' picture tied with an old 'stabbing' picture for the top
emotionality rating (average rating 6, on a 7 point scale).
Experiment 4 used only 4 emotional slides and showed each slide four times;
the aim of this was to reach a compromise between a comfortable session
length (for the participant, who could find the subliminal task tiring) and a
reliable brightness score for each slide. One might speculate however that, as
in real life, repeated exposures to emotional stimuli could lead to a lessening
of their impact. One could even ask, like Haraldsson & Houtkooper (1992)
when discussing the declining DMT-ESP relationship: 'Could the prevalence
of increasingly bloody horror movies explain the decline in the series of ESP-
DMT correlations, by lowering the intensity of the perceived threat or lack of
identification with the central person which is displayed in the DMT?'
(p. 1094). Perhaps, because of the daily exposure to genuinely gory and 'real'
pictures in the news media, people's sensitivity to emotional pictures has
been dulled; if this is so, then one either has to go to extreme lengths to show
strongly emotional pictures (e.g. photographs of mutilated babies), or one has
to accept 'watered down' defensive and vigilant reactions; for ethical reasons,
I prefer the latter. For these reasons, it was decided for the next experiment to
revert to the '32 stimuli shown twice each' design used in experiments 1 and
2, though incorporating stronger emotional stimuli than were used in these
experiments.
Discussion
This study has resolved the question of whether or not to adopt a less
conservative response criterion on the measure of perceptual
defence/vigilance. It was seen that this methodological change introduced
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greater variability in scoring, apparently due to the increased amount of
'conscious cognition' which is introduced by letting slides brighten to the
point where something is seen. This variability does not appear to be a sign of
increased defensiveness or vigilance to the emotional slides because: 1. the
variability in brightness scores was not restricted only to the emotional slides
(which would have suggested more extreme scoring for these slides
compared to the others) - instead, all slide categories had higher SD scores
than had been found previously, suggesting a possible source of extraneous
variance was affecting all the data; and, 2. there was no tendency for the
emotional slides' brightness scores to be ranked 1 (^'defensive') or 4
(='vigilant') more often than the other slide categories.
Judging from participants' subjective descriptions of their visual experiences
with a more relaxed response criterion, when something is seen on the slide
participants do not appear to realise the emotional nature of some of the
stimuli, so that aspect of the experiment may remain unconscious to
participants. Nevertheless, using the more relaxed response criterion means
that strictly speaking one is no longer looking at perceptual
defence/vigilance in a subliminal perception paradigm, since participants are
seeing something on the slides. Many experiments in subliminal perception
do use this looser definition of subliminal (one exception being Dixon's closed
loop control method, aspects of which the 'Pandora's Box' method is
attempting to emulate), but they take a great deal more time and effort to
ascertain each individual's 'threshold' and then present the stimuli at or
below this level; my method does not permit this. I would rather be able to
continue to regard my work as comparing subliminal to extrasensory
perception, and to cut out as many sources of noise as possible by retaining
the conservative 'awareness of slide presence' response criterion. By relaxing
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the subjects' response criterion, however, and asking participants to report
their visual experience, one began to see the projective nature of these
partially visible stimuli, as participants 'saw' things that were not objectively
represented on the slides. Thus, the Pandora's Box methodology with relaxed
response criterion probably bears more similarity to the method of the DMT,
and one should not therefore rule out the possibility that one would similarly
find a 'defensiveness'-psi correlation using the revised methodology; this
would be an interesting future experiment, but for the present I will continue
to work with the subliminal perception paradigm adopted for this thesis.
Part 2: Alternative scoring methods
The second problem to be addressed in this chapter is that of the method of
analysis of the brightness scores in the subliminal perception measure. Until
now, a very crude method has been used: mean brightness scores are
calculated for each slide category, these are ranked, and individuals are
defined as defensive if their responses to Emotional slides are ranked 1 (most
bright of all) and vigilant if their responses to Emotional slides are ranked 4
(least bright of all). As individuals vary greatly in their visual sensitivity and
their choice of response criterion (there is not a distinct moment at which a
light rectangle suddenly becomes visible), these brightness ranks are used for
calculating correlation coefficients, rather than the 'raw' brightness scores.
When the correlation is calculated for criterion participants, whose brightness
ranks for E slides are by definition only 1 or 4, this crude method of scoring
could be misleading (that is why such correlations are backed up by f-tests in
this thesis).
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Additionally, a gross ranking obviously contains less information than
individual brightness scores. This feature has advantages and disadvantages.
The advantage is that, if brightness scores are 'noisy', containing variance due
to extraneous factors, this noise is masked with rank scores. The
disadvantage, however, is that potential information about degree of
defensiveness or vigilance is lost using ranked scores. For both these reasons,
the second part of this chapter will explore different methods of scoring
participants' responses to subliminal slides, to see how these different
methods affect the defensiveness-psi and defensiveness-neuroticism
correlations which have been seen so far.
Probably, the most promising avenue for increasing the amount of
information in the defensiveness/vigilance scores is to devise a ratio measure
which contrasts the scoring for the critical, emotional slides, with that for the
other slide categories (emotional control, neutral, and neutral control). The
first ratio measure that was explored was E-[(EC+N+NC)/3]; that is, the
mean of the scores for the non-critical slides EC, N, & NC, was subtracted
from the scores of the critical, E slides. For the data of experiment 4, the
largest to date, this measure yielded rs=.183 for the criterion participants. This
was in the right direction, but disappointingly small. Looking more closely at
this ratio measure, it was found that the value produced was confounded
with the participants' overall level of brightness scoring; thus individuals
who responded at a relatively bright level for all slides would have higher
ratio scores than those who responded at a relatively dim level for all slides,
regardless of whether they appeared to be perceptually defensive or vigilant.
The obvious way round this problem is to take a ratio measure which divides
the score for the critical emotional slides by the mean of the other three slide
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categories: E/[(EC+N+NC)/3]. Thus if a person is perceptually defensive, the
ratio measure will be greater than 1, and if they are perceptually vigilant, the
ratio measure will be less than 1. For the criterion participants in experiment
4 (those whose overall brightness ranks for E slides were 1 or 4), this revised
ratio indicator of defensiveness gave rs=.247; this is again in the right
direction, and is a larger correlation than was found using the original crude
rankings (rs=.192). Originally, correlations were also calculated for responses
to emotional control slides, and the prediction was that these correlations
would be small and nonsignificant. For a control correlation using a revised
ratio indicator of defensiveness, one would probably select those participants
whose brightness rankings were highest for the EC slides (control defensive,
one might say) and those whose brightness rankings were lowest for the EC
slides (control vigilant); so apart from the critical correlation one would also
calculate a correlation using these 'control criterion' participants' data,
predicting that such a correlation would be small and nonsignificant. Doing
this, we get rs-.027 for experiment 4 (n=22).
These post hoc analyses with the revised ratio scoring system were sufficiently
encouraging to invite further investigation. The same scoring system was
used to calculate ESP-Pandora's Box correlations for experiments 2, 3, and 5.
The results are shown in table 8.1.
To summarise the contents of table 8.1, it can be seen that, using the original
crude ranking indicator of defensiveness/vigilance, 4 out of 6 defensiveness-
psi correlations are in the expected direction, but none is statistically
significant; the correlations between control slides and psi are, with one
exception, smaller than the critical correlations, as one would hope for. Using
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Table 8.1
Summary of defensiveness-psi correlations (Spearman's rho) for experiments 2 to 5:
original indicator of defensiveness/vigilance and revised indicators of
defensiveness/vigilance1
Original rs Revised rs
Study No. Rank E Rank EC E/[(EC+N+NC)/3] EC/[(E+N+NC)/3]
2
(training study: .514 -.156 .759 .08
free-response ESP) (n=7) (n=7) (n=7) (n=7)
3
(psychokinesis) .291 -.183 .288 -.262




(forced choice ESP) .192 -.069 .247 .027
(n=24) (n=24) (n=24) (n=22)
.149 -.117 .066 -.048




free-response ESP -.387 -.339 -.314 -.128
(n=14) (n=14) (n=14) (n=14)
forced choice ESP -.219 .609 -.302 .734
(n=14) (n=14) (n=14) (n=14)
1 When 2 values are given in 2 rows, the first row, with lower number of participants, is
with the 'criterion' or 'control criterion' participants' data; the second row is the correlation
calculated for all participants. For ease of comparison, the sign of the correlations have been
adjusted so that a positive correlation for the critical measures indicates a correlation in the
expected direction (i.e. more vigilant had relatively high psi scores; more defensive had
relatively low psi scores).
the revised ratio measure of defensiveness, 5 out of 7 defensiveness-psi
correlations are in the expected direction, though again none is statistically
significant. Again, with one exception, the control ratio measures of
defensiveness all give smaller correlations with psi than the critical measures.
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Given the number of correlations represented in table 8.1, the two statistically
significant correlations (for the control conditions in experiment 5, forced
choice ESP, rs=.609 and rs=.734) may have been significant by chance, and
were found with a relatively small number of participants, and so they
should not be given much weight.
It does not appear, on the face of it, that much is to be gained from adopting a
revised ratio measure of defensiveness. A final question is whether, if one
were to select for defensiveness-psi correlations those individuals who had
the most extreme ratio scores (that is, those individuals whose responses to E
slides were most widely divergent from their responses to the other slide
categories), one would find a stronger effect. This was done for the data of
experiment 4: the E/[(EC+N+NC)/3] scores of the 12 'most defensive' and the
12 'most vigilant' participants in this experiment were selected. The
correlation with forced choice ESP performance was rs=.184, which is opposite
to the direction expected, so selecting extreme ratio scores does not appear to
strengthen the defensiveness-psi effect.
Summary and Conclusions
The first part of this chapter reported an experiment to investigate
methodological changes in the subliminal perception procedure developed
for this thesis. It was found that adopting a more relaxed response criterion
led to a wider variability in scoring. However, that variability did not appear
to be due to the emergence of stronger signs of defensiveness or vigilance
compared to previous experiments (i.e. more extreme scoring on the
emotional slides compared to the others). Instead, participants' conscious
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attitude to the task changed, with many reporting a temptation to allow the
slides to brighten further because their curiosity was piqued by glimpses of
slide contents. For the final experiment in this thesis, therefore, it was decided
to continue to use the more conservative response criterion as before.
Participants also rated several new pictures for emotionality. Some of these
pictures had higher emotionality ratings than those used previously, and it
was decided to include these pictures in the next study, and to show a greater
number of stimuli twice each, rather than a smaller number four times each,
so that each stimulus might retain its emotional impact more than if it were
repeatedly exposed.
The second part of this chapter explored alternative methods of scoring
participants' responses for defensiveness/vigilance. A revised ratio measure
of defensiveness/vigilance was used on the data of experiments 2 to 5. While
the crude ranking measure used previously had the advantage of masking
extraneous noise, the ratio measure could potentially reveal more information
(i.e., degree of defensiveness/vigilance); conversely, there was a risk that the
ratio measure could enable more extraneous noise to be expressed in the
defensiveness/vigilance scores. It appeared that this ratio measure was no
more revealing of defensiveness/vigilance than the previous crude ranking
measure.
For the final study of this thesis, therefore, the ratio measure will be included
for interest, but the usual scoring system, with target ranks, will be used for
correlations, backed up by significance tests of the difference in scoring (for
example, on psi and neuroticism) between the two groups of criterion
participants (that is, defensive and vigilant individuals).
242
A note on statistical power.
It seems that the defensiveness-psi correlation has been very weak so far in
this thesis (though it has been quite consistent). Were it not for the additional
support of the neuroticism-defensiveness correlation, which has been
relatively strong and consistent throughout, one might even put the
defensiveness-psi results so far down to luck. One must bear in mind,
however, that the overall DMT-ESP correlation calculated in the meta¬
analysis in chapter 2 of this thesis (based on the 16 studies with a total of 582
participants reported by Haraldsson & Houtkooper, 1992) gave rs=.16.
Along with the developments in meta-analytic procedures that are becoming
established in the behavioural sciences, there is a growing realisation that
statistical significance is highly dependent upon the power of one's
experiments (e.g. Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). Power can be defined as the
likelihood that a significant result will be obtained if there is a true effect (in
this case, a relationship between psi and defensiveness/vigilance); put
another way, power can be seen as the likelihood of committing a type II
error. Among other factors, the number of participants in a study, or the
number of trials conducted, has a dramatic effect on statistical power (as can
be seen by looking up significance tables, where as the number of
participants increases the size of the statistic required to be significant
decreases).
Jacob Cohen (e.g. 1977) has pioneered the study of statistical power in the
behavioural sciences. As early as 1962, he found that typically behavioural
scientists carried out their research with a remarkably high risk of committing
type II errors. Surveying the power of experiments in the Journal of Abnormal
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Psychology, Cohen (1962) found that for medium effect sizes, and taking
statistical significance to be .05, the odds were better than 50:50 that a type II
error would be committed. Depressingly, an updated survey of the same
journal by Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer (1989) found that typical statistical
power had decreased, so that there was less than a 40% chance of obtaining a
significant result if there was a true effect. Sedlmeier and Gigerenzer state:
'only 2 out of 64 experiments mentioned power, and it was never estimated.
Nonsignificance was generally interpreted as confirmation of the null
hypothesis..., although the median power was as low as .25 in these cases' (p.
309).
Taking these findings to heart, what is the statistical power in the studies
reported so far in this thesis? Assuming a defensiveness-psi effect size of .3
(which would be seen as correlations around .3, perhaps an over-optimistic
assumption), the analysis of the 24 criterion participants reported for
experiment 4 had only .42 power (to detect an effect at p<.05, 1-t). For the
same effect size and significance level, I would need 68 criterion participants
for .81 power, and 52 participants for .71 power. Given that in experiment 4
only half of the total number of participants fell into the 'criterion category',
one would have to double the number of participants suggested by the power
analyses in order to be fairly confident of detecting the defensiveness-psi
effect.
For practical reasons, however, it would be unwise for me to attempt to
conduct a study with such a large number of participants. The alternative is
to compromise, to conduct a study that is larger than those which have been
conducted before, thus increasing statistical power, while acknowledging that
statistical power is still relatively low. One might then conduct a small meta-
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analysis, combining the results of the studies in this thesis which are
sufficiently similar, in order to increase the odds of significantly detecting a
defensiveness-psi relationship, if one exists. The next chapter reports on this
final, larger experiment, and this is followed, in the final chapter, by just such
a meta-analysis.
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Chapter 9. Experiment 7: A study of perceptual
defence/vigilance, implicit and explicit ESP
performance, and personality.
One goal of this conceptual replication (meaning this experiment 7 as well as
the entire thesis), is to consider whether the novel measure of perceptual
defence/vigilance that has been developed could be of equal or even greater
utility than the DMT as an instrument for identifying participants likely to
score well at ESP. Beyond this, there is the goal of learning more about the
relationship between defensiveness, in general, and psi. Experiments 2 to 5,
comparing subjective awareness thresholds for subliminally-presented
emotional slides with psi performance, have shown some encouraging but
usually non-significant correlations in the predicted direction: 'defensive'
individuals scored relatively poorly at psi tasks, 'vigilant' individuals scored
relatively well. From the standpoint of the validity of the prototype indicator
of perceptual defensiveness/vigilance, also, it has been encouraging to have
repeatedly found that apparent perceptual defensiveness correlates with the
well-established personality factor of neuroticisim.
Shortly before the present study was planned, a paper was published
(Stanford, 1990) that seemed highly relevant to my previous experiments, in
that it provided a theoretical framework for making comparisons between
different sorts of ESP measures and defensiveness measures. The present
study will enable some more direct examination of Stanford's ideas, and so
some space will now be given to summarising these ideas.
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The aim of Stanford's paper was to relate evidence from parapsychology and
other sciences to his model of spontaneous psi events. As part of his
comprehensive coverage of this topic, Stanford included a consideration of
subliminal perception as it relates to extrasensory perception, pointing out
some potentially interesting research questions which, he thought, had not
yet been tackled.
Implicit and explicit measures ofperceptual defence and ESP
Stanford reports a meta-analysis of 6 parapsychological studies that have
compared sensitivity to subliminal perception with forced choice ESP scoring
(the studies were by Eisenbud, 1965; Rao & Rao, 1982 (4 correlations); and
Haight, Morrison, & Kennedy, 1977). These six studies were selected by
Stanford because they presented the subliminal stimuli at exposure times
from 8 to 10 milliseconds so Stanford judged that these stimuli would be
below Cheesman & Merikle's (1986) subjective awareness threshold. These
studies also involved only visual subliminal stimulation (as is typical of
studies comparing subliminal to extrasensory perception), to avoid the
introduction of possibly misleading findings from pooling across sensory
modalities. Stanford excludes the DMT studies from this meta-analysis
because, like me, he does not regard the DMT as a measure of subliminal
perception (since at later stages participants can see some, and eventually all,
of the stimuli in the DMT).
As an example of the methodology used in the studies selected by Stanford,
let us consider one of the experimental series reported by Rao & Rao (1982).
50 subjects were tested individually in a session that randomly mixed
subliminal perception and ESP trials. The subject was to guess the nature of
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60 slides, 30 of which (the slides testing subliminal perception) depicted
pictures of 10 objects (such as an airplane, bird, man) and 30 of which (testing
ESP) were blank slides smudged with India ink 'in order to make it difficult
for the subject to consciously distinguish them from the picture slides' (Rao &
Rao, 1982, p. 193). These 60 stimulus slides were numbered from 1 to 60. The
slide order was determined for each subject by randomly selecting, one at a
time, a number from 1 to 60, thus building up a slide presentation sequence.
The same 10 object pictures that were used for the subliminal perception
slides were then 'associated' to the 30 blank slides by assigning code numbers
to the pictures and randomly selecting one code number at a time and
entering it against the blank slides in the previously prepared slide
presentation sequence. The subject was told the purpose and the nature of the
test, but no reference was made to the ESP aspect of the study; therefore an
ESP trial consisted of the subjects guessing the nature of a target slide that
they thought depicted one of 10 pictures when in fact the slide was simply
smudged with ink. Seated in front of a projector screen, the subject was given
a few practice trials with slides that were not from the pool of 10 pictures. The
subject was then instructed:
I will now show you another set of slides each showing a
picture of one of the following 10 objects: (1) airplane, (2) bird,
(3) book, (4) building, (5) cabinet, (6) child, (7) flower, (8) man,
(9) nature scene, (10) watch. Just as before, each of them will be
shown to you only for a fraction of a second. Please try to make
a guess even if you cannot see the objects clearly. The names of
the objects are given above in an alphabetical order. Make
yourself familiar with the list. Please write your guess in the
response column after every projection. Do not omit any
column, (p. 195)
The stimuli were presented via a projector fitted with a photographic shutter
at the exposure time of 1/100th of a second; this time had been selected on
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the basis of preliminary trials that had shown that subjects could not at this
level distinguish between the smudged and the picture slides and were on
average guessing the pictures slides correctly less than 30% of the time. Each
slide presentation was preceded by a 'ready' signal. In this series, Rao & Rao
found a nonsignificant correlation of r=.15 between subliminal perception
and extrasensory perception scores.
Stanford's meta-analysis found an overall correlation (weighted by sample
size) of .167 between sensitivity or openness to subliminal perception and
ESP performance (z-2.707, p=.0069, 2-t). Stanford's meta-analysis therefore
provides empirical support for the impression of many parapsychologists and
some subliminal perception researchers (reviewed in chapter 2) that
subliminal and extrasensory perception are in many respects closely-related
phenomena, especially when it comes to the phenomenological experience of
the participants, and the perceptual, cognitive, and motivational distortions to
which each kind of information (subliminal and extrasensory) is apparently
subject.
It was the founder of experimental parapsychology, J.B. Rhine, who said 'It is
here, in the common unconscious functions of both sensorimotor and
extrasensorimotor (or psi) character, that parapsychology comes closest to
psychology' (Rhine, 1977, p.171). Many others have repeatedly indicated the
striking parallels between psi and subliminal perception (e.g. Beloff, 1974;
Dixon, 1979; Irwin, 1979; Johnson, 1975; Nash, 1986; Rao & Rao, 1982; Roney-
Dougal, 1981,1986; and Schmeidler, 1986,1988).
Stanford (1990) is the most recent addition to these ranks: he suggests that the
subliminal perception-extrasensory perception correlation fits with the idea
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that preconscious and extrasensory information may be processed similarly,
and one implication of this is that:
it is possible that the demonstrated positive relationship
between ESP-task and subliminal performance is, at least in
part, influenced by the subject's deliberate effort to retrieve or
obtain information and report it, rather than from
characteristics of unconscious processing per se (p.120)
Stanford points out that in the studies he reviews (that exclude the DMT-ESP
studies), both the subliminal perception and the extrasensory perception tasks
are forced choice tasks - so the participant has to make deliberate or explicit
efforts to produce the correct response to the tasks. The same could be said of
the DMT-ESP studies, where the ESP tasks are forced choice and the DMT
methodology involves the subjects deliberately trying to describe what they
saw when the stimulus was exposed. While the DMT is not forced choice in
the sense that there is a restricted range of possible answers, it is so in the
sense that the participant is asked repeatedly to make a conscious effort to
describe their perceptual experiences. Stanford says:
(This) might explain why tests such as the Defense Mechanism
Test...that require subjects to try to retrieve low-level visual
information correlate quite consistently with ESP tasks that
involve deliberate efforts at the conscious retrieval of
extrasensory information...Subjects with the ability to retrieve
deliberately one type of low-level information (sensory) may
also have the ability to retrieve another type (extrasensory)
(p. 122, my emphasis)
Note that Stanford is not simply saying that the same sorts of cognitive effort
characterise both DMT and forced choice ESP tasks - effort is a component of
many tasks; rather, as my emphasis in the above quote indicates, Stanford is
repeating the hypotheses made by many other parapsychologists that the
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similarity between responses to tests such as the DMT and to psi tests is
partly due to the attempts to retrieve weak, 'low-level' visual information.
One implication of Stanford's reasoning is that 'DMT performance might not
correlate or might not correlate in the same way or in the same degree with
performance on a nonintentional or implicit ESP task' (p.122). The kind of
implicit ESP task that Stanford has in mind is one where you look for the
cognitive consequences of extrasensory information for the processing of
nonpsi information (by analogy with subliminal perception tasks in this
paradigm, for instance, the effects of subliminal primes on the subsequent
processing of supraliminal words, as shown in speed of reaction to the
supraliminal words). This kind of task might compare with what I have
called in my previous experiments the 'unconscious ESP' measure: where
participants indicate when they become aware of the presence of (blank)
stimulus slides while simultaneously emotional or neutral slides are being
shown in a nearby room. In this kind of task, participants are not deliberately
attempting to describe or react to weak sensory information - by definition,
participants are intended to be unaware or unconscious of the influence of the
weak information on their responses to a neutral or apparently unrelated
task. In the 'unconscious ESP' task devised for this thesis, for instance,
participants naturally showed varying degrees of discrimination to the
identical blank slides, and this was related to the nature of the concurrently-
displayed slides as a novel indicator of ESP. Experiment 4, with the largest
number of participants and therefore the greatest statistical power (increasing
the chances of significantly detecting an effect if it is real) of the studies
reported in this thesis, found a nonsignificant correlation in the expected
direction of .269 between this measure of ESP and the subliminal perception
indicator of perceptual defence/vigilance, for criterion participants. It will be
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recalled, however, that participants completed a two-stage ESP task, with the
'unconscious' or implicit measure of ESP just the first step. After participants
had registered their awareness of the blank slide, they then proceeded to give
a traditional forced choice judgement as to the nature of the ESP target slide -
whether it was negatively emotional or neutral. This latter is clearly a task
that Stanford would describe as an explicit ESP task, since participants are
deliberately attempting to identify the nature of weak impressions
(incidentally, experiment 4 found that the 'unconscious ESP' measure
correlated .540 [p=.000074, 2-t] with the forced choice or 'conscious' ESP task.)
One could, however, argue over whether the 'unconscious' ESP measure used
in the experiments reported until now in this thesis was truly 'unconscious':
in order to be as honest as possible to them, participants were informed in
advance that their responses to the blank slides might be related to the ESP
target slides, even though they were encouraged to focus on achieving the
same mental attitude as in the previous, defensiveness testing session, where
they were simply attempting to be consistent in their reactions to the slowly
brightening stimuli. Thus, unlike, for example, Rao & Rao's (1982) series
described earlier, participants were aware of the possible ESP aspect of the
study. In my experiment 4, the mean brightness score for the 'unconscious
ESP' task was 30.87 (mean SD=2.42). This compares with a mean brightness
score of 28.33 for the defensiveness testing session (mean SD=2.54). Thus
there was a slight trend for mean brightness scores to be higher (though
slightly less variable) in the unconscious ESP testing session (when
participants were asked to respond in the same way as they had done in the
previous week's defensiveness testing session) than in the defensiveness
testing session. Possibly, participants' knowledge that the stimulus slides
(presented in Pandora's Box) in the ESP testing session were blank and were
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presented simultaneously with the ESP target slides (presented in the
nonadjoining room) affected participants' attitude to, and therefore their
responses to, the blank 'unconscious ESP' slides.
To be more confident that the blank slides do constitute an implicit ESP task,
it would be preferable (methodologically, if not ethically) to use some 'cover
story', so that so far as participants are concerned they are only aware of
doing one, forced-choice, ESP task. If this methodological change is made,
then, in principle, the ESP measures developed for this thesis could permit an
examination of both implicit and explicit responses to a single set of targets.
In contrast with the DMT and with the subliminal perception measures in the
studies reviewed by Stanford, Pandora's Box could be described as an
implicit measure of perceptual defence, since participants are required only
to give a simple motor response to a stimulus which is, to them, neutral and
meaningless. In the series described earlier, for instance, Rao & Rao's (1982)
participants were trying to identify which of 10 possible pictures was being
briefly shown to them, thus this was a forced-choice design with a range of 10
possible answers. On Pandora's Box, the critical stimulus information is
apparently being presented at subliminal levels of brightness (since the vast
majority of my participants reported no visual impressions of the slide
contents) and the dependent measure, level of slide brightness at which
participants first report slide awareness, is apparently being responded to
without participants' awareness of the actual critical contents of the slide. The
v cognitive demands of the Pandora's Box task, therefore, are quite different to
"V
those in the studies reviewed by Stanford and in the DMT studies.
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Because the Pandora's Box methodology can therefore be viewed as an
implicit subliminal perception task, following Stanford's reasoning one can
make the following prediction:
Using the Pandora's Box methodology, a greater correlation will be
found between perceptual defence/vigilance and performance on the
implicit (unconscious) ESP measure than will be found between
perceptual defence/vigilance and performance on the explicit (forced
choice) ESP measure.
This prediction is based on Stanford's assumption (quoted earlier) that tests
like the DMT correlate quite consistently with forced choice ESP tests because
both involve deliberate attempts at the retrieval of low-level information. While the
present experiment will make predictions based on this assumption, it is
important to note that it is presently only an assumption (though admittedly it
is an assumption that has been implicitly shared by many parapsychologists
as the reason (or a reason) for the defensiveness-psi correlation). When
making differential predictions for performance on conscious
subliminal/extrasensory perception tasks versus performance on unconscious
subliminal/extrasensory perception tasks, many other factors vary
concurrently apart from those of deliberate versus not-deliberate retrieval of
low-level information. For instance, the former may involve a semantic
component, while the latter may not; the former may involve stress or
striving, while the latter may not; personality may interact with task so that,
for instance, extraverts prefer the former, goal-oriented task while introverts
prefer the latter non-striving task. While nevertheless acknowledging that the
situation may be more complex than Stanford suggests, it is practical to
restrict our attention to comparing tasks characterised grossly as 'implicit' and
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'explicit'. If our predictions (of greater correlations between two implicit and
between two explicit measures of subliminal and extrasensory perception
than between implicit compared to explicit measures) are fulfilled, then it
would be time to begin to consider why - what are the critical factors that
differentiate implicit from explicit measures?
Looking back to experiment 4, it can be seen that there is post hoc support for
this prediction: for all 48 participants there was a correlation of .149 between
defensiveness and conscious ESP (that is, between an implicit subliminal task
and an explicit ESP task), and .257 for unconscious ESP (that is, between an
implicit subliminal task and an implicit ESP task). For the 24 criterion
participants in experiment 4, as expected, the correlations were slightly
increased, to .192 for defensiveness and conscious ESP and .269 for
unconscious ESP. Thus, experiment 4 showed a pattern of scoring in
accordance with that hypothesised by Stanford: the correlation was stronger
for implicit ESP, perhaps because the subliminal perception task was also
'implicit'. Unaware of my work, Stanford states 'such predictions have not
been studied, but they seem well worth examination' (Stanford, 1990, p. 122).
Because only the second, unconscious ESP correlation was statistically
significant (p<.05,1-t, n=48), one must treat these findings with caution. It is
necessary to conduct another experiment with greater statistical power in
order to see whether this trend is confirmed.
(Incidentally, Stanford notes that free response ESP may represent a task mid¬
way between explicit and implicit ESP; in this context, it is interesting to note
that no clear pattern of free-response ESP-defensiveness correlation has been
found either in the experiments in this thesis or with studies using the DMT.)
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To complete the examination of the relationship proposed by Stanford, one
would need to include a more explicit measure of openness to subliminal
perception. Olff (1991), comparing the DMT with paper and pencil measures
of defensiveness, found that there were virtually no correlations between the
two kinds of measures. She suggested that the DMT may be measuring
'primary defence', while the latter measure 'secondary defence'. On the face of
it this sounds similar to Stanford's implicit and explicit subliminal perception
ideas. However, in the sense that the DMT requires explicit cognitive effort
from participants to report their perceptual experiences, I would agree with
Stanford's description of the DMT as an explicit measure (perhaps paper and
pencil measures should be regarded as 'tertiary').
Were it possible, the DMT would probably be the ideal measure for
comparison with Pandora's Box for the relationship of both to implicit and
explicit ESP; one would predict that the DMT-explicit ESP correlation would
be stronger than the DMT-implicit ESP correlation, while the converse would
apply for the Pandora's Box measure of defensiveness. As was pointed out in
chapter 2, however, to administer and score the DMT requires extensive
training which I have not had, so regrettably another more convenient
('tertiary') measure of defensiveness must be used. Experiment 4's results
with Byrne's Repression-Sensitization questionnaire (Byrne, 1961; Byrne,
Barry, & Nelson, 1963) suggested that there might be problems of external
validity with this instrument. Perhaps recent developments in the psychology
of personality might suggest a possible paper and pencil measure?
In the past few years, there has emerged some consensus among personality
psychologists that both natural language personality descriptors and a wide
variety of personality questionnaires all point to a five-factor model of
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personality (e.g. John, 1990; Digman, 1990). These 'Big Five' factors have been
variously labelled, but the terms used by the NEO-PI-R, probably the most
widely used personality inventory based on the five factor model of
personality, are: Neuroticism; Extraversion; Openness; Agreeableness; and
Conscientiousness (Costa & McCrae, 1992).
The experiments reported in this thesis suggest that Eysenck's Neuroticism
correlates quite consistently with perceptual defensiveness, and Costa &
McCrae's Neuroticism has been shown to correlate highly with Eysenck's
Neuroticism. The NEO-PI-R manual cites a study examining relations
between NEOAC and three sets of measures of defense mechanisms (Costa,
Zonderman, & McCrae, 1991). This study found 'N was related to measures
of regression, displacement, doubt, and maladaptive action patterns,
confirming the association of N with poor coping styles' (Costa & McCrae,
1992); this finding provides some support for the notion that Pandora's Box
may be an indicator of perceptual defensiveness, and it also indirectly
supports the DMT research cited in chapter 2 that suggests an increased
likelihood of accidents among deep sea divers, parachutists, and pilots who
have relatively high defensiveness scores.
The NEO-PI-R characterises the broad domain of Openness into 6 facets:
Fantasy; Aesthetics; Feelings; Actions; Ideas; Values. On the face of it,
Openness on these dimensions might be related to lack of defensiveness.
There has been little research on this question so far. The study by Costa,
Zonderman & McCrae found that O was positively related to adaptive
defences and A was negatively related to image-distorting defenses (or
superiority), as measured by the Defense Style Questionnaire. Possibly,
adaptive defences would equate with perceptual vigilance?
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At the time of planning experiment 7, only the Openness scale was available
for my use; so it was decided to include this scale with the readily available
scale for Eysenck's E and N as an exploratory personality measure in
experiment 7. Although one could not make a strong argument that openness
equals perceptual vigilance, the possibility is intriguing and well worth
investigation. Therefore, the 'explicit' measure of defensiveness/vigilance in
experiment 7 would be Costa & McCrae's Openness.
Following Stanford's line of reasoning, then, one would predict a stronger
correlation between Openness and forced choice (or explicit) ESP than
between Openness and unconscious (or implicit) ESP; and, conversely, one
would predict a stronger correlation between (implicit) perceptual
defensiveness (as measured by the 'Pandora's Box' subliminal perception
measure) and unconscious ESP, than between perceptual defensiveness and
forced choice ESP. Acknowledging that there is some doubt over the
relationship between Openness and defensiveness/vigilance, this aspect of
the experiment will be purely exploratory. However, given the emergence of
the 'Big Five' model of personality and the NEO-PI-R as major influences in
contemporary personality psychology, it is certainly worthwhile to explore
the relationship between Openness, perceptual defensiveness/vigilance, and
ESP performance, as the NEO-PI-R is a questionnaire that parapsychologists
may readily use and whose use may encourage links between
parapsychology and psychology.
For purposes of replication and later meta-analysis, the design and procedure
of the present study will be quite similar to my previous studies, especially
experiment 4, which focused on forced choice ESP performance as it related
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to perceptual defence/vigilance. The main methodological change, as argued
for in chapter 8, will be to double the number of different slides used, and
halve the number of times each is shown. Also, there are several reasons for
adopting a clairvoyance design for the present study: 1. it is more convenient
and secure to have no sender; 2. my most impressive ESP results so far have
been using a clairvoyance design (albeit with experienced participants); 3.
anecdotally, it seemed that having a sender might introduce a possible source
of noise in the participant's judgement of whether or not a target was
negatively emotional - in some cases the sender found a target bland or even
humorous and therefore had difficulty sending it as a negative emotional
target, while the participant found it quite disturbing when they later viewed
it - a clairvoyance design would remove this possible source of confusion;
that is, the sender may also play a direct psychic role in the experiment; 4. in
Palmer's reviews of psi scoring and neuroticism, he finds the clearest negative
relationship between neuroticism and intentional ESP performance in studies
that involve individual testing and a clairvoyance design (Palmer, 1977,1978,
1982). Stanford (1990) suggests this may be due to an individual participant
feeling more responsibility, more ego-involvement, in this sort of design:
it seems plausible that this kind of situation would be precisely
the kind of thing...that would favour neurotic manifestations: a
clear focus of reponsibility and attention on the performer. But
while these patterns seem reasonably clear for conscious,
intentional ESP tasks, information is lacking about
nonintentional tasks, (p.151)
Kreitler & Kreitler (1990) point out that 'more theoretically oriented
discussions of repression emphasize favorably its status as a major element of
a neurotic personality style' (p.559), and defensiveness appears to be an
important factor in repression (defined by Weinberger et al., 1979, as low
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anxiety, high defensiveness). Therefore, it would appear that using a
clairvoyance design might increase the chances of the experimental situation
arousing signs of defensiveness in participants.
To increase the statistical power of the study, data will be gathered from a
greater number of participants than before. Experiment 4 showed a stronger
defensiveness-psi correlation for those 'criterion' participants whose
subjective awareness thresholds for subliminally presented negative
emotional slides were either highest (=perceptual defence) or lowest
(=perceptual vigilance) compared to the other stimulus categories. It was
decided to continue to focus the main defensiveness-psi analysis on criterion
participants, and to terminate the experiment when data had been gathered
from at least 15 defensive and/or 15 vigilant individuals (i.e. if there were 16
vigilant individuals and only 10 defensive, the study would continue until
there were at least 15 defensive, even if the number of vigilant individuals
increased further).
Method
Participants. Volunteer participants, who had not previously taken part in
one of my studies, were invited to participate. Many of these participants had
contacted the parapsychology unit out of their interest in the subject, or had
attended talks by staff members of the unit. These individuals had each filled
out a Participant Information Form (that included some 'sheep-goat' questions
and some questions relevant to mental health) and they were sent a letter
describing the nature of the study (though, as usual, not revealing critical
details of the design and hypotheses). This letter was followed-up by a
phone-call that answered any questions the volunteers might have and that
260
arranged a time for their first session if they wished to participate. Also,
because there were not enough participants in the pool of volunteers who had
not previously participated in a study with Pandora's Box, those who took
part in this study were encouraged to invite any interested friends or family
to participate, and new participants were recruited this way. When a new
name was passed on to me, I wrote to the potential volunteer enclosing
details of the study and a PIF form for completion and return. When the PIF
form had been completed then the volunteers were telephoned, any questions
answered, and a time for the first session was scheduled. Thus the
participants in this study were from a slightly different subject population
than in experiments 1 to 6 (some of whom were friends and colleagues, but
most of whom were 'self-selected' volunteers); those who were contacted by
word of mouth in this study, while open-minded about parapsychology,
would probably not have been sufficiently motivated or curious to volunteer
for experiments on their own initiative.
Overview ofprocedure
The procedure was quite similar to that of my previous studies, so only the
procedural changes will be emphasised. Perceptual defence/vigilance was
tested in session 1, with the procedure modified as already noted
(principally, double the number of stimulus slides, each shown only twice, to
give 64 exposures in total). Participants were given a questionnaire measure
of Eysenck's Neuroticism and Extraversion, and Costa & McCrae's Openness,
to complete at home before returning in about a week to do session 2. As
before, the ESP session took two measures of ESP: 'implicit' or unconscious
ESP and 'explicit' or forced choice ESP. For the former ESP measure,
participants were not informed that the measure might reflect ESP
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performance; they were told that the measure was simply to provide a 'base¬
line' for comparison with the overall level of brightness scoring recorded in
session 1. As an exploratory measure, participants would be timed as they
responded to the ESP targets, to see whether successful ESP performance was
related to the length of time taken (for instance, it has been suggested that
'spontaneity' is conducive to ESP; this would presumably be reflected in
briefer ESP sessions). There would be no sender for the ESP session. After all
ESP targets had been responded to, the experimenter and participant viewed
the targets, and the participant judged each of the 12 emotional targets on his
or her individual emotional reactions to the picture (using the same scale as
in previous studies). Only after participants had rated the pictures for
emotionality were they informed whether or not they had a 'hit' on that
target, so their emotionality impressions would not be influenced by their
success with the target. The session then ended. Once all data had been
collected and analysed, each participant received a letter detailing the main
findings of the study, their personal scores, and how to interpret these (e.g.,
care was taken to explain that high neuroticism scores were quite 'normal'
and not indicative of a need for professional help).
Measure ofPerceptual DefencefVigilance
The apparatus for this experiment was identical to that used in experiments 1
to 6. There were 4 categories of stimuli: 8 'Neutral' slides; 8 'Neutral Control'
slides; 8 'Emotional' slides and 8 'Emotional Control' slides. Appendix 6
shows the full set of stimuli used for this experiment. Each slide was shown
twice. The 8 E slides had been previously rated for emotionality by the 18
participants in experiment 6, mean rating 5.68, SD-0.356. The mean
emotionality rating for experiments 1 and 2 had been 5.981 (using 8 E slides
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shown twice each), and that for experiments 3, 4, & 5 was 6.16 (using 4 E
slides shown four times each). Thus according to the ratings of participants in
experiment 6, the stimuli for the present study are slightly less emotional than
in previous studies. This is not because some more emotional stimuli were
dropped from the pool for the present study; more likely, it is because the
participants in experiment 6 included some friends and colleagues who had
previously seen (and presumably were more familiar with) some of the
emotional slides; also, experiment 6 did not include an ESP-testing session, so
participants in experiment 6 rated the stimuli in a slightly different context
than previously.
The defensiveness testing sequence was as follows: 1 demo slide, 5 practice
slides, 17 experimental slides, short break, 17 experimental slides, longer
break, 17 experimental slides, short break, 17 experimental slides, end. It will
be noted that this gives more than 64 experimental slides. This is because of a
methodological alteration, whereby the first of each run of experimental
slides was actually a meaningless 'dummy' slide (with each of the 4 'dummy'
slides being identical). It had been observed in previous experiments that
after their breaks participants took a little time to 'settle down' to their usual
level of responding: there was a tendency for the first slide after a break to
have a higher than average brightness score. Because each participant
responded to a unique random slide order, this would not have
systematically biased results, but it might introduce some extraneous noise.
To remove this potential source of noise, then, the first slide of each run was
not counted in the analysis, though participants were not aware of this.
Another methodological alteration was to remove the second set of practice
slides at the half-way point; this had been a 'hangover' from the early
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experiments where defensiveness was tested over two short sessions rather
than the one longer session used now, and it was no longer considered to
contribute anything to the design.
At the conclusion of the defensiveness testing, participants were asked if they
had seen anything on the slides, and then they were shown some of the slides
(one each of the emotional, emotional control, neutral, and neutral control
slides) and the full rationale for the measure was explained.
ESP testing session
This was very similar to the previous experiments, with a few exceptions that
will be noted below. This would be a clairvoyance study, so there was no
sender. As most participants would feel more confident of success with a
sender than without, some time was taken at the outset of the session to
explain to participants the advantages of not having a sender, and the
successful results already obtained this way. Also, by way of establishing a
symbolic link with the room where the targets were located (a link which
would normally be provided by a sender), participants were invited to light a
candle in the target room, which would stay lit until the ESP testing was over
(some participants remarked afterwards that the candle had been included in
their imagery strategies for 'reaching' the target). Earlier it was said that a -~
clairvoyance design was adopted because this might induce more ego-
involvement (and possibly more stress) than a telepathy design. However,
could having a candle diminish this ego-involvement and stress? It was felt
that the candle might help the participant feel more comfortable with no
sender, but it was nevertheless felt that participants were conscious that they
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were solely responsible for their ESP impressions, so ego-involvement and a
certain degree of stress remained.
As before, there were 24 ESP targets, in a different pseudorandom order for
each participant, and both the experimenter and the participant remained
blind as to target order until after the participant's ESP impressions had been
recorded. The targets consisted of 12 neutral (identical drawings of a simple
rectangle) and 12 emotional (the 8 simple drawings as used in session 1, plus
4 more complex pictures and photographs, the same complex targets as used
in experiments 4 and 5).
The participant sat at Pandora's Box. The stimuli to be projected in the box
began with 1 demo and 5 practice slides, followed by two sets of 12 identical
blank slides, that synchronised with the presentation of the ESP slides in the
target room. The layout of the ESP target room and the experimenter and
participant's room was as previously described in chapter 6, and as depicted
in figure 6.1 in that chapter, with the exception that there was no sender in
the ESP target room, and the ESP target room was locked. As before,
participants did two ESP measures. The first, 'implicit' or unconscious ESP
measure, consisted of participants registering their subjective awareness
thresholds for a blank slide while a target slide was being simultaneously
projected in the target room. Participants were not aware that this was an ESP
measure, having been told that it was merely to provide a 'base-line' of their
brightness scores for comparison to the previous week's session. Following
their response to each blank slide, participants were directed to think about
the ESP target slide displayed in the target room. Participants then stated
whether they thought the target was emotional or neutral, and whether they
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had a feeling/impression about the slide, or whether they were just guessing;
this was the 'explicit' forced choice ESP measure.
The session ended with target emotionality ratings, feedback on hits, and
further discussion about the session.
Only once the two sessions had been completed did the experimenter look at
each participant's subliminal and personality data, thus keeping the
experimenter and the participant blind during the ESP test of the participant's
other scores.
Predictions
1. Defensiveness-psi relationship. Based on the findings of the previous
studies, the main predictions of this study were concerned with the
relationship between perceptual defence/vigilance and both implicit and
explicit measures of ESP, where it was predicted that perceptual vigilance
would tend to be associated with relatively high ESP scores (and that the
correlations for the control subliminal slides would be relatively small and
statistically nonsignificant). Following on the implications of Stanford's
theoretical assumptions, a subsidiary prediction was that the
defensiveness/vigilance-ESP correlation would be stronger for the implicit
ESP measure than for the explicit measure (since Pandora's Box was regarded
as an implicit subliminal perception measure). It was not, however, expected
that the difference between these correlations would be statistically
significant given the anticipated small effect size and consequent low
statistical power of this aspect of the study.
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2. Defensiveness-neuroticism relationship. Another main prediction, based on
the consistent findings of the previous experiments in this thesis, and based
on the assumption, justified earlier, that one would expect neuroticism to
correlate with defensiveness, was that the relationship between defensiveness
and neuroticism would again be found.
3. Forced choice ESP scoring pattern. As suggested by trends seen in
experiment 4, that were confirmed in experiment 5, it was predicted that calls
which participants described as 'impressions' would score more highly than
'guesses', and that among the emotional targets, scoring would be higher for
the 4 'complex' targets than for the 8 'simple' targets.
Exploratory Analyses
The ratio measure of defensiveness/vigilance would be calculated and
correlated with ESP and neuroticism, as suggested in chapter 8. It was not
known what to expect for the relationship between Openness and perceptual
defence/vigilance and ESP. If Openness was regarded as an 'explicit' measure
of perceptual vigilance, following Stanford's rationale, then one would
tentatively predict a greater correlation between Openness and forced choice
('explicit') ESP than between Openness and implicit ESP.
As with experiment 4, all participants in this study had previously filled out
an extensive 'Participant Information Form', which enabled a 'sheep-goat'
score to be calculated, reflecting belief in psi; so this measure would be
related to the other personality and ESP measures. The PIF form would also
enable some description of the self-reported 'mental health' (as shown in
sleeping patterns and reported episodes of mental illness, for instance) of
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participants identified on the Pandora's Box measure as 'perceptually
defensive' and 'perceptually vigilant'. Table 6.4, in chapter 6, demonstrated
that perceptually defensive individuals tended to show fewer signs of mental
health than perceptually vigilant individuals. This study would enable some
further examination of this apparent trend with a greater number of
participants.
The relationship between length of time taken for the ESP session and ESP
performance would also be explored, as would sex differences in
defensiveness/vigilance and ESP performance. Other exploratory questions
might be suggested by the data.
Results
Seventy-seven individuals took part in this study, but the data of the last 2
was not included because their sessions were conducted after the requisite
number of defensive and vigilant participants had been obtained. Of the 75
participants, 44 were female, 31 male, mean age 37.6, range 16 to 74 years. Of
the criterion participants, 15 individuals were defensive (10 males, 5 females),
and 28 were vigilant (10 males, 18 females). As expected from my previous
findings, the 'sex by defensiveness/vigilance (Rank E)' distribution was
statistically significant (x2=8.397, 3df, p=.038). Notably, far more individuals
had brightness scores for E slides ranked 4 (= perceptually vigilant) than for
the other 3 ranks, and of these vigilant individuals, there was an excess of
females. The 'excess of vigilant females' pattern echoes that found for the
criterion participants in experiment 4: there were 10 defensive participants (3
males, 7 females) and 14 vigilant participants (2 males, 12 females). Taken
together, these results suggest that, as discussed in chapter 6, sex differences
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in defensiveness and vigilance may be an important factor to be taken into
consideration in experiments of this nature. One cannot at this stage,
however, say whether these results are supportive of the hypothesis (Brown,
1961; Wagstaff, 1974a, 1974b) described in chapter 6 that males and females
differ in their defensive response, with males showing a linear increase in
threshold with an increase in stimulus emotionality and females showing a
curvilinear response, with thresholds increasing at first, and then decreasing
as stimulus emotionality increases. Further research on this question of sex
differences in characteristic defensive response would need to vary
systematically the degree of emotionality of stimuli and observe how
perceptual thresholds varied concurrently. For the moment, however, one can
only say that there appear to be differences in the number of males and
females who show perceptual defensiveness and vigilance and that
parapsychologists ought to be aware of this apparent population trend when
conducting (and later generalising from) studies into defensiveness and psi.
As has been discussed earlier, the distribution of perceptually defensive and
perceptually vigilant individuals in the population (disregarding sex) is
apparently not well-established. I inferred from the emphasis in the literature
on the phenomenon of perceptual defence (i.e., raised thresholds to emotive
stimuli) that perceptual defence was found more frequently than perceptual
vigilance. If this is so, then the fact that the present study found almost
double the number of vigilant compared to defensive participants goes
against the usual population bias. However, my experiment 4 also found an
excess of vigilant over defensive individuals (14 vigilant, 10 defensive), so the
trend for the present study has been found before in this thesis (the trends for
the other experiments in this thesis are not included here because these
studies had, at the most, half the number of participants for experiment 4,
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and so imbalances in the number of defensive or vigilant individuals would
be quite likely to occur by chance alone).
The main analyses comparing defensiveness with ESP (Spearman correlation
coefficients) are calculated using the data of the 43 'criterion' individuals (that
is, the 15 defensive and 28 vigilant participants), though all participants' data
is included where appropriate for purposes of comparison. Also where
appropriate, the correlations are backed up with t-tests of the significance of
the difference in scoring between defensive and vigilant individuals.
Perceptual defence/vigilance and ESP
Spearman correlation coefficients were calculated for perceptual
defence/vigilance versus ESP; the results are shown in table 9.1. As can be
seen from the table, the prediction of a correlation between
V defensiveness/vigilance and forced choice ESP performance was significantly
supported (rs=.310, p<.025, 1-t, n=43), and a f-test of the difference in ESP
scoring between defensive and vigilant participants gave f=-2.077 (p=.02,1-t),
thus confirming the finding that perceptually defensive individuals tend to
score less highly on forced choice ESP than perceptually vigilant individuals.
As expected, the defensiveness-ESP correlation for all participants was lower
than for those participants whose brightness scores to the subliminally-
presented emotional slides were either highest (=defensive) or lowest
(=vigilant), though it was still statistically significant (rs=.198, p<.05,1-t). Also
as expected, the correlations for the emotional control slides were very small
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Table 9.1
Correlations (Spearman's rhoj between perceptual defensiveness/vigilance (rank E,
and rank EC for control purposes) and forced choice (explicit) ESP
Rank E Rank EC
Criterion Subjects .310 -.014
(n=43) (p<-025, 1-t)
All Subjects .198 .048
(n=75) (p<.05,1-t)
and nonsignificant. This finding therefore adds weight to the positive but
nonsignificant correlations between defensiveness/vigilance and psi that
were found in experiments 2, 3, and 4 with smaller numbers of participants
(and therefore less power to detect the defensiveness-psi effect, if it is real).
Turning briefly to the ratio measure of defensiveness explored in chapter 8
(E/[(EC+N+NC)/3] for the critical measure, and EC/[(E+N+NC)/3] for the
control correlation); for criterion participants the former ratio measure of
defensiveness gave rs=-.164 (a nonsignificant correlation in the direction
opposite to that expected), and for all participants the correlation was very
small (rs=-.093). For the 42 'control criterion' participants (whose mean
brightness scores for emotional control slides were ranked 1 or 4), the ratio
correlation was rs=.006, while for all participants the correlation was rs=.038.
Thus it would appear that the 'ratio' measure of defensiveness continues to be
less helpful as an indicator of a defensiveness-psi relationship than the basic
ranked mean brightness scores.
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Table 9.2
Correlations (Spearman's rho) between defensiveness/vigilance and implicit ESP
performance.









A second prediction was that perceptual defence/vigilance would correlate
with implicit or unconscious ESP performance, and the results for this
analysis are shown in table 9.2.
As the table shows, there is a significant correlation in the predicted direction
between implicit ESP and defensiveness (rs=.268, p<.05, 1-t), however a t-test
of the difference in ESP scoring betwen defensive and vigilant individuals is
nonsignificant (f=-.988), thus this correlation should be given less weight. As
expected, though, the implicit-ESP-defensiveness correlation for all
participants is smaller than that for the criterion participants (rs=.152); it is in
the expected direction, but is not statistically significant. For all partcipants
the control correlation is, as one would hope, tiny (rs=-.059), but that for the
criterion participants is larger than for the correlation with the critical
emotional slides (rs=-.295). This latter effect was not predicted (though
remember that the ranked brightness scores for EC slides are not completely
independent of the ranked brightness scores for the E slides), but it is
nonsignificant on a two-tailed measure of probability.
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Looking for interest at the ratio measures of defensiveness,
E/[(EC+N+NC)/3] correlated -.173 with implicit ESP for criterion
participants (in the expected direction, but not significantly so), and for all
participants the correlation was -.182 (again, nonsignificantly in the expected
direction). For the control ratio correlation, rs=-.022 for the 42 criterion
participants, and for all participants rs=-.034.
It will be recalled that, based on Stanford's ideas, I predicted implicit ESP to
correlate more highly with the (implicit) measure of defensiveness than
l
explicit (forced choice) ESP. In fact this prediction was not confirmed: the
defensiveness-forced choice ESP correlations were slightly higher than for the
implicit ESP measure.
A second (exploratory) measure that tied in with Stanford's line of reasoning
was the questionnaire measure of Openness, which was considered possibly
to represent an explicit measure of vigilance. The mean Openness scores was
182 (range 146 to 215; SD=15.7). In fact, for criterion participants Openness
correlated -.106 with perceptual defensiveness/vigilance (contrary to
expectations, the more defensive were the more Open), with the Ideas facet of
Openness giving the largest correlation (rs=-.381, p<.025, 2-t). For all
participants, Openness correlated -.126 with perceptual defensiveness/
vigilance, and again Ideas correlated most highly, at rs=-.262 (p<.05, 2-t).
These findings suggest that one cannot meaningfully relate Costa & McCrae's
Openness to perceptual defensiveness/vigilance as measured by Pandora's
Box. Given this, one would not be confident of finding that (explicit)
Openness correlated more highly with (explicit) forced choice ESP than with
implicit ESP. Table 9.3 shows the findings of this analysis: while the trend is
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Table 9.3
Correlations (Spearman's rho) between Openness and ESP measures
Explicit ESP Implicit ESP
Criterion Subjects'
Openness (n=43) .143 .044
All Subjects'
Openness (n=75) .106 .074
in the direction predicted by Stanford, none of the correlations is statistically
significant.
Perceptual defence/vigilance and neuroticism
The mean neuroticism score was 11 (range 1 to 21, SD=4.9). An important
prediction in this experiment was that, as had been found in my earlier
experiments, neuroticism would correlate significantly with perceptual
defensiveness/vigilance. Table 9.4 shows the outcome of this analysis: the
neuroticism-defensiveness prediction is confirmed, being statistically
— significant for all participants (rs=~.252, p<.025, 1-t); the control correlations
are lower than the critical correlations, and are not significant on a two-tailed
test (two-tailed tests are chosen for the control correlations because no
directional prediction is being made for these correlations). A t-test of the
difference in neuroticism scores between defensive and vigilant participants
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As the neuroticism-defensiveness correlation is one of the more consistent
and important (with respect to the validity of Pandora's Box) findings in this
thesis, it is interesting to see how the ratio measure of defensiveness
correlates with neuroticism. For criterion participants, the correlation is .082;
and for all participants it is significant, in the predicted direction: rs=. 194
(p<.05, 1-t). The 'control criterion' ratio correlates -.269 with
neuroticism (ns, 2-t), and -.254 for all participants (p<.05, 2-t). Given the size
of the control correlations, these findings suggest that the ranking method of
scoring is preferable to the ratio method, so far as demonstrating the
defensiveness-neuroticism correlation is concerned.
When participants were asked whether they could see anything on the slides
being shown in Pandora's Box, the vast majority reported no other visual
impressions. On the few occasions when visual images were reported
(usually vague blobs, blotches, shapes), participants were unable to identify
them or to relate them to the slides when they were later shown these. It can
therefore be considered acceptable to continue to describe the slide
presentations as 'subliminal'.
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Forced choice ESP results
These results are based on the data of all 75 participants. Predictions were
made primarily based on the results of experiment 4, which had the most
similar design to the present study.
None of the predicted ESP scoring patterns was found. Overall ESP scoring
was slightly negative (Z=-.306). It was predicted that scoring on calls
described as 'impressions' would be higher than for 'guesses'; in fact the
reverse was the case - for impressions Z=-.575, for guesses Z=.325. It was also
predicted that complex emotional targets would be associated with higher
ESP scoring than simple emotional targets. This prediction was discontinued,
with Z=-2.256 for complex targets (p=.02, 2-t) (i.e., significant psi-missing
occurred on the targets that, previously, had been associated with the highest
positive psi scoring), and Z=.450 for the simple targets. The one overall trend
that was in line with the findings of experiment 4 was that scoring was
negative for the emotional targets as a whole (Z=-.901) and positive for the
neutral targets (Z=.434). Recall, however, that there was a slight bias against
calling the target 'emotional' in experiment 4 (with 550 'emotional' calls and
595 'neutral' calls), so that there was a greater likelihood of higher scoring for
the neutral targets by chance alone in that experiment. In the present
experiment, there were 879 calls for emotional targets and 921 calls for
neutral targets; once again, therefore, there is a calling bias against emotional
targets that would contribute to lower scoring on these targets by chance
alone.
With the exception of the result for the complex emotional slides, none of
these forced choice ESP findings is statistically significant, so it would be
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unwise to go to greater lengths to try to justify them. To complete the picture
of reversal of experiment 4's ESP results, it was found that implicit or
unconscious ESP correlated -.117 with explicit or conscious ESP - contrary to
the expected direction! (Despite this, both implicit and explicit ESP measures
correlated significantly and in the predicted direction with performance on
the indicator of perceptual defence/vigilance.)
Table 9.5 gives the breakdown of forced choice ESP results for the criterion
participants. Again, none of these Z scores is statistically significant. Four of
the trends for this study agreed with those for study 4 (Overall ESP,
Impressions, emotional, and neutral targets), and the remaining 3 showed
different patterns from study 4 (in which vigilant individuals scored more
negatively than defensive individuals for guesses, both scored negatively for
simple targets and both scored positively for neutral targets). Note that one
would expect about 50% of the scoring patterns to be confirmed by chance
alone, so little weight should be given to these findings.
Table 9.5
Explicit (forced choice) ESP scoring (Z scores) for defensive and vigilant participants
Defensive Vigilant
Overall ESP -1.530 0.965
'Impressions' -1.219 0
'Guesses' -1.170 1.375
Emotional targets -1.528 -0.164
Neutral targets -0.509 1.584
Simple targets -0.642 0.335
Complex targets -1.692 -0.854
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Exploratory Questions
These exploratory analyses were calculated with the data of all 75
participants.
Personality measures. The mean extraversion score was 11.7 (range 2 to 21,
SD=4.6). Previous experiments showed few significant correlations between
Extraversion and other measures. This continued to be the case: extraversion
correlated .050 with forced choice ESP scoring, -.107 with unconscious ESP
scoring, -.145 with rank E slides (the critical defensiveness measure), and .198
with rank EC slides (the control defensiveness measure). Extraversion did,
however, correlate to a statistically significant degree with Openness (rs=.334,
p<.001, 2-t), and especially with the facets of Feelings (rs=.464) and Actions
(rs=.471).
Belief in ESP. Some interesting results were found for the sheep-goat measure
(of belief in psi) extracted from the Participant Information Form. The mean
sheep-goat score was 32.6 (SD=5.524), and scores ranged from 18 to 45 (with
high scores indicating 'sheepishness', that is, belief in and experience of psi).
There were only tiny correlations for the ESP measures (rs=.009 for explicit or
forced choice ESP; rs=.061 for implicit ESP). There were slight nonsignificant
tendencies for sheep to be more extraverted than goats (rs=.101) and for sheep
to be more neurotic than goats (rs=.198). As one might expect, sheep were,
however, significantly more Open than goats (rs=.241, p<.05, 2-t), especially
on the Ideas facet (rs=.255, p<.05, 2-t).
Older participants tended to be more believing of psi than the young (rs=.342,
p<.0005, 2-t). This finding is contrary to the conclusion of a recent
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comprehensive review of the empirical literature on belief in the paranormal
(Irwin, 1983), that: 'With the major exception of traditional religious beliefs,
most paranormal beliefs appear to be stronger in young adults than in elderly
people' (p.7). Perhaps differences in the populations sampled by the studies
reviewed by Irwin and the present study might explain this discrepancy: the
youngest participants in the present study were schoolchildren recruited at a
University Open Day when they visited the Psychology Department to learn
more about the topics taught in the department. Perhaps these pupils were
more 'science-minded' (and possibly therefore more skeptical of psi) than the
older participants (many of whom were employed in creative or artistic
endeavours).
Finally, on the forced choice ESP measure, experiment 4 had found that,
although they did not score differently on ESP, sheep tended to identify more
of their calls as 'impressions' than goats, whereas goats tended to call more
'guesses' than sheep. This study found the same pattern: rs=.244 (p<.05, 2-t)
for the former; and rs=-.420 (p<.0005, 2-t) for the latter comparison.
Time taken for ESP trials. It will be recalled that one new measure introduced
for this study was of the time taken to complete the ESP trials. The shortest
time was just over 5 minutes, the longest was just over 23 minutes, but
around 10 minutes was average. It was found that time correlated .109 with
forced choice ESP scores (so those who took longer scored better), and there
was a significant correlation between time taken and unconscious ESP
(rs=.269, p<.002,2-t; again, those who took longer did better).
This interesting finding suggests that, if speed reflects spontaneity, then in
this particular experiment, contrary to parapsychological lore, spontaneity
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did not appear to facilitate ESP performance. However, speed might relate to
other factors as well, that cannot be excluded at this point. For instance, one
might expect the more relaxed participant to respond more slowly than a
relatively alert or nervous participant. Also, a flippant or bored participant
might go through the ESP session more rapidly than one who was seriously
trying to do well. 'Longer' does not simply equal 'better' in this study, since
time taken also correlated significantly with age (rs=.279, p<.002, 2-t): there
was a tendency for older participants to take longer (and age was negatively
correlated with forced choice ESP (rs=-.105), and positively correlated with
implicit or unconscious ESP (rs=.201, ns). That is, the older participants
tended to take longer over their ESP session, and to do better at unconscious
ESP, than the young.
Sex differences. Apart from the relatively large number of vigilant females
already noted, there were no significant sex differences on the main measures
taken in this study (neuroticism, extraversion, openness, belief in ESP, and
explicit and implicit ESP performance). For the purposes of comparison with
the data reported in experiment 4, however, table 9.6 gives a breakdown of
basic forced choice ESP performance for male and female participants.
Table 9.6
Forced choice ESP performance (Z scores) for male andfemale participants
Male Female






In terms of who had the highest scores, all of the trends reported for
experiment 4 were reversed in the present study, and as none of these is
significant, there will be no further attempt to justify or explain these scores.
Target Emotionality Ratings. It will be recalled that all participants in this study
rated the emotional ESP targets on degree of emotionality prior to receiving
feedback on ESP performance. Similar data had been gathered from
participants in experiment 5 and preliminary measures suggested that there
were no signs that degree of target emotionality was related to ESP scoring
success (rather, that the higher scoring for the complex targets was associated
with their greater visual complexity). This study had a far greater number of
participants, though, which enables one to be more confident about any such
findings. The mean emotionality rating for all 75 participants and all 12
emotional slides was 5.62; thus on the whole participants in this study found
the emotional slides to be slightly more emotional than participants in
experiment 5. The simple emotional slides received a mean rating of 5.58 and
the mean rating for the complex emotional slides was 5.69; therefore, as in
experiment 5, on the whole participants found the complex slides to be
slightly more emotional than the simple slides.
To investigate further the question of how degree of emotionality relates to
ESP scoring, the number of hits were calculated for the three targets receiving
the highest emotionality ratings (2 complex, 1 simple, mean rating 6.11) and
the three targets with relatively low emotionality ratings (2 complex, 1
simple, mean rating 5.08). The high emotionality targets had 94 hits,
compared with 109 hits for the low emotionality targets. Thus there is a slight
trend towards lower scoring for the more emotional targets (controlling for
target complexity), but this is not statistically significant (f=1.521, 74df,
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p-. 133). Experiment 5 also found no significant difference in scoring for
selected high and low emotional targets. However, no conclusions may be
made at this stage on the advisability of using emotional pictures as ESP
targets, since it is possible that in both studies there was insufficient
difference in the mean emotionality ratings for the high and low emotional
targets for the effects of emotionality to reveal themselves in the data. The
nature of the neutral ESP targets in these studies (identical drawings of a
rectangle) means that they cannot readily be compared with the emotional
targets, because other factors such as informational complexity are not held
constant.
Summary and Conclusions
This study had two broad aims: 1. to conduct a conceptual replication of the
DMT-ESP studies, to replicate to a statistically significant degree the
encouraging signs of a perceptual defence/vigilance-ESP relationship seen in
my earlier studies, and to replicate the statistically significant defensiveness-
neuroticism relationship that was found in my previous studies; 2. to examine
the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of defensiveness and
ESP, in the light of Stanford's theoretical ideas.
The increased statistical power of this study was perhaps one factor that
enabled the first aim to be met successfully. The significant relationship
between apparent perceptual defensiveness/vigilance (as measured by
subjective brightness judgements for subliminally-presented emotional
slides) and ESP performance thus confirms the relatively consistent but
nonsignificant trends seen in my earlier studies to be real rather than chance
effects. The significant defensiveness-neuroticism relationship (rs=-.252,
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p<.025, 1-t, n-75), though of a smaller magnitude than in experiment 4
(rs=~.381, p<.01, 2-t, n=48) also supports the notion that the novel 'Pandora's
Box' methodology developed in this thesis has some validity, and that it may
be measuring some aspect of coping with stress or anxiety aroused by the
subliminally-presented emotional stimuli.
Chapter 6 included some descriptive information on self-reported 'mental
health' questions (from the Participant Information Form) (see table 6.4),
contrasting 'perceptually defensive' individuals' responses to those of
'perceptually vigilant' individuals. It was found that, for experiment 4, there
was a distinct tendency for defensive participants to show fewer signs of
mental health than vigilant participants (indicated by the greater use of
'calming' mental disciplines, sleep disturbances, and self-reported 'mental
disorder' for the former participants). This trend could indicate the external
validity of the Pandora's Box measure of perceptual defence /vigilance;
though the trend could also have reflected the higher degrees of neuroticism
that were found for the perceptually defensive participants compared to the
vigilant participants. Because all participants in the present study also
completed a Participant Information Form, it was possible to look again at the
relationship between defensiveness/vigilance and mental health; table 9.7
summarises the findings for this study; the findings for study 4 are given in
brackets for comparison.
The table shows that this study confirms the trend found in experiment 4:
there were fewer signs of mental health in perceptually defensive individuals
than in perceptually vigilant individuals. Overall, for both the present study
and study 4, this trend was in the expected direction for all 12 comparisons.
Comparing this study's figures with those of experiment 4, however, it can be
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Table 9.7
A summary of responses to PIF questions related to mental health, for 'perceptually
defensive' and 'perceptually vigilant' participants in experiment 7 (details of each
question are given below the table); the figures for experiment 4 are given in
brackets, for comparison.
Mental Formal Self- Regular Hours of Enough Mental
Discipline? Improvement? Sleep? Sleep Sleep? Disorder?
(%'yes') (%'yes1) (%'yes') (mean) (%'yes') (%'yes')
•Perceptually 73(89) 20(67) 53(67) 7.02 (7.2) 47 (67) 7(22)
Defensive'
'Perceptually 61 (57) 5 (14) 54 (79) 7.241 (7.3) 57 (77) 0 (7)
Vigilant'
1 This figure excludes the response of one participant who said he slept around 12 hours
with 'a break at 6 hours'; it was not clear how long a break he had.
The 'mental discipline' question was: 'Have you ever practised any form of mental discipline/exercise, e.g.
meditation, biofeedback, hypnosis, relaxation exercises?' The 'self-improvement' question was: 'Have you ever taken
part in a formal self-improvement program such as TM, psychotherapy, etc?' The 3 'sleep' questions were: 'Do you
have regular sleep habits?'; 'On average how many hours a night do you sleep?'; 'Do you usually feel you get enough
sleep?'. The 'mental disorder' question was: 'Occasionally our research might require our having some information
about various medical problems. Please tick any of the following of which you have had experience in the indicated
period' (the 'mental disorder' option was embedded among others such as 'heart trouble' and high blood pressure').
seen that overall scores are lower for the present study, suggesting overall
higher mental health for the defensive and vigilant participants in this study
compared to experiment 4. It has already been noted how the population of
participants in this study differed from those in experiment 4, because some
of the participants in the present study were friends, family, and colleagues
of individuals who had volunteered on their own initiative for experiments.
In experiment 4, however, all participants volunteered on their own initiative,
based on their curiosity in and experience of psi (the mean sheep-goat score
in experiment 4 was 34 (range 22 to 47.5), compared to a mean score of 32.5
(range 18 to 5) for experiment 7; thus the participants in the present study
were slightly less 'sheepish' than those in experiment 4). Perhaps the different
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subject population for this study can account for the overall improved
indications of mental health compared to experiment 4.
In chapter 6, it was also noted that defensive participants had considerably
higher neuroticism scores than vigilant participants (mean neuroticism scores
were 15 (SD=6.2) for the former, 7.6 (SD=3.8) for the latter group), and that
this might at least partially account for the apparently higher mental health of
the perceptually vigilant participants, since defensiveness/vigilance had been
found to correlate with neuroticism. In the present study, the mean
neuroticism score for the defensive participants was 12.1 (SD=5.1), while for
vigilant participants the mean neuroticism score was 9.1 (SD=4.3). Therefore
the criterion participants (i.e. those who were identified as perceptually
defensive or vigilant on Pandora's Box) in experiment 7 had on the whole
more moderate neuroticism scores than did those participants in experiment
4. This may account for the smaller magnitude of the defensiveness-
neuroticism correlation in the present study (rs=-.252, p<.025, 1-t, n=75)
compared to experiment 4 (rs=-.381, p<.01, 2-t). The fact that the
defensiveness-neuroticism correlation is nevertheless statistically significant
in the present study, and that there still appear to be meaningful differences
between 'defensive' and 'vigilant' participants on self-reported measures that
may relate to mental health, is an encouraging sign that there is some validity
to the prototype indicator being developed in this thesis. This study therefore
v continues to suggest that Pandora's Box shows some promise as an indicator
of perceptual defensiveness/vigilance in its own right, and as a tool for
V enabling parapsychologists to explore the defensiveness-psi relationship in
. V
more detail. At this stage, however, I feel that the evidence of the 'validity' of
) Pandora's Box as a measure of perceptual defensiveness/vigilance is mostly
n'circumstantial'; if this prototype indicator were to be taken seriously by
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psychologists and parapsychologists, much more time and effort would need
to be devoted to systematic testing, for instance to establish population
norms, and relationships with other measures of perceptual defence and the
major personality dimensions.
The second aim of experiment 7 was to consider more fully, the theoretical
aspect of the relationship between different, implicit and explicit, measures of
defensiveness/vigilance and psi. To this end, this study enabled a
preliminary exploration of Stanford's ideas (1990), that 'implicit' measures of
ESP and perceptual defensiveness would correlate more highly with each
other than with 'explicit' measures, and that, conversely, 'explicit' measures of
ESP and defensiveness would correlate more highly with each other than
with 'implicit' measures. Post hoc examinations of the data of experiment 4
had found some support for these ideas. It was argued that the measure of
perceptual defence/vigilance was 'implicit', as was the unconscious ESP
measure, and that the forced choice ESP task was 'explicit'. It was also
tentatively suggested that the questionnaire measure of Openness was an
'explicit' indicator of perceptual vigilance. Contrary to expectations, in this
experiment the implicit measure of defensiveness correlated more highly
with the explicit measure of ESP than with the implicit ESP measure. As
predicted, however, the possible 'explicit measure of defensiveness'
(Openness) did correlate more highly with explicit ESP than with implicit
ESP, though none of these latter correlations is statistically significant. These
findings, while not conclusive in themselves, suggest that the methodology
used in the experiments in this thesis may lend itself to further examination
of theoretical questions concerning the relationship between different
measures of ESP and defensiveness.
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The final chapter of this thesis synthesises, where possible, the main findings
of the 7 experiments that have been conducted, and suggests directions for
future research.
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Chapter 10. Summary, conclusions,
and future directions.
The links between defensiveness and psi have been thought by many
parapsychologists to reside in the common operation of unconscious
processes on weak information. For subliminal perception, the weak
information is sensory in origin; for extrasensory perception, by definition,
attempts are made to exclude the operation of the known senses in perceiving
the target information. Based on a model that psi information enters the
organism initially at an unconscious level and then emerges in consciousness,
however, individuals' attitudes, personality, and characteristic modes of
defensive responding may similarly operate to transform or distort both
subliminal and extrasensory perceptions.
Resting on these assumptions, then, the aims of this thesis were: to develop a
simple yet effective methodology for measuring perceptual defence/
vigilance; to contribute to the study of the defensiveness-psi relationship by
conducting a conceptual replication of the DMT-ESP studies; and to explore
the process-related questions of how personality and ESP target nature
correlate with psi scoring.
Summary and Main Findings
1. Defensiveness and psi.
A meta-analysis and a review of relevant literature (chapter 2) suggested the
need for replication of the DMT-ESP studies, but pointed out difficulties with
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the use of the DMT. A consideration of several existing indicators of
perceptual defence/vigilance (chapter 3) concluded that none was ideally
suited to the aims of the thesis, so a prototype indicator of perceptual
defence/vigilance, named Pandora's Box, was developed (chapter 4). After
initial development of this methodology, seven experiments were carried out.
These experiments continued to refine the Pandora's Box methodology
(chapter 5, experiments 1, 2, & 3), as well as enabling the comparison of
apparent perceptual defence/vigilance with four different psi measures: free-
response ESP (before and after training with various mental exercises)
(chapter 5, experiment 2; chapter 7, experiment 5), forced choice and
'unconscious ESP' (chapter 6, experiment 4; chapter 9, experiment 7), and PK
(chapter 5, experiment 3).
While the picture for free-response ESP before and after training was unclear,
perceptual defence/vigilance was found to relate in the predicted fashion
with PK, unconscious ESP, and most consistently with forced choice ESP.
These experiments, therefore, conceptually replicate the findings of the DMT-
ESP studies.
Using the same techniques of meta-analysis of correlation coefficients
reported in chapter 2, one can combine the defensiveness-ESP results of the
two most comparable studies in this thesis, experiments 4 and 7, which were
the only two studies to take measures of forced choice (or 'conscious' or
explicit) ESP and unconscious (or implicit) ESP. The criterion participants
were those who apparently showed the strongest signs of perceptual defence
or vigilance, and who would therefore be expected to show stronger
defensiveness-psi correlations than other participants. Recall that the forced
choice ESP measure was to ask participants to identify the nature of each of
289
24 target slides (12 emotional, 12 neutral) that were projected in a nearby
room; the 'unconscious ESP' measure, which was taken before the forced
choice ESP measure, asked participants to indicate the moment when they
became aware of a gradually brightening blank slide, within the Pandora's
Box apparatus, while simultaneously an emotional or a neutral target slide
was projected in a nearby room.
The results of this meta-analysis are shown in table 10.1, where a positive
correlation for Rank E slides represents a correlation in the predicted
direction: that perceptually vigilant individuals scored relatively well at ESP,
and perceptually defensive individuals scored relatively poorly at ESP; one
would not predict a correlation for the EC slides.
The table compares the defensiveness and ESP scores for all participants and
for criterion participants. As expected, the defensiveness-ESP correlations are
in the predicted direction and are highest for the criterion participants. It is
curious to note that one of the correlations for the Emotional Control slides is
also statistically significant; this can partly be explained by the fact that the
rank of EC slides is not independent of the rank of E slides (and vice versa),
so that a positive correlation for E slides would tend to be reflected in a
negative correlation for EC slides. One would, however, expect the Rank EC-
defensiveness correlation to be smaller than that for the critical Emotional




Meta-analysis of the correlation (Spearman's rho) between perceptual
defence/vigilance and forced choice (conscious) ESP and unconscious ESP
performancefor experiments 4 and 7.




vs Rank E .27 2.16 .0152 .02 .48
Rank EC -.03 .26 .6016 -.28 .21
Unconscious ESP
vs Rank E .26 2.09 .0184 .01 .47
Rank EC -.33 2.69 .0072 -.08 -.52.
All Participants (n=123)
Forced choice ESP
vs Rank E .18 1.96 .0250 .00 .35
Rank EC .07 .81 .4186 -.11 .25
Unconscious ESP
vs Rank E .19 2.11 .0173 .01 .36
Rank EC -.16 1.80 .0724 .02 -.33
1 Because the experimental hypotheses for Emotional slides were directional, the p values
associated with these slides are one-tailed; there was expected to be no relationship between
defensiveness and psi for the Emotional Control slides, so the p values associated with these
slides are two-tailed.
2. Individual differences and defensiveness.
The psi and defensiveness measures were also related to personality factors
(Neuroticism, Extraversion, 'Repression-Sensitization', and Openness),
attitudes (belief in psi), and participants' age and sex. The most consistent
finding here was that neuroticism correlated with perceptual defensiveness,
as one might expect if defensiveness and neuroticism were both considered to
reflect maladaptive responses to stress (as has been suggested by Costa &
McCrae, 1992). The neuroticism-defensiveness correlation is important,
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therefore, because it may provide some indication of the construct validity of
the prototype indicator of perceptual defence/vigilance. Although it is
encouraging to find a defensiveness-psz correlation as predicted, very little is
as yet known about psi; neuroticism, on the other hand, is a well-established
major personality factor, so to find a defensiveness-neuroticism relationship
provides some evidence that the Pandora's Box methodology may be
measuring something that is related to neuroticism.
A meta-analysis was conducted to combine the neuroticism-defensiveness
data of experiments 4 and 7; the results are presented in table 10.2 (with the
sign of the correlations adjusted for ease of comparison with table 10.1, so
that a positive correlation between neuroticism and E slides indicates a
correlation in the predicted direction (that more defensive individuals would
be more neurotic)). As the table shows, neuroticism correlated with
perceptual defensiveness to a highly significant degree, and in the predicted
direction. The neuroticism measure was also given to the 7 participants in
experiment 2, but this data is not included in the table because there was no
attempt to differentiate between criterion and other participants in
experiment 2. However, if one includes the neuroticism-defensiveness data
from experiment 2 (r§=.145 for E slides, rs=.154 for EC slides, n=7) in the data
for all participants (total n=130), the neuroticism-defensiveness correlation
(i.e., for responses to E slides) is unchanged, at rs=.30, Z=3.38, p=.0004 (1-t);
the 95% confidence interval drops slightly from that shown in table 10.2 (.12
to .45) to from .12 to .44. For responses to EC slides, the correlation drops
slightly from that shown in table 10.2 (rs=-.22) to rs=-.20, Z=2.28, p=.0228 (2-t),
and the 95%ci is, as one would expect, lower as well, from -.03 to -.36. Thus,
adding the data of experiment 2 has little effect on the overall neuroticism-
defensiveness correlation, and slightly lowers the neuroticism-control slides
292
correlation (as one would expect, since the prediction is for no systematic
relationship between responses to the control slides and neuroticism).
In fact, for the studies in this thesis the neuroticism-defensiveness correlation
was higher than the ESP-defensiveness correlation. This is perhaps not
surprising since presumably neuroticism and defensiveness/vigilance
manifest in individuals more reliably than ESP talents. This finding supports
the notion that Pandora's Box may indeed be able to measure individuals'
characteristic coping reactions to subliminally-exposed stressful or
emotionally arousing stimuli. Considerable progress has thus been made
towards another major aim of the thesis, to develop a simple indicator of
Table 10.2
Meta-analysis of perceptual defence/vigilance and neuroticism correlations
(Spearman's rho) from experiments 4 and 7.
























1 Because the experimental hypotheses for Emotional slides were directional, the p values
associated with these slides are one-tailed; there was expected to be no relationship between
defensiveness and neuroticism for the Emotional Control slides, so the p values associated
with these slides are two-tailed.
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perceptual defence/vigilance. Much work still remains to be done on this
measure, however, and this will be discussed shortly.
The measures of perceptual defence/vigilance and neuroticism can to some
extent be examined for their external validity, by looking at participants'
responses to some of the questions on the Participant Information Form
which was filled out by all participants in experiments 4 and 7 (also, by all
participants in experiment 5, who had previously participated in experiment
4). One section of this form asks some questions aimed at finding out the
individual's 'mental adjustment', for want of a better term. Table 6.4 in
chapter 6 describes the responses of experiment 4's participants to these
questions, and table 9.7 in chapter 9 summarises the responses of experiment
7's participants. It was found that, when comparing the responses of
individuals who had been identified as perceptually defensive and
perceptually vigilant, defensive participants tended to show fewer signs of
mental health than vigilant participants. When compared to vigilant
individuals, a higher proportion of defensive individuals: 1. had practised a
'calming' mental discipline such as relaxation or meditation; 2. had
participated in a 'formal self-improvement' program such as psychotherapy;
3. showed signs of sleep disturbance; 4. had experienced a 'mental disorder'.
Whether this trend reflects neuroticism or defensiveness is not clear, since the
two are presumably not mutually exclusive; both seem to reflect characteristic
responses to anxiety or stress. However the trend does lend further support
to the notion that the measure of perceptual defence/vigilance has some
meaning in 'real life'.
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Unexpectedly, the studies in this thesis also found signs that males and
females might differ in their reactions to the subliminal emotional stimuli:
there appeared to be relatively few vigilant male participants. Chapter 6
noted that some of the earlier subliminal perception literature suggested that
males and females could show differing styles of defensive responding.
Specifically, it had been suggested that females might show a curvilinear
relationship between degree of stimulus emotionality and sensory threshold
(so that, with increasing stimulus emotionality, females' sensory thresholds
would increase to a point, and then begin to drop in the direction of
perceptual vigilance) whereas males might show a linear relationship
(increasing thresholds together with increasing stimulus emotionality). The
present studies did not allow the kind of systematic manipulation of stimulus
emotionality and measurement of thresholds that would be needed to
directly address the hypothesised sex difference in defensive responding. For
the moment, then, one can simply note that, given these suggestions of
possible sex differences in defensiveness/vigilance, one should be cautious
about generalising from the results of the DMT-ESP studies, since in these
studies the majority of participants were male.
3. Successful ESP performance: targets and call types.
A third major area of interest for this thesis was a process-oriented study of
psi performance when different kinds of forced choice ESP targets were used:
familiar versus unfamiliar; emotional versus neutral; simple emotional versus
complex emotional; and emotionally weak versus emotionally strong. There
has been little research into the characteristics of successful ESP targets, but
the dimensions of complexity, novelty, and emotionality are generally
considered by parapsychologists to be important, so this aspect of the thesis
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was intended to contribute to answering the question of what makes a good
ESP target. Attention was also paid to whether the participant reported an
'impression' of the target, or just a 'guess'. The reason for this manipulation
was to see whether participants had any 'insight' of times when they were
(correctly) responding to ESP impressions.
With the exception of experiment 5, whose participants were experienced at
clairvoyance tasks, overall psi performance was unimpressive in these
experiments. Looked at more closely, however, there appeared to be some
consistent trends for experiments 4 and 5: calls described as 'impressions'
scored more highly than 'guesses', and scoring was higher on complex than
on simple emotional targets. These trends were reversed by experiment 7,
however, so no conclusions may be drawn at this stage. Familiarity with the
target appeared not to be an important factor in these studies, and degree of
target emotionality, as rated by the participants themselves, did not appear to
be related to the likelihood of correctly identifying the target nature.
Experiments 4 and 7 both found lower ESP scoring for emotional targets
compared to neutral targets, while experiment 5, with experienced
participants, found little difference between emotional and neutral targets.
Finally, the relationship between 'implicit' and 'explicit' measures of ESP and
perceptual defence/vigilance was studied in experiment 7. It was argued that
Pandora's Box was an implicit indicator of perceptual defence/vigilance and,
as such, that one would expect to find higher correlations between scores on
Pandora's Box and an implicit measure of ESP (that is, an unconscious ESP
measure) than with an explicit (e.g. forced choice) ESP measure. Post hoc, this
pattern of scoring was, indeed, found in experiment 4 but it was not found in
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experiment 7, which had a higher explicit ESP-defensiveness correlation than
the implicit ESP-defensiveness correlation.
Conversely, it was also predicted that an 'explicit' measure of defensiveness
would correlate more highly with explicit than with implicit ESP. For
experiment 7, a recently developed questionnaire measure of 'Openness' was
used as an exploratory 'explicit' measure of defensiveness (acknowledging
that the relationship between the personality construct 'Openness' and
defensiveness was speculative). In line with theoretical expectations,
Openness correlated more highly with explicit than with implicit ESP.
However, since none of the latter correlations was statistically significant, and
since Openness may not in any case equate with 'lack of defensiveness', no
definite conclusions could be drawn at this early stage on the relationship
between implicit and explicit ESP and defensiveness measures. Perhaps, in a
future study, it would be more fruitful to use as an 'explicit' defensiveness
measure one of the established 'paper and pencil' measures of defensiveness
that was described in chapter 3.
Despite the partial failure to confirm the post hoc pattern seen in experiment 4
(between implicit and explicit measures of defensiveness and ESP), it was felt
that the methodology developed in this thesis was well-suited to such an
exploration of mode of responding to weak information, whether of
'extrasensory' or 'subliminal' origin.
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Future Research Suggestions
Throughout this thesis, suggestions have been made for future research.
Questions remaining unanswered include: sex differences in perceptual
defence/vigilance; the relationship between implicit and explicit measures of
defensiveness/vigilance and psi; the relationship between the DMT and
Pandora's Box, including whether the DMT measures high and low
defensiveness on a single dimension, and how these relate to perceptual
vigilance as defined in the subliminal perception paradigm adopted for this
thesis. These are all intriguing questions, but since a major part of this thesis
was concerned with the development of a new measure of perceptual
defence /vigilance, it seems appropriate to comment particularly on how this
aspect of the project should proceed from here.
Right from the outset of these studies, it became evident that any effects of
perceptual defence /vigilance to subliminally-presented emotional slides
'/ .
were not visible 'to the naked eye'. There were no overt signs of dramatically
different responding to the emotional slides compared to the other kinds of
slides that were presented. That there was any effect at all was only revealed
through the successfully predicted correlations between the subliminal
perception measure, neuroticism, and psi scores. Methodological changes
were introduced with the aim of strengthening signs of defensiveness/
vigilance, but with limited success.
The sense one has, from looking at the raw data, and from observing
participants' reactions to the test, is that there is great potential for extraneous
variability in scoring on Pandora's Box. When actually experiencing the test,
you are aware of dealing with a very 'labile' measure: some slides seem to
298
creep up and catch you unawares; others seem to take ages to appear;
attention can wander, and fatigue or boredom can dull your responses; the
stimulus slides gradually emerge rather than suddenly becoming visible, so
you are aware of some subjectivity in adopting a criterion for responding to
the slides and in attempting to apply this criterion consistently.
One important way of dealing with such potential for variability is to increase
the number of responses that participants are asked to make. In these studies,
participants responded to only 64 subliminal 'experimental' slides. With four
slide categories, that makes only 16 responses per category. It was hoped that
this would be sufficient to allow signs of defensiveness/vigilance to appear,
as they apparently did to some extent, but all along it has been acknowledged
that this is a relatively small number of trials for a possibly noisy measure.
Given the limited resources of time and money associated with a project such
as this, it was not possible to extend the defensiveness testing over two, or
more, longer sessions. Future studies of the Pandora's Box measure should,
however, attempt to increase the number of trials completed.
Another, related, question to be considered in the future is the role of the
Neutral and Neutral Control slides. These helped to spread out the possible
range of the ranks of averaged brightness scores for the four slide categories,
but except for the ratio measure of defensiveness, which did not appear to be
informative, N and NC scores did not form part of the critical defensiveness
measure. Dropping N and NC scores would enable one to double the number
of exposures to E and EC slides, while still maintaining the task at a
convenient and not too tiring length. Pilot research would be necessary,
however, to explore alternative scoring systems if N and NC slides were no
longer involved.
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Concerning the EC slides, which depicted incoherent lines and whose role
was to control for the physical characteristics of the matched E slides,
responses to these slides showed virtually no correlation with the main,
forced choice, ESP measure. This was as predicted. However, the novel
unconscious ESP measure, especially, correlated with responses to the EC
slides, significantly so for the criterion participants in experiments 4 and 7.
How might this come about? Looking at participants' scoring patterns, there
did not seem to be any systematic relationship between participants'
responses to E and EC slides (responding quickly to E and slowly to EC, or
responding quickly to both, for instance) that might account for the occasional
relatively strong EC correlations. It has already been pointed out that the
ranked scoring system used in this thesis means that the ranks allocated to
one slide category are not independent of the others. Therefore if, say, a
strong positive correlation is found for E slides, one would be quite likely to
find a negative correlation for EC slides. One would, however, expect the
correlation for E slides to be greater than for EC slides if the 'defensiveness'
effect resides, as expected, with the Emotional slides, and this is usually the
case. At the present, then, one cannot ascertain whether the control slide
correlations with some of the main measures in this thesis may be attributed
to chance, to artefact, or to some other as yet unidentified factor. This
question should be explored in more detail in further research, but the size
and consistency of the effect that is seen for the Emotional slides in relation to
the other main measures of ESP and neuroticism, and in contrast to the
generally smaller and inconsistent effect for the Emotional Control slides,
testifies against the argument that the real effect lies with the EC slides so that
the E correlations are artefactual.
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Another important question that was not addressed by the studies in this
thesis, due again to time and money constraints, was that of the test-retest
reliability of the novel measure of perceptual defence/vigilance. The
development of any new psychological test is a huge exercise. Done well,
hundreds if not thousands of participants should take the measure to
establish population norms. The new test should be exhaustively compared to
other possibly related tests, and the stability of scoring from one sitting to
another should be known. Although experiments 2 and 5 administered the
measure of perceptual defence/vigilance twice, in each case participants
intensively practised various mental techniques in the interim, techniques
such as relaxation which could conceivably affect an individual's defensive
reactions. Taken together with the small number of participants in
experiments 2 and 5, it was considered that any formal test-retest statistics
would be invalid and unhelpful.
Related to these considerations of the development and the validity of the
prototype indicator of perceptual defence/vigilance is the question of the
process underlying the apparent perceptual defence/vigilance effect. It has
already been pointed out that perceptual defence and vigilance within the
subliminal perception paradigm is defined in physiological terms as
differential fluctuations in sensory thresholds for emotional versus neutral
stimuli. Little attempt has been made within the subliminal perception
literature to integrate this conceptualisation of defensiveness with that seen
with the psychoanalytic tradition, where drives and motivations are felt to
underlie the defence mechanisms. It is not clear whether the two traditions
are merely setting a single phenomenon within different theoretical contexts,
or whether they are considering the phenomenon at different levels of
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description, or whether perceptual defence is something distinct from
'Freudian' defensiveness.
It has already been noted that, regardless of how they conceptualise
defensiveness, parapsychologists have found defensiveness to associate quite
consistently with relatively poor psi performance. This would suggest that
perceptual defence is closely identified with 'psychodynamic' defence (even
though the former is defined more narrowly than the latter), or (and not
necessarily mutually exclusive of the first interpretation) that the two notions
of defence relate similarly to a third, commonly shared, factor (for instance,
characteristic reactions to stress or anxiety). One way to begin to untangle
these issues would be to take measures of physiological arousal while
participants respond to different tests of defensiveness. Specifically for the
Pandora's Box measure, therefore, one would note fluctuations in
participants' physiological arousal while they are performing the slide-
presence task, to see whether there was any systematic relationship between
physiological arousal and apparent threshold changes for emotional slides. If
there was no relationship between physiological arousal and apparent
threshold changes for emotional slides, then this would argue against the
importance of a physiological model for explaining perceptual defence and
vigilance. However, if there was a systematic arousal-perceptual
defensiveness relationship then this would still not distinguish between the
respective contributions of the psychodynamic and physiological models
(assuming that the two need not be mutually exclusive), since unconscious
motivations and conflicts would be expected to be associated with changes in
physiological arousal. If one could find a way of demonstrating the operation
of defence mechanisms using a test (such as the DMT) based on
psychodynamic assumptions, without finding any concurrent signs of
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systematic fluctuations in physiological arousal, then this would suggest that
sensory or perceptual effects are neither necessary or sufficient to account for
apparent perceptual distortions to emotive stimuli. This would be a
challenging future project, however, since the most sensitive and labile
indicators of physiological arousal, such as the galvanic skin response, are by
nature very noisy measures so that any underlying physiological effect could
easily be swamped by other influences, much as a sensitive EEG record can
be influenced by simple eye-blinks or other body movements.
Conclusion
In sum, the most that can confidently be said about the Pandora's Box
technique developed in this thesis is that, as a prototype instrument, it has
shown promise as an indicator of perceptual defence/vigilance and therefore
as a tool to facilitate the study of the defensiveness-psi relationship, and as a
predictor of psi performance on related tasks. Defensiveness was found to
relate to questionnaire measures of neuroticism (with the more defensive
being more neurotic), and of mental health (with the more defensive showing
fewer signs of mental health).
It is acknowledged that far more work must be done before Pandora's Box
can seriously be considered as an alternative or a complement to the DMT.
Nevertheless, the correlation between perceptual defence/vigilance and
forced choice ESP (rs=.27 for the 67 criterion participants in experiments 4
and 7, p=.0152, 1-t) seen in the studies conducted for this thesis compares
favourably with that for the 16 DMT-ESP studies (rs=.16, n=582, p-.00014,
2-t). This could be regarded as a successful conceptual replication of the
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DMT-ESP studies, using a methodology that may be easier than the DMT
methodology for others to attempt to replicate.
In a series of 10 DMT-ESP studies, no correlations were found between
overall DMT scores and Eysenck's Neuroticism, Extraversion, and
Psychoticism (Haraldsson & Houtkooper, 1992), while Cooper & Kline (1986)
did not find the predicted relationship between the Repression scale of the
DMT and Wallace & Worthington's (1970) measure of perceptual defence.
The measure of perceptual defence/vigilance developed in this thesis did,
however, show a consistent and sizeable correlation with Eysenck's
Neuroticism (rs=.42, for the 67 criterion participants in experiments 4 and 7,
p=.0003, 1-t). As perceptual defence could be considered as one possible
manifestation of a neurotic personality style (Costa & McCrae, 1992; Costa,
Zonderman, & McCrae, 1991; McCrae & Costa, 1986; Kreitler & Kreitler, 1990;




, With further, more systematic development, then, the Pandora's Box
methodology may come to be a useful tool for parapsychologists and
psychologists alike. Its potential application ranges widely: the selection of
, - *
individuals likely to score well at ESP; the detailed examination of process-
related questions including the best target-personality-methodology
combinations for successful ESP scoring; the possible practical use in
occupational psychology (like the DMT) as a selection measure to identify
those individuals best suited to rapidly identifying possibly stressful or
threatening information; and, perhaps most usefully, to facilitate the
exploration of ways that individuals might recognise and change their
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habitual defensive responses for the better. These goals are still a long way
down the road, but this thesis has taken a step in the right direction.
305
































































































































































































TITLE ONi\i&2Siry Or &>/NhyPt>rt,
*>FfT. AS^CHOLOOV .
SAScn?os.L7/*-t//US£c2JrAJ7~ Prk^cA-S
OO^TpO^ /Soy GftCu'T iVHiS-SVHW.
fro? tyMoi wt W A-rr )
DRAWN TRACED CHECKED APPROVED DATE
's/g/tr}
DRAWING No.
6- 1 7 . 8 1 9 10
307
Appendix 2.Technical data on potentiometer used for
measuring electroluminescent panels' light output.
Issued July 1987 8098
m Digitally controlled potentiometer ic's
DataJUbrary X9103'X9503 and X9104
Stock numbers 636-182, 636-198 and 636-205
Three non-volatile potentiometers with maximum re¬
sistance values of lOkfl, 50kH and lOOkfl. Packaged m
compact 8-pin dil packages, ideal for use in digitally
controlled resistance trimming applications.
Each device contains a resistor array composed of 99
resistive elements. Between each element and at either
end are tap points accessible to the wiper element. The
position onhe wiper element on the array is controlled
by the CS, U/D, and INC inputs. The position of the
wiper can be stored in nonvolatile memory and is
recalled upon a subsequent power-up.
Resolution is equal to the maximum resistance value
divided by 99. As an example; for the X9503 (50k ohms)
each tap point represents 505 ohms.
Absolute maximum ratings
Temperature under bias =-65°C to + 135°C
Storage temperature -6S°C to + 150°C
Voltage on CS, INC, U/D and Vcc
referenced to ground .-1.0V to +7.0V
Voltage on VH and VL
referenced to ground .-8.0V to +8.0V
Lead temperature (soldering, 10 seconds) +300°C
Wiper current ± 1mA
Stresses above those listed under 'Absolute maximum ratings' may
cause permanent damage to the device. This is a stress rating only
and the functional operation of the device at these or any other
conditions above those indicated in the operational sections of this
specification is not implied Exposure to absolute maximum rating
conditions lor extended periods may affect device reliability
Features
• Sold state reliability
• Single chip MOS implementation
• Three wire TTL control
• Operates from standard 5V supply
• Wide analogue voltage range ±5V min
• 99 resistive elements temperature compensated
±20% end to end resistance range
• 100 wiper tap points
Wiper position digitally controlled
Wiper position stored in nonvolatile memory then
automatically recalled on power-up
• 100 year wiper position retention
• Compact 8-pin package.
Pin connections
IHC[£





dc operating characteristics TA = 0°C to +70°C, Vcc = +5V ± 10%, unless otherwise specified
Parameter Symbol Test Conditions
Limits
UnitsMin. Type.<J) Max.
Active supply current Icc JSs v,L 25 - 35 mA
Input leakage current Ili v,„ - ov to 5.5v, Inc. u/B, cS ±10 nA
Input high voltage llh 20 Vcc 4* 1-h V
Input low voltage V,l -1.0 0.8 V
Wiper resistance Rw ±lmA 40 100 ohms
vh voltage Vvh -SO +5.0 V
VL voltage VvL -SO +5.0 V
SS. INC, U/D. input
capacitance
c,n(3> 10 pF
Noim. (1) 1 LSB- RtoV99
(2) Typical values are tor T» - 25*C and nominal supply voltage





End to end resistance tolerance _



















(volatile mode while chip is selected)




Operating 0°C to +70°C
Storage -65°C to + 150°C




CS to INC setup tot 100 ns
INC high to U/D change t|D 100 ns
U/D to INC setup tpi 2.9 MS
INC low period t|L 1 MS
INC high period tlH 3 MS
INC inactive to CS inactive tic 1 MS
CS deselect time tcPH 20 ms
INC to Vw change •tw 100 500 MS
Note. (1) Typical values are tor TA = 25*C and nominal supply voltage
ac conditions of test
Input pulse levels 0 to 3.0 volts
Input rise and fall times lOnsec
Input 15 volts
Mode selection
C5 mc U/I5 Mode Power
L H Wiper up Active
L L Wiper down Active
-J H X Store wiper position Active












Figure 2 Functional diagram
Pin descriptions
VH High terminal of pot
Vw Wiper terminal of pot




INC Wiper movement control
£S Chip select for wiper movement
The state of U/D may be changed while CS remains
LOW, allowing a gross then fine adjustment dunng
system calibration
If Vcc is removed while CS is LOW the contents of the
nonvolatile memory may be lost.
The end to end resistance of the array will fluctuate
once Vcc is removed.
Applications
The combination of a digital interface and nonvolatile
memory in a silicon based trimmer pot provides many
application opportunities that could not be addressed
by either mechanical potentiometers or digital to ana¬
logue circuits. The digitally controlled potentiometer
addresses and solves many issues that are of concern to
designers of a wide range of equipment.
Consider the possibilities:
Automated assembly line calibration versus mechanic¬
al tweaking of potentiometers.
Protection against drift due to vibration or contamina¬
tion.
Eliminate precise alignment of PWB mounted potentio¬
meters with case access holes.
Eliminate unsightly access holes on otherwise aestheti¬
cally pleasing enclosures.
Product enhancements such as keyboard adjustment of
volume or brightness control.
Front panel microprocessor controlled calibranon of
test instruments.
Remote locahon calibration via radio, modem or LAN
link.
Calibration of hard to reach instruments in confined
spaces.
The high terminal of the digitally controlled potentio¬
meter is capable of handling an input voltage from -5 to
+5 volts.
VL
The low terminal input is limited from -S to +5 volts.
The wiiper terminal series resistance is typically less
than 40 ohms The value of the wipier is controlled by
the use of U/D and INC.
UpVDown (II/D)
The U/D input controls the direction of the wipier
movement and the value of the nonvolatile counter.
Increment (INC)
The INC input is negative-edge triggered. Toggling
INC will move the wipier and either mcrement or
decrement the counter in the direction indicated by the
logic level on the U/D input.
Chip select (CS)
The device is selected when the CS input is LOW. The
current counter value is stored in nonvolatile memory
when CS is returned HIGH.
Device operation
The INC, U/D and CS inputs control the movement of
the wipier along the resistor array. HIGH to LOW
transitions on INC, with CS LOW, increment (U/D =
HIGH) or decrement (U/D = LOW) an internal counter.
The output of the counter is decoded to pxasition the
wipier. When CS is brought HIGH the counter value is
automatically stored in the non-volatile memory. Upon
p>ower-up the nonvolatile memory contents are res¬
tored to the counter.







































Wiper @ Tap 50
Ampl. « 2Vrms
Test Circuit #1
K«y: - 1st harmonic
2nd harmonic
• 3rd harmontc




























Wiper @ Tep 50
Wiper resistance
Test Circuit #2
RS Components Ltd. PO Box 99. Corby, Northants. NN17 9RS Telephone; 0536 201234
An Qectrocomponents Company ©RS Components Ltd. 1987
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Appendix 3.Technical data on amplifier used in control
circuit for electroluminescent panels.
5 WATT AUDIO AMP
This kit features a very compact audio amplifier suitable for use as an output stage for a
wide range of equipment. The size of the amp should enable it to be incorporated into
existing cases or to be constructed as a stand alone unit.
Due to its rather high current consumption the amplifier is not suitable for battery use.
However, its supply requirements make it ideally suited for use with in-car entertainment
units, possibly as a replacement for a defunct output stage.
CONSTRUCTION
The only difficulty that should be encountered in
assembling the kit is with the mounting of the IC
and the heatsink on the PCB. Firstly, Fit the 5 PCB
pins followed by the remaining components,
taking core over the orientation of the electrolytic
capacitors.
Insert and solder the IC so that the body is
raised approximately 5mm above the board.
Position the heatsink so that the tabs on its base
pass through the holes provided in the PCB, and
then bend the tabs outwards to secure it. Finally,
bolt the IC directly to the heatsink.
If the amplifier is to be used in a car, care must
be taken over earthing, although with negative
earth this presents no real problems.
312
CIRCUIT DESCRIPTION
The low component count was made possible by
utilising the TDA2002 integrated circuit. This is a
complete doss B audio amplifier, designed to
deliver a high power output into low impedance
loads. Short rircvit protection, over voltage
protection and thermal shutdown are all provided
internally.
The circuit is a straightforward application of
the TDA2002 with additional precautions against
instability — R1 and C2 on the input and the R5/
C7 Zobel network on the output. The input signal
is fed via CI to pin 1 of the IC and the output from
pin 4 is coupled to the loudspeaker via C6. There
are two feedback networks between pins 2 and
4: C4 and R2, which control the bandwidth and
R3. R4 and C3 which determine the dosed loop
gain (R3/R4 = 220/2.2 = 100). C5 and C8
provide supply roil decoupling, thus enabling the
IC to draw peaks of heavy current without the

























36 x 48 x 33mm
Note: Will also drive 20 loads, with increase in
power output but requires slightly larger heatsinlc.
PARTS LIST


















































Appendix 4. Stimulus panel calibration tables.
The following tables give the details of the calibration of the stimulus electroluminescent
panel for the apparatus measuring perceptual defence/vigilance. Step refers to the 99
incremental steps of brightness that the BBC microcomputer causes the stimulus
electroluminescent panel to produce. Volts refers to the voltage produced by a photodiode
in response to light stimulation from the stimulus electroluminescent panel. The photodiode
is positioned so that the light measured is equivalent to that illuminating a stimulus slide.
Lux refers to the incident illumination at the location of a stimulus slide, and is calculated by
multiplying the voltage produced by the photodiode by 7.14. Table 1 gives the figures for
August 1989; table 2 gives, for purposes of comparison, figures for November 1990.
Table 1
Stimulus panel calibration figures, August 1989
Step Volts Lux Step Volts Lux Step Volts Lux
1 0.168 1.200 34 0.316 2.256 67 0.903 6.447
2 0.169 1.201 35 0.328 2.342 68 0.926 6.612
3 0.170 1.214 36 0.340 2.428 69 0.950 6.783
4 0.171 1.221 37 0.352 2.513 70 0.974 6.954
5 0.172 1.228 38 0.365 2.606 71 0.998 7.126
6 0.173 1.235 39 0.378 2.699 72 1.023 7.304
7 0.174 1.242 40 0.392 2.799 73 1.047 7.476
8 0.176 1.257 41 0.406 2.899 74 1.075 7.676
9 0.177 1.264 42 0.422 3.013 75 1.100 7.854
10 0.179 1.278 43 0.437 3.120 76 1.126 8.040
11 0.181 1.292 44 0.452 3.227 77 1.152 8.225
12 0.183 1.307 45 0.468 3.342 78 1.179 8.418
13 0.186 1.328 46 0.484 3.456 79 1.205 8.604
14 0.188 1.342 47 0.500 3.570 80 1.232 8.796
15 0.191 1.364 48 0.518 3.699 81 1.260 8.996
16 0.195 1.392 49 0.538 3.841 82 1.288 9.196
17 0.198 1.414 50 0.556 3.970 83 1.316 9.396
18 0.201 1.435 51 0.574 4.098 84 1.345 9.603
19 0.205 1.464 52 0.591 4.220 85 1.374 9.810
20 0.210 1.499 53 0.609 4.348 86 1.403 10.017
21 0.215 1.535 54 0.628 4.484 87 1.431 10.217
22 0.220 1.571 55 0.648 4.627 88 1.461 10.432
23 0.225 1.607 56 0.667 4.762 89 1.490 10.639
24 0.230 1.642 57 0.687 4.905 90 1.520 10.853
25 0.236 1.685 58 0.708 5.055 91 1.549 11.060
26 0.243 1.735 59 0.728 5.198 92 1.579 11.274
27 0.252 1.799 60 0.748 5.341 93 1.609 11.488
28 0.260 1.856 61 0.769 5.491 94 1.639 11.702
29 0.268 1.914 62 0.791 5.648 95 1.670 11.924
30 0.276 1.971 63 0.813 5.805 96 1.700 12.138
31 0.285 2.035 64 0.835 5.962 97 1.731 12.359
32 0.294 2.099 65 0.857 6.119 98 1.762 12.581




Stimulus panel calibration figures, November 1990
Step Volts Lux Step Volts Lux Step Volts Lux
1 0.159 1.132 34 0.334 2.385 67 0.977 6.976
2 0.160 1.139 35 0.346 2.470 68 1.001 7.147
3 0.161 1.147 36 0.360 2.570 69 1.027 7.333
4 0.161 1.152 37 0.376 2.685 70 1.053 7.518
5 0.162 1.159 38 0.391 2.792 71 1,078 7.697
6 0.163 1.167 39 0.408 2.913 72 1.104 7.883
7 0.165 1.176 40 0.423 3.020 73 1.131 8.075
8 0.166 1.186 41 0.438 3.127 74 1.157 8.261
9 0.168 1.201 42 0.454 3.242 75 1.184 8.454
10 0.170 1.215 43 0.471 3.363 76 1.211 8.647
11 0.172 1.230 44 0.488 3.484 77 1.238 8.839
12 0.175 1.251 45 0.506 3.613 78 1.265 9.032
13 0.178 1.269 46 0.524 3.741 79 1.292 9.225
14 0.180 1.288 47 0.543 3.877 80 1.320 9.425
15 0.184 1.311 48 0.561 4.006 81 1.349 9.632
16 0.187 1.338 49 0.580 4.141 82 1.378 9.839
17 0.192 1.368 50 0.600 4.284 83 1.407 10.046
18 0.196 1.399 51 0.620 4.427 84 1.436 10.253
19 0.203 1.449 52 0.640 4.570 85 1.465 10.460
20 0.208 1.485 53 0.660 4.712 86 1.495 10.674
21 0.213 1.521 54 0.680 4.855 87 1.525 10.889
22 0.219 1.564 55 0.701 5.005 88 1.554 11.096
23 0.225 1.607 56 0.722 5.155 89 1.586 11.324
24 0.232 1.656 57 0.744 5.312 90 1.616 11.538
25 0.239 1.706 58 0.766 5.469 91 1.648 11.767
26 0.249 1.778 59 0.788 5.626 92 1.679 11.988
27 0.257 1.835 60 0.810 5.783 93 1.711 12.217
28 0.266 1.899 61 0.833 5.948 94 1.743 12.445
29 0.275 1.964 62 0.856 6.112 95 1.775 12.674
30 0.285 2.035 63 0.880 6.283 96 1.807 12.902
31 0.297 2.121 64 0.904 6.455 97 1.840 13.138
32 0.309 2.206 65 0.927 6.619 98 1.873 13.373
33 0.321 2.292 66 0.952 6.797 99 1.906 13.609
100 1.938 13.837
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Appendix 5. BBC Basic program used to run
defensiveness testing session in experiment 7.
10 NOI'E 3
20 F'ROC Initial i se
30 PROCintroduce
50 PROCdemo
120 PROCpract ice_tr ia 1 s
125 PROCpause ( 1 50) : REM to simulate manual Slide change
13<"> VDI.l'7
110 ran elide--6 7 0 22
1 15 , .
110 f>ROCchange_B l I de
l 50 PROCrande I ay
160 PROCtitrate
175 F'RIMTC channel, clicks
IPO PROCrerrt










320 UNTIL button' 1
325 VDl 17
400 EOR slide*-! TO 17
405 I j
406 PROCchange_s1idp
4 10 PROCramie 1 ay
420 PROCt i trate











650 UNTIL butt on-1
65? VDU7


















671 UU1JL. but ton* t
696 VDt 17
673 FOR sllde^i TO J 7
7 OO : !
702 F'ROCchange_s 1 1 de
701 FROC'r andc l ay
706 PROOt 1 trate
70S PR INT£ channel, clicks
710 PROCreset





710 PRINT "End of session. Thank you for participating."
IjtOO 8 8
900 END
972 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 1 t 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 I 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 ! 8 8
lOOO DEF PROCreset
101O PROCset (via*/., 9)
1020 PROCset < vi a", 1) :REM Direction downwards
1030 TOR i^O TO 97
1032 PROCset (v 1 a*/., 2)
1031 REM PROCpnuse<I)
i036 PROC-clear < viaX, 2)
1033 REM PROC'paur.r* 1 >
1010 NEXT I
1070 ENHPRIIC
1072 I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I II I I I I I I I I I I I I t I I I I I I I I II I t I I I I I I I I I I t I I I I I 8 I 8 8 I I 8 8 I
ll 00 DEE PROCch«ngr»_s l l dp
I I I O * root or I
l120 FROCpause(50>





2012 v 1 aPDR'/.«*?'FE62
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Appendix 6. Full set of stimuli used in defensiveness
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